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Why
the Soviets Can't Feed Themselves
Did you know that before the
1917 revolution Czarist
Russia was the world's
leading grain exporter?
Yet today, after 65 years
of central planning, the
biggest problem facing the
leaders of the Soviet Union is
not the arms race or
Afghanistan.
1t
is the chronic
failure of Soviet agriculture to
grow enough food for the
nation' s needs.
For the fourth year in a
row, the Soviets are tacing a
poor grain harvest. This
year's yield alone will fall 68
million metric tons (a metric
ton is 2,205 pounds) short of
the Kremlin 's projections.
This will mean still more
grain imports and a continued
drain on dwindling hard
currency reserves.
Today, the Soviets not only
import grain (they import the
largest amount in the world),
but also other staples like
eggs and butter from the
E.E.C. and meat from
Argentina.
Why can 't the Soviet Union
leed itself?
The problems with Soviet
agriculture are manifold. First,
the collective farm concept
along with state planning has
not preved workable.
By contras!, the small
family plot, accounting for
only three percent of the land
under cultivation, provides
nearly 30 percent of the
Soviet Union's total
agricultura! output.
Why?
The biggest reason is
incentive. The small family
plot or
prusadebny
(Russian
for "near the house"), can
net the grower nearly one
third of his annual income.
The problem with the wage
incentives offered by the
State is that they are not
enough lo enable farm
laborers lo buy the luxury
items they most desire in their
consumer-goods-poor
society.
Sorne officials blame the
weather for poor Soviet
yields. Yet last November, Mr.
Brezhnev told the Central
Committee lo stop blaming
the weather. He said:
"Experience of many years
has shown that we have
weather unfavorable for
agriculture almos! every year.
Consequently, it should be
viewed not as an exception,
but as a usual, natural
phenomenon for our climate. "
Brezhnev, like other Soviet
leaders, knows that the real
problems of Soviet agriculture
are serious. The Soviets have
poured nearly 27 percent of
their state investment into
agriculture - more than any
nation.
Additionally, the USSR
employs about 27 million
people in agriculture (more
than 10 times the U.S. figure) .
Still more people - one
figure estimates 15.6 million
- are drafted from industry
for farm labor at the peak of
harvest.
Yet the shortfalls exist.
Much of the problem stems
from spoilage and rot.
According to Soviet figures,
20 percent of their potatoes,
20 percent of their sugar
beets, 20 percent of their
vegetables and 18 percent of
their fruit spoil because of
inadequate storage.
Other problems occur in
machinery. Much of it is ill
maintained and spare parts
are hard to come by. Most
farm experts believe there is
just not enough farm
machinery to do the job in
the Soviet Union.
On May 24 of this year,
Presiden! Brezhnev unveiled
the Kremlin 's plan for
overcoming the USSR's food
problems.
Essentially the plan would
put more money into
improving farm lite and meat,
grain and milk production.
Brezhnev, however, made it
clear that there would be no
radical departure from the
state collective farm system,
which he called a
" scientifically corree! policy."
However, given the
success of the
prusadebny,
it
would seem that Brezhnev,
trapped by 65 years of
rhetoric, has missed the
point . The failure of Soviet
agriculture líes not with the
Russian farmer, but with !he
lack of an adequate incentive
to produce. This mistake will
necessitate more long-range
grain deals similar to the
curren! agreement the Soviets
have with Argentina.
One such deal currently
being talked about could be
again with the U.S. Many
Americans have forgotten
the expert Russian grain
deals of the early '70s.
Ouring that period, the
Soviets privately and quietly
bought so much U.S. grain
that domestic grain prices
rose severa! times their
former price. In effect, the
American consumer
subsidized the Soviet grain
purchase by incurring higher
domestic prices.
Why is North America so
blessed in agriculture?
Furthermore, why would the
U.S. sell food to its worst
perceived enemy? The
astounding answers were
long ago recorded in the
Bible!
Most people have never
understood that the biblical
promises of special prosperity
were pledged to the birthright
tribe of Joseph in the ancient
nation of Israel (Gen. 49:10,
1
Chron. 5:2).
These material blessings
promised to Joseph's
descendants were inherited
by no other people than the
white English-speaking
peoples of today. For a vital
understanding of
why
the
white, English-speaking world
possesses such agricultura!
blessings, write for our free
book,
The United States and
Britain in Prophecy.
But these
blessings were conditional,
contingent on obedience to
God's laws.
In fact one of the prices for
disobedience would be the
current dilemma facing the
United States: lo sell its
perceived enemy the food it
needs or pul the U.S. farmers
out of business.
God says: "And you shall
sow your seed in vain, for
your enemies shall eat it"
(Lev. 26: 16, last part, RSV) .
ldeology has blinded Soviet
Agricultura! Policy. But, Soviet
leaders are wise enough to
recognize that unless they
provide adequate food for
their people they will be
facing interna! turmoil among
the hungry Russian
masses. o
ing est imated $195 billion by the
end of this year.
In 1980, the average farm family
in the state of Georgia had a net
income of j ust $705. Last year,
net income for farm families in
southwestern Minnesota was only
$ 1,059. By comparison, United
States per capita income in 1980
was up to $9,521.
J ames Plax ico of Ok lahoma
State University predicts that net
U.S. farm income, in real terms,
for 1982 may be less than the
record low of 1933.
10
Unless condit ions improve, and
soon, a growing exodus of Ameri–
can farmers wi ll join the 37,000 in
1980 and the thousands more in
198 1 and 1982 who have left the
(Continued on page 37)
The
PLAIN TRUTH