Basic HTML Version
mented the Arab world, with coun–
tries d ivided in their support.
Syria and Libya, for example,
support Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran.
Jordan, on the other hand , openly
supports lraq. Earlier this year,
J ordan's King Hussein sent volun–
teer Jordanian troops (known as
the Yarmouk Force) to aid Iraqi
forces fighting Iran. King Hussein
sees the Khomeini brand of Islamic
fundamentalism as a threat aimed
not only at Iraq, but also at Jordan
and the entire Arab World.
"What is at stake is the very
future of the Arab world as we
know it," King Hussein declares.
He calls Iran's effort to export its
revolution "a sinister, almost crimi–
nal attempt to create a rift between
Moslems."
King Hussein 's a lliance with
l raq has considerably strengthened
Jordan in the face of a possible
Syrian threat. Iraq is also a major
rival of Syria. The J ordan-Iraq
entente thus presents Syria with
the prospect of 600 miles of poten–
tially hostile borders. Syria fears
that a new political axis comprising
l raq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia may
be in the making.
Lebanese Tinderbox
The story is not yet complete. Yet
another threat to peace Iooms near
J ordan's borders-inside the bitter–
ly divided nation of Lebanon.
This war-torn country--<mce the
banking and trading center of the
Arab world- has been rent asunder
in recent years by divisive infight–
ing and intervention by outside
powers. In June, Israelí troops,
backed by tanks and jet fighters,
struck Palestinian guerrilla posi–
t ions in what was lsrael's deepest
penetration of Lebanon to date.
This invasion- designed to smash
the Palestine Liberation Organiza–
tion's military structure in sou thern
Lebanon-brought Israelí forces to
the gates of Beirut. The PLO suf–
fered heavy losses, from which it
will not soon recover.
Despite the setbacks, the PLO
declares it will carry on the fight.
Observers are quick to point out that
the PLO has not been destroyed,
only weakened in Lebanon. No one
has yet written off the PLO or its role
within Lebanon. In the long term,
Lebanon remains a potential Middle
August 1982
East tinderbox- and as such, a
major concern to Jordanians.
Search for Peace
Any one of the numerous threats to
peace we have examined could trig–
ger a sudden blowup in the Middle
East, with wide implications for
J ordan.
J ordan's concerns, as we have
seen, are not centered exclusively on
its relat ions with Israel. Many of the
tensions besetting the region have
nothing whatsoever to do with
Israel.
Yet Israel
is
unquestionably a
major concern of J ordan. Jordan
shares a longer border with Is rael
than does any other Arab country.
Consequently, Jordan has been
closely following developments on
the West Bank, as well as the ongo–
ing attempts to achieve a nego–
tiated peace in the long-standing
Arab-Israeli dispute.
King Hussein has steered a
guarded course since the disastrous
S ix-Day War against Israel in
1967. It was then that J ordan lost
the fertile West Bank-acquired
by war in 1948- to Israelí forces.
King Hussein's approach toward
the American-sponsored Camp Da–
vid peace process is a case in point.
The Camp David framework–
which brought about the Egyptian–
l sraeli peace treaty and the Israelí
withdrawal from the
Sinai~lls
for
negotiations leading to sorne sort of
autonomy for the Palestinian Arabs
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Jordan surprised sorne Middle
East experts by joining most of the
Arab world in condemning Camp
David.
Why?
King Hussein sensed from the
outset what sorne observers are j ust
now beginning to realize: the Camp
David approach will not succeed
because Israel is determined not to
withdraw from the strategic West
Bank. T he King clearly perceived
that Israel viewed the now-relin–
quished Sinai península completely
differently from the mi litarily cru–
cial West Bank. Therefore, he con–
cluded , Israel would not voluntari ly
yield effective control over the occu–
pied West Bank, despite talk of a
vaguely defined autonomy for the
area.
Is raeli settlements on the West
Bank-now numbering more than
80 and con taining sorne 25,000
J ewish inha bitants- continue to
increase in number. King Hussein
sees this as a clear signa! that Israel
has no intention of ever withdraw–
ing from the occupied area. More–
over, as the Camp David autonomy
nego tiation s remai n in limbo,
rumors of possible Israelí
annexa–
tion
of the West Bank persist.
Is rael's annexation of the Golan
Heights region has heightened sus–
picions in this regard.
With no l srael i commitment
toward withdrawal in sight, King
Hussein will have nothing to do
with Camp David. In fact , he
believes that with the Sinai with–
drawal now completed , the end is in
sight for Camp David.
"The Palestinian autonomy pro–
posals wi ll never work," King Hus–
sein declares. " Israel now says that
the occupied territories belong to
I srael. The Arabs say the occupa–
tion must end and the people
granted self-determination. 1 can–
not see how these two positions can
be reconci led."
From the standpoint of this pres–
ent world, this tangled dilemma
is
indeed an unsolvable problem!
The " Jordanlan Optlon"
Yet the search for peace cont inues.
While King Hussein has refused to
take part with Egypt in the Camp
David peace process, he has also
refused to side with radical Arab
s tates who reject any kind o f
accommodation with Israel.
In Washington's view, a key
ingredient for success with any plan
is the participation of Jordan. Jordan
has a vast Palestinian population of
its own-perhaps even a Palestinian
majority. Around half of Jordan's
3.3 million people are Palestinian
Arabs, most of whom are refugees
from past Arab- Is raeli wars.
In view of this, American policy–
makers have long hoped that Jor–
dan might one day enter the peace
process, possibly as a spokesman
for the Palestinian cause. Sorne
have envisioned Israel swapping the
West Bank back to J ordan in
exchange for security guarantees,
as it did the Sinai with Egypt.
There are reports that sorne Pales–
tinians living in the Israeli-occupied
(Continued on page 43)
5