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SHOWDOWN
(Continued from page 4)
(Gen.
49:1)
to blos·som in to a
great "multitude" of nations- an
empire and later a multinational
commonwealth (Gen. 48:
19).
Manasseh meanwhile- the
Uníted States-was prophesied in
Jacob's blessing to become a sin–
gle great power (same verse).
While the United S tates ini–
tially sat on the fence, trying to
mediate between "two friends,"
the British received salid support
from an area where support has
not always been forthcoming- its
fellow members of the European
Community (Common Market).
The EC solidly backed up Brit–
ain's request for community-wide
sanctions against Argentina.
This initial Common Market
support softened in view of the
sinking of the
General Be/grano.
France and West Germany ex–
pressed dismay over the incident.
The Republic of Ireland, in fact,
has now labeled Britaín an aggres–
sor.
But then carne the sinking of
the H.M.S.
Sheffield
which made
the question of "aggressor" irrele–
vant.
ls Britain risking isolation in a
South Atlantic -war of attrition,
much as the U.S. became en–
snared in Vietnam?
The U.S. government on the
other hand initially displayed
reluctance in cutting ties to
Argentina, a nation that Washing–
ton has hoped would help it in
anticommunist struggles in Cen–
tral America.
Argentina is not a brother nation
descended from the patriarch
Joseph, but a recently hired "lover"
(Jer. 30:
14) ,
a nondemocratic
country that would hardly aid the
U.S. in a reverse situation.
Argentina's Record
Argentina was a nation of open pro–
Nazi sentiment in World War
11.
Afterward, it provided a safe haven
for Aeeing Nazi war criminals. At
the time when former President
J immy Carter called for a world
grain embargo against the Soviet
Union in the wake of its invasion of
Afghanistan, Argentina respond–
June/ July 1982
ed- by breaking the embargo.
Russia takes more th an three
fourths of Argentine wheat ex–
ports.
Yet the United States ambassa–
dor to the United Nations declined
to cancel an invitation to dinner at
the Argentine embassy in Wash–
ington, D.C., the very night of the
attack on the Falklands.
Evil Precedent Set
The April
10
issue of Britain's
The Economist
editorialized: "For
America to lie low will only di–
mínish, irrevocably, its leverage
with both [Britain and Argenti–
na]. By lying low it would cede to
Argentina, and to other South
Americans, the notion that their
''
The United States
could end
up the biggest loser
of all in the
Falklands crisis.
''
great northern neighbour is pow–
erless to hinder even their wildest
actions."
There are at least 20 border
conflicts in Latín America that
could be inflamed by this evil
precedent.
Chilean officials are worried that
the Argentines, if successful in the
Falklands, will try next to wrest
from them three contested Beagle
Channel islands at the tip of South
America.
Meanwhile, Peru and Bolivia
side with Argentina on its disputes
with Britain and Chile. Both would
like to recover parts of northern
Chile which they lost
100
years ago
in the War of the Pacific.
In Central America, Guatemala
has shown its support for Argen-·
tina and received inspiration to
press its claims against all of
neighboring Belize, formerly Brit–
ish Honduras. Only the presenee
of a contingent of British military
men in Belize prevents a Guate–
maJan walkover.
U.S. Caught in the Middle
"Equally," added
The Economist,
"for American inaction to cause
Britain to lose the whole dispute to
Argentina would cede to those in
Britain and elsewhere in Europe
the notion that the leader of their
North Atlantic alliance is a fair–
weather ally."
Yet, curiously, the United States
could end up the biggest loser of all
in the Falklands crisis.
Already there are signs of grow–
ing anti-American resentment
throughout the Western Hemi–
sphere because of the U.S. decísion
to back Britain's side. Latín-Amer–
ican solidarity is taking form, even
among nations not sympathetic to
Argentina in the past .
The Soviets and Cubans are
exploiting this rift between the
English-speaking and Spanish–
speaking countries. Communist
pressures in the hemisphere will
increase as Latín America as a
whole resists U.S. leadership in
resolving the conflicts in Central
America.
Another Sea Gate Gone
Even were the British to recover
their possession by force of arms,
the Falklands are lost in the long
run. Britain would have to maintain
a large and expensive occupying
force, far out of relationship to the
islands' few inhabitants and the
strained British military budget,
now being trimmed to provide
money for Trident submarines.
Then too, how long can N ATO
permit two thirds of the British
navy to remain far removed from
its primary assigned area, the
North Atlantic?
The immediate a1m of the Brit–
ish government is to restare its
rights for the sake of redeeming
national honor. Eventual sovereign–
ty over the archipelago is another
matter. Were it not for the wishes
of the islands' inhabitants, who
want to remain under British rule,
sovereignty would have been peace-
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