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To Western Europeans, living in much closer
proximity to the Soviet Union, their
giant communist neighbor is seen more as a
fumbling giant, grappling with
difficult political and economic problems
January France moved ahead on
the project.
Crisis in Soviet Bloc
The Soviets, for their part, will be
doing their best to hold onto their
Wes tern European trade partners.
Without continua! trade, financ–
i ng and tech nological t ransfers
from the capitalist world, the
Soviet Union and its East bloc
Comecon par tners face an ex–
tremely bleak economic picturc–
perhaps even a breaking point- in
thc mid-to-Iate 1980s.
Recently a Czechoslovak ccono–
mist admitted, with uncharacteris–
tic frankness: "lt is becoming clcar
that for a full 30 years we have
been unable to salve problems asso–
ciated with production under
4
socialism, either in theory or m
practice."
East Germany, Czcchoslovakia,
even the Soviet Union itself, have
started to introduce more profit–
incentive economic policies, espe–
cial ly in agriculturc. Hungary is
already far advanced with its own
partially privatized, so-called "gou–
lash communism."
However, after thc experience
with the Solidarity labor union
movement in Poland, there ís a def–
inite limít to how far authorit ies in
the Soviet s pherc will permit
decentralized rule. Hcnce, the eco–
nomic door to the West must
remain open.
Now is the time, say sorne
influential Americans, to take
advantage of the impending eco-
nomic cnsts in the communist
world. The time is ripe, they say,
to eithcr cut off trade and aid or
to extract political concessions in
return for its continuance.
Western Europeans, however,
are generally in no mood to rock
the boat. They don ' t wish to disturb
stability in Europe, even though
this stability results from Europe
being divided into two superpower
spheres of interest.
"Americans," noted one U.S.
observer, "cheer news of Polish
resistance to martial Jaw. Euro–
peans are made nervous by the
cheering. They prefer a Polish
a rmy in Poland to a Ru ssian
army."
Cut Loose " Ungrateful Europe"?
The blossoming transatlantic crisis
regarding trade with the East bloc
nations is far more serious than
superficial differences of view
among NATO partners. Down
deep, something extremely serious
is developing on both sides of the
ocean.
The summer of 1981 saw wide–
spread demonstrations throughout
Western Europe over the proposal
to upgrade, by 1983, NATO's
European forces with new U.S.–
madc nuclear weapons.
Underlying the demonstrations
was a definite tone of anti-Ameri–
canism. The United States was por–
trayed as a principal threat to world
peace.
Spcakers at rallies in West Gcr–
many demanded a n end to the
"master-slave" relationship with
the Amcricans, calling instead for
an "alternative security policy"–
meaning a neutralized Germany
between East and West.
Public opinion polls in West
Germany have revealed startling
perceptions among the country's
youths. Fifty-six percent of the 16-
to-29-ycar-olds questioned in one
survey, for example, claimed thcy
wanted to avoid a war at all costs,
even if it meant that the Soviet
Union would take over' Western
Eurape.
The growing acceptance of the
"better Red than dead" concept in
Europe has fostered a dangerous
"better cut Europe loase" counter
philosophy in America. For the past
half year the editorial pages of lead-
The PLAIN TRUTH