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CRISIS
IN
POLAND
FORESHADOWS
A
ERIOUS- perhaps un–
bridgeable-split has
developed between the
Un ited States and its
allies in Western Europe over
reaction to the crisis in
Pola nd.
Whe n the Polis h govern–
me nt c racked
d own o n its
internal c ritics
on December
In the aftermath of the crack–
clown in Poland, President Ronald
Reagan levied a series of unilater–
al U .S. sanc t ions against both
Moscow and the new martial Iaw
government in Poland. Given this
bard-line stand against Soviet
polic ies, this was the very least
he felt he could do.
Mr. Reagan's
moves were
shr ill y
de-
nounced
in
Moscow ("in–
terference in Poland's i nterna)
affairs") and coolly received by
Western Europe, with the notable
exception of Great Britain.
13, 198 1, a stage was set for a
most serious squabble within
NATO.
At stake is the survival of this
key Western defense structure
formed in 1949 to tbwart fur ther
Soviet inroads in Europe.
Opposlng Views to Soviet Threat
The crisis revealed more than ever
before two fundamental and con–
trasting viewpoints among NATO
power s r egarding the Soviet
Union.
America on the one hand, espe–
cially the Reagan administration,
tends to view the Soviet Union as a
si ngleminded expansionist power.
It
must be checkmated at all points
around the globe. According to this
viewpoint, the Soviets are involved,
at least indirectly, in every world
trouble spot. And they play a big
role in worldwide terrorism.
To Western Europeans, living in
much closer proximity to the Soviet
Union, their g iant communist neigh–
bor is seen more as a fumbling giant,
grappling with difficult pol itical and
economic problems in its own "em–
pire." One special problem area is
Poland, which is struggling with
massive economic difficulties its
Marxis t-oriented bureaucracy is
incapable of solving.
But Western Europeans, at the
same time, have a healthy
respect- in many cases, fear- of
Russian
mi/itary
migbt. As the
Soviet Union increases its military
power, its political weight and lev–
erage on its Western European
neighbors grows.
Bonn-Washíngton Ríft
Above all , tbe crisis is threatening
to divide the United States and
West Germany, the two lead ing
NATO partners.
March 1982
by
Gene H. Hogberg
1982 promises to be the
most critical year for the
Free World since the end
of World Wár 11.
The fact is, ever since detente
has been in vogue, t rade between
capitali st Western Europe a nd
communist Eastern Europe, includ–
ing the Soviet Union, has mush–
roomed . According to one source,
Moscow's trade with the capitalist
world expanded from approxi–
mately $6.5 billion in 1970 to $44
billion in 1980.
The trade stakes of West Ger–
ma ny- and all of Western Eu–
rope- wi th Eastern Europe are at
least seven times as high as that of
the United States with the same
reg ion. Keeping this trade lifel ine
open is considered political ly crit–
ica! in these recessionary times.
Nearly a half million jobs in
West Germany alone are depen–
dent upon East bloc exports. The
big steel firm of Mannesman, for
example, sells almost 60 percent
of its steel tubing to the East–
and t his percentage will increase if
the massive $ 15 billion Soviet–
Western Europe gas deal goes
t hrough.
The Reagan administration has
rest r icted the participation of Amer–
ican fi rms in the proposed 3,000-
mile Siberian-Western European
pipeline. However, it has not been
able to persuade its European allies
to back ou t of the deal.
According to an American gov–
ernment trade official the project
"throws an energy noose around
the economies of Western Europe
that can gradually be tightened as
the U.S.S. R . attempts to gain
greater control over the energy
resources of the globe."
"We need the gas," countered a
top Frenc h officiaJ bluntly. In late
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