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4
notice that
tve cottld not accept the
lemtS
negotiated by the Cooservatives."
"If
the Community then refused to
negotiate, as we should have asked, or
if the negotiations were to fail, we
would sit clown amicably and discuss
the situation with them."
Mr. Wilsoo then carne bluntly to the
point: "We should make clear that our
posture ... would be rigidly directed
towards the pursuit of British inter–
ests ... They might accept this, oc they
might decide that we should agree to
part - that would depend on them.
That is our [the Labour party's]
THE UNITED STATES
COMPARED WITH
E.E.C. ANO BRITAIN
(1969STATISTICS>
The
PLAlN TRUTH
He then stated how Britain could dis·
engage from Europe: "There would be
two possible ways of withdrawal and
two only, once entry has been made.
The first would be to secure a
voltmlary
re/ease,
freely and unanimously given
by every member state."
Sir Derek then goes on to show that
this would be difficult if not impossible
to effect.
He then mentioned the second way
Britaio might possibly withdnw from
the Community: "The second and only
other possible method would be by
tmilalera/ rep11diation,
of the 'scrap of
CJ
UNITED KINGDOM
-
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY
-
UNITED STATES
POPULATION
(MIIIlono)
STEEL
MERCHANT FLEET
FOREIGN AIO
RESERVES
PROOUCTION
(Million Tono Groso) (Totol Cophol Flow to (MIIIiono of Dolloto)
(Millions Motric: Tono)
Devotop¡ng Countrioo
Sollrce European Communory - The Feeto. May. 1971
position." In effect, former Prime Min–
ister Wilson had served notice on
Me.
Heath's Conservative government that
should he become Prime Minister, his
Labour Government would repudiate
the "unacceptable terms" which
Mr.
Heath's goveroment has agreed to.
This could result in a serious rift
with Brussels, and could lead to Britain's
withdrawing or being kicked out of the
EEC once and for aJI.
No Right of
Withdrawal
Sir Derek Walker-Smith, later in the
debate, pointed out the dangers which
would face Britain if she tried to opt
out of the Common Market.
"The Treaty of Rome is
not
a normal
treaty, either in scope
oc
in duration.
Normally, treaties are restricted in scope
and limited in duration. Exceptionally,
the Treaty of Rome covecs an enormous
range of our domestic life, exceptioo–
ally, it is
forever
- no limit of time
and
no right of withdrawal."
Milliono of Dollaro)
paper' variety, which Britain has tra·
ditionally rejected for herself and op–
posed for others to the point of war.
"So I say that signing the treaty
would be, in law, in practice and in ho–
nour, forever. But - and here is
the rub -
Parliamel/l cam1o1 ron–
stitutionally
bind its mcceuors.
That is
the central and inescapable dilemma
which entry would bring - to escape
by unilateral action would be a breach
of international obligation, but to deny
to successor Parliaments the right of
escape would be a breach of Constitu–
tional principie."
Thus we
see
that the British Parlia–
ment is sharply divided on this n'atter
of entering Europe - though all Brit·
ish political parties agree they want to
see
Britain enter Europe on the "right
terms."
Britain's New Ro le in Europe
What is certain is Britain's realization
that she can no Jonger play the role of
December 1971
wocld power
alone.
The sun has set on
the British Empire, and only "líttle
England" is left.
At the end of World War II, Britain,
though badly hurt, sti ll sat at the con·
ference table with the United States and
the Soviet Union.
She
soon carne to
realize, however, that her influence was
waning. Most decisions since World
War
II
have bypassed London, being
made in either Washington or Moscow.
Britain realizes
she
no longer cacries
the weight in shaping important world
decisions as she
once
did. Europe, of
course, realizes the same obvious fact.
But Britaio has particularly felt tbe cold
shouldcr. She has lost her empire, has
been
the "Sick Man of Europe"
eco–
nomically and has witoessed her demo–
tion from equal to junior U. S. partner.
Britain has come to the rude realiza–
tion that she is not in a dass with the
two superpowers - the United States
and Russia. The traumatic realization
carne when Britain, with France and
Israel, tcied to retake the Suez Canal
from Nasser in 1956. The United States
diplomatically forced them to give up
the captured prize.
Thcn Harold MacMillan succeeded
Anthony Eden as Prime Minister and
during the next few years presided over
the headlong abandonment of Britain's
imperial possessions in Africa. Mr.
MacMillan's 1966 "Wind of Change"
speech
regarding African independence
set the British policy-makers to granting
their African colonies iodependence.
These cold, hard facts have forced
the British to seek a greater say in
world affairs through becoming part of
a strong, powerful Europe - a
European bloc powerful enough to
counterbalance the U. S. and Russia.
Realizing this, Prime Minister Heath
recently told a press conference in
Bonn : "The world is suddenly realiz–
ing that the enlarged commuoity is
going to
be
a very, very powerful in–
fluence, economically and then
politi·
cal/y.
And indeed this is why we in
Europe want to create it."
Jf
Britain and the three other appli·
cant members - Irelaod, Norway and
Denmark - join, (the latter three
are dependent upon both British and
( Contin11ed on page 46)