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October 1971
and tortures which in sorne cases their
own parents faced . Israelí soldiers also
study the holocaust period, believing
that it is they who stand between their
people and yet another holocaust.
The Israelis find it difficult to trust
other nations and their peace packages,
be they in the form of United Nations
"Guarantees," Big Four agreements, or
in the proposals of Arab states them–
selves.
Arabs Equally Distrustful
The Arab peoples also feel betrayed.
Promised independence by Britain dur-
The
PLAIN TRt.rnl
Primary Aims of
Both
Antagonists
This same mistrust prevents the two
sides from getting together. Meanwhile,
each side continues to work toward the
goals it considers most vital.
To the Israelis the most important
goal is
secmíty.
Israel must be strong
enough to prevent the Arabs from driv–
ing them ioto the sea.
For this reason Israel probably will
not give up all the occupied territories.
l t may gamble sorne of its strategic
positions for the sake of a potential
Ambo<Sodor College /'hoto
Arab refugee camp near the town of Nablus.
ing World War I, the Arabs found
themselves divided into British and
French mandates after the war. Arabs
look upon the state of Israel as a
Westero creation - in effect, as a
bridgehead of Westem "imperialism."
Nor do the Arabs trust the Russians.
They full well remember the Soviets
were among those who supported the
establishment of Israel. They also realize
the Soviet support they are today receiv–
ing is not without ulterior motives. Wit–
ness the attempted Communist takeover
of the Sudan.
Most Arab states do not even trust
one another. This is profusely illustrated
by the attempted overthrow of King
El Hasan of Morocco; the fighting be–
tween Palestinian guerrillas and Jordan·
ians; the subsequent clash between
Jordan aod Syria; the enmity betweeo
Syria and Iraq.
If
the Arabs cannot
trust their own, bow can they be ex–
pected to trust Israel
?
peace but cannot gamble all. For many
Israelis, to returo to the borders of 1967
means to returo to an Israel that was
just too tempting a target for President
Nasser and his allies back in 1967.
Israelis are convinced that even if a
peace agreement were reached, Arabs
would not greet the Jews with open
arms. "You do not reverse overoight
25
years of anti-Israel teachings that the
Arab people have continually been
exposed to," reason many Jews.
Therefore, to the Israelis, security re–
mains the primary consideration. As far
as they are concerned, good fences do
make good neighbors.
The Arab Side
To the Arabs the primary considera–
tions are two-fold. A story that occurred
after the Six Day War illustrates one of
those.
Israelí officials were taking a group
of Arab notables from Gaza on a tour
of the Knesset building in Jerusalem in
hopes of achieving good will. At the
close of the tour one of the Arabs was
not completely satisfied that he had seen
everything.
' 'Where is the map
?"
he wanted to
know.
' 'What map
?"
the puzzled Israelis
asked.
"You know," he replied, "tbe map of
the greater Israel - from the Nile to
the Euphrates."
"But there is no such map," the Israelí
guide explained. But this the Arab
refused to believe.
Arabs know that in the Bible the God
of ancient Israel promised that nation
all the land from the Euphrates to the
"River of Egypt." This the Arabs be–
lieve is the Nile while most Jewish
commeotators feel it only refers to the
Wadi El Arísh in eastern Sinai.
Of
course most Jews do not look upon that
Biblical statement as being necessarily
prophetic anyway. But Arabs who
sctu–
tinize the conditions of modero Israel's
birth and subsequent conquests are
absolutely convinced Israel is planning
to expand even further than at present.
As a condition for peace the Arabs
therefore want
alt
the occupied territor–
ies back. This they say will show that
Israel truly desires peace and not ex–
pansion. The Arabs believe the Israelis
are militarily superior to them and that
this is all the security they need. They
point to their own defeat in the Six
Day War as proof.
Israelis on the other hand are not
so
sure. They are convinced the Arabs have
made sizable gains
in
dosing the mili–
tary power gap since the war. Russian
"advisers" and anti-aircraft weapons are
present in greater numbers than before.
Besides, Israel does not want to go to
war again even if it would mean a
grealer
victory than in 1967 because
so
many of their people were killed in the
war and subsequent border skirmishes.
The
Second Arab
Concero
The second main consideration to the
Arabs is solving the problem of the
Palestinian refugees, homeless since
1948. This is often referred to by the
catch-all phrase, "restoration of the
rights of the Palestinian people." To
moderate Arabs this means granting all