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Onober 1971
writing a bilJion-dollar defense pro–
gram for Iran. Americans are to
contribute squadrons of late-model
Phantom jets and Britain will come
across with hundreds of tanks and sorne
naval units.
According to officials, the buildup
will fill the vacuum being created by the
British departure. Also, it is to be a
counter-move against Soviet strategic
plays in the Persian Gulf.
This will make the Iranian Shah a sort
of guardian of Persian Gulf security.
Whether the other states in the area wíll
take to this with delight remains to be
seen. Iran, as mentioned, has sorne
claims on Persian Gulf real estate be–
longing to other nations. Meanwhile,
Iraq is the closest thing to an arch-foe
of Iran.
Therefore, whether the buildup of
Iran -
minus
the presence of British or
American troops - will Jead to greater
stability or more JNstability remains to
be seen. With wodd politics being what
it is, stability for so vital a region may
be well-nigh impossible.
The stakes are too high bere; the
prizes are too great. The region is
bound to see pressures from both within
and without. British power and
physical
presence
kept the lid on this volatile
area. But the contínuing Brítish evac–
uation has made the Soviets deeply
interested in their new chances. And the
Soviets' chances do not Jook bad.
The Soviet role in the Iscaeli-Arab
conflict gives them increased leverage
among the Arabs in the Gulf. While
the British empire is a rusty relic, the
Soviets evidence both qualities necessary
for the
growth
of an empire - a sense
of purpose and
appetite.
Meanwbile, America, smarting from
a protracted war in Vietnam, has said or
done Jittle about ensuring its
physicai
presence
in the area - outside of sorne
reported military aid. But military aid is
not synonymous with presence. MiJitary
hardware may be present but physical
presence will still be Jacking. Thus, a
vacuum will still be there. Unless sorne
drastic aboutface occurs, the Persian
Gulf power vacuum may also increase.
But in world power politics, a vacuum
is soon fiUed. The guestion is, by
whom?
O
The
PLAIN TRUTH
Britain's
~~Little
Vietnam''
I
T HAS ALL
the trappings of the
Vietnam wac. Chinese trained
and Soviet-armed guerrillas oper·
ating from havens across a bordee
are trying to gain the support of
the local population with foreign
advisers helping both sides. There is
even a monsoon season affecting mili–
tary operations. And in the end, this
war in little-known Dhofar province
of the natíon of Oman may prove
just as significant as Vietnam.
It
all began in 1963 as a tribal
revolt against the harsh, feudalistic
and repressive rule of Omani Sultan
Said bin Taimur. The insurgents had
taken the name "Dhofar Liberatíon
Front." But following the Britísh
withdrawal from Aden and the
ascension of a revolutionary regime
in renamed South Yemen, the guer–
rilla movement took on a more
sinister complexion.
The movement was g reat ly radi–
calized. Its goal was no longer the
"liberation" of merely Dhofar prov–
ince, but the setting up of radical
governments throughout tbe Gulf re–
gion. Hence, the new name, "Popu·
lar Front for the Liberation of the
Occupied Arab Gulf." A safe haven
was provided in South Yemen, and
that country also offered the guer–
rillas Soviet and Chinese arms.
Chinese advisers carne in; and, it is
said, sorne 300 Dhofaris have
received training in China.
British Role
Britain suddenly found itself in·
volved in a far off revolutionary
struggle. Ties between the Sultanate
of Oman and Britain go back to the
Eighteenth Century. In exchange for
military bases and trade concessions,
Britain had assumed the defense of
the Sultan's realm. This was the case
when the tribal revolt against the
Sultan began in Dhofar. Able to
equate dissatisfaction with tbe Sultan
with their leftist cause, ¡ro-Commu–
nist elements succeede in taking
over the rebel movement.
The British, realizing they were
supporting an unpopular cause,
backed the coup of the Sultan's son,
Qabus, who ousted his father in
1970. A modernization program was
implemented by Qabus to bring his
nation from the 15th into the 20th
Century. But Qabus is nota Commu·
nist, so the revolt goes on.
This revolt would mean little to
the rest of the world, perhaps, were
it not for geography. For it
is
Oman
that sits astride the South shore of
the Strait of Hormuz, through which
1.3 million tons of oil pass daily.
And it is for this reason tbat the
Oman conflict is being carefully
studied by strategists in Communist
capitals as well as in the West.
Britain realizes its significance as
well. Although British forces are
slated to leave the Gulf region
proper by the end of this year, Brit–
ish military advisers will remain in
Oroan.
Two-Front War
At present, the outcome of the war
is uncertain. The rebels show no sign
of giviog up.
Right now Sultan Qabus is using
half of Oman's
SlOO
million oil rev–
enue on the military effort and the
other half on the equally vital social
front. Schools are being built, and
the country's six miles of paved
roads are being extended to 242
miles. The first radio stations have
been opened and Muscat harbor is
being deepened. Much of this devel–
opment is taking place in Dhofar.
This prompted sorne but not most of
the rebels to give up the revolt.
Prime Minister Tariq recently
admitted, "We're starting from
below scratch." How successfully the
Omanis catch up to modero times
may have a great bearing on the out·
come of the war. The wac, in tuco,
may determine control of a most
vital and signi6cant macitime gate. O
17