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38
IRAQ
The Strait of
Hormuz is a 26-
mile-wide water–
way at the end of
the Persian Gulf. lt
commands all the ma–
rine exits and en–
trances in an area which
in 1970 supplied 28 per–
cent of all oil used in the
world and which holds 62
percent of proved oil reserves.
RUSSIA IN MIDDLE EAST
(Contin11ed from page 34)
per day), Saudi Arabia (2.9), Kuwait
(2.5),
lraq
(1.5) -
in thousands of
barreis per day: Abu Dhabi
(600),
Qatar
(355),
Omao
(326),
Bahrain
(76),
Dubai
(20).
Since the British influence is rapidly
disappearing, and the U. S. is not mak–
ing any great overtures to take up the
military slack, the question is not
whether anyone will move into the Per–
sian Gulf area - but
WHO
will be
first: Iraq, lean, Saudi Arabia, or the
Soviet Union. A gambler would prob–
ably put his money on an eventual So–
viet takeover.
The Soviet Union would merely be
fulfilling its expressed desire written
down in a secret
1940
pact signed by
the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, Fascist
ltaly and Japan. The Soviets then said
their "territorial aspirations center south
of the national territory of the Soviet
Unioo in the directioo of the !odian
Ocean
!"
I ndian Ocean - "Soviet Lake"?
Look south of the Soviet Union aod
what do you see? Iran, the Persian Gulf
aod the Indian Ocean. The Red Navy
already has a string of naval facilities -
sorne still unconfirmed - in such places
as South Yemen's Socotra Island,
Mogadishu in the Somali Republic and
trawler facilities at Mauritius. Then
The
PLAJN TRUTH
there is Ras Banas in the United Arab
Republic, Berbera in the Somali Repub–
lic aod Hodeida in Yemen. Soviets are
reportedly helping develop the Indian
port of Vishakhapatnam and are adapt–
ing it for the
possible
use of sub–
marines.
Today, the Soviet Unioo is acknowl–
edged to be the dominant power in the
Arab nations that bordee the Medi–
terraoean. Also, in South Yemen, Soviet
advisers support a guerrilla movement
whose aim is to gain control of the sun–
baked South Arabian area.
In
1970
the Soviets completed a
major new highway across Afghanistan
linking Soviet Central Asia with the In–
dian Ocean via Pakistan.
At peak periods as maay as
25
Soviet
warships have been spotted in the In–
dian Ocean, including missile cruisers,
nuclear submarines aod supply vessels.
As yet, the Soviet Union's navy has
not established a meaningful presence
in the Indiao Ocean. There are many
reasons for this - one of which is that
the approaches to the Indian Ocean
from the South China
Sea
and around
the
Cape
of Good Hopeare in Western
control.
Soviet Unioo Needs Laod
This, of course, does
NOT
mean the
Soviet Unioo cannot make extremely
important advances in sorne
land
area.
lo fact, tbe U.S.S.R. is traditionally an
expansionist
LAND
power. Hence, the
September 1971
strategic importance of Iran's territory.
Before the Kremlin
is
in a position to
rule the sea, it must acquire more
LAND
outposts. What more useful outpost
than Iran, which would give the Soviet
Union a
LAND
access to the Persiao Gulf
and the Indian Oceao? The Kremlin is
using various means to iocrease its
influence around the rimlaod of the
Indian Ocean.
For example, Russians are hungrily
developing trade relations with Kuwait.
One hundred percent of Kuwait's tim–
ber and eighty percent of its steel come
from the Soviet Union. The Russian
Moskvich is the hottest selling car in
Kuwait.
Iran is also feeling the impact of the
Soviet economic juggernaut. To the tune
of thousands of cheering townspeople
waving Soviet and Iranian flags, a
630-
mile Trans-Iranian gas pipel ine was
recently opened. It will carry natural
gas -
600
million cubic feet a day at
opening - from southero Iraoian oi1-
fields to the Soviet Republics of
Azerbaijan, Georgia aod Armenia.
The
Bear Makes l ts Moves
The harnmer and sickle is becoming
the dominant symbol from lean to
Egypt and from the Mediterranean to
the Indian Ocean. Slowly but relent–
lessly the Russian bear is pursuing
its objective - dominance both politi–
cally and militarily across the vital
mid-section of the world.
Meanwhile, the Uoited States and
Britain are being edged further toward
a peripheral no-power position in the
area. Europeans, presently with few
political or military inroads into this
vital piece of global real estate, see the
handwriting on the wall.
They realize that if the Soviet Union
continues to Rex its diplomatic, military
and economic bíceps throughout the
Middle East, a conflict is sure to rise.
The Middle East is too vital for an
enemy power to assert its authority
unchallenged. Realizing that the Soviet
Union is in the Middle East by design,
not by accident, means that its power
must be challenged if the area is to
remain accessible to
a1l
nations.
The question for the next few years
is: From what quarter will the challenge
come, and
HOW
will it be met?
o