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But friends aod allies - Europeans
aod Japanese - caooot take the situ–
ation so lightly. To Europe and Japao,
the thought of a Middle East oil stop–
page brings a thousaod and one Ara–
bian nightmares.
Middle East oil Iiterally turns the
wheels of European aod Japanese
inJustry. Japan imports 90 percent of
its oi l from the Middle East; Britain
relies on the Middle East and North
Africa for 70 percent of its oil needs;
France 80 percent; West Germany close
to
90
percent; Italy almost 95 percent.
As a whole, 85 percent of Western
Europe's oil is extracted from beneath
the desert floors of the Middle East and
North Africa. Libya supplies about one
third of Western Europe's oil needs.
She is Britain's most important supplier.
Algerian oil supplies are earmarked for
France.
The impact of these statistics is ob–
vious. Western Europe's prospects for
industrial growth are
directly Jinked
to
a continuing and unimpeded access to
Middle East oi l. If another outbreak of
fighting, or sorne other política! factor
stimulates Arab oil producers or transit
nations to new embargoes, the very fu–
ture of the Cornmon Market could stand
in jeopardy.
You can be sure Europeans will not
take such a dangerous situation with a
shrug of the shoulders.
Economy Tied to Oil
Like it or not, Europeans are hooked
on oil. Nuclear energy production has
fallen way behind schedule. While nat–
ural gas is eotering the field, coa! pro–
duction is running clown. Coal's share
of the energy market has fallen from 56
to 27 percent in ten years. Oil's share
has doubled from 32 to 60 percent.
In spite of new oil discoveries such as
the one-million-barrel-per-day produc–
tion of Nigeria and Indonesia, oil
con–
Jflrrtption
is nstng out of sigbt.
Europcan and Japanese customers are as
dependent on the Middle East oil as
they ever were. There can be no cutting
of the umbilical cord between the two.
Middle East and North African oil, the
industrial lifeblood of Europc and
Japan, must continue to flow.
Western Europe, with a population
of 354 million people, is guzzling oil
The
PLAIN TRUTH
aod the full range of oi l products -
gasoline, jet fuels, fue) oils, lubricants
- at tbe voracious rate of 12 million
barreis each day.
This is three times their consumption
of ten years ago. Predictions, noto–
riously shortsighted, say that the need
for oil will double by 1980.
Japao is also a prisoner of oil. Even
in 1958, Japan was the world's seventh
largest oil consumer. She has gradually
but steadily climbed the Iist since then.
Besides, Japan has no present promise
of large natural gas supplies which
Europe hopes to count on. Japan's exist–
ing nuclear power industry is still too
fledgling to make any appreciable dents
in her energy needs.
Japan must be nurtured on oil if she
is to grow 15 percent annually in her
GNP
and become
Dai lchi
-
"Num–
ber One" by 2000 A.D. Japan already
burns 3.4 million barreis of oi l per day,
and is forecast to consume over 10 mil–
lion in 1980. After that, it's anyone's
guess.
Yet, oil-poor Japan must presently
rely on the Middle East for anywhere
from 85 to 93 percent of her oil -
depending on who is doing the
counting.
Clearly, oil requirements put Japan in
a very vulnerable economic and military
position.
What of the Future?
In the light of Japan's and Europe's
oil vulnerability, the particularly annoy–
ing questions are: Will Middle East
and North African oi l flow unimpeded
in the 1970's and l980's?
If
oil Row is
slowed or blocked simultaneously by a
consortium of nations, what will be the
reactioo of both Europe and Japan?
Would either Japan or Europe (or
both) forcibly intervene militarily in
the affairs of the obstructing nations to
uncork the flow?
Is the growing influencc of the Soviet
Union in the Middle East a threat to
industrial developmcnt and stability of
Western nations? Could a world war
result over restricted oil supply?
Sorne of these questions may seem
farfetched to those unacquainted with
the importance of oil. But these are real
dilemmas faced by European and Japa–
nese statesmen who must deal with the
August 1971
realities of Middle Eastem, North Afri–
can and Soviet politics.
Oil is a massive industry. 1t is the
single most important ítem in world
trade. Yet, the greatest possibilities for
growth in the industry still lie in the
future. A few simple statistics show
why. By
1950
twice
as
much crude oil
was produced as in 1945. Ten years
later production again doubled to 1,000
million tons. By 1968, the amount pro·
duced had again doubled. The prospect
(almost always too conservative) is for
oil production to double once again by
1980.
Therefore, an oil crisis
alone
could
lead to war in the Middle East. Today,
the United States alone is providing a
peace-keeping
balance of power in thc
area. But suppose the Unüed States
~e
ti,·
tterranean Sea
ALGERIA
LIBYA
!
- Jcw
011 ,._
-- OIIPi¡MI;.,.
,
____
. ...........
should make the gross political blunder
of eliminating itself irom thc Middle
East arena? An Armageddon could
result.
Oil Sparks a World War ?
In order to portray grapbically how
política! events surrounding an oil stop–
page could lead to a war involving
many powerful nations, consider the
following fictitious, but wholly possiblc
scenario of the future:
It
is November, 1977. Wintec is com–
ing on and Europe has increased fuel
needs.
A federation of Middle East nationl'
called the United Arab Union has beco
involved in months of stormy haggling
over oil prices. They now decide to put
the squecze on the foreign-owned oil
compan ies and their paying customcrs,