Basic HTML Version
28
The abuse in print is undoubtedly
exaggerated, but the Chinese genuinely
fear the steady build-up of Japan's
"Self-Defense Forces."
Memories of Japan's exploitation of
Manchuria and ruthless occupation of
China in World War II still run deep
among China's ruling class. The average
age of the members of China's Central
Committee is 64. Most are veterans of
Mao's famous 1930's "Long March" to
escape Chiang Kai-shek's forces, as well
as seasoned warnors against the
Japanese.
It
is only logical that Peking should
look with suspicion upon Tokyo's drive
to become the world's number one eco–
nomic and industrial power by the end
of the century.
Japan's gross national product must
multiply about six times in order for
this lofty goal to be reached . With such
an explosive growth in economic power
anticipated, Japan's military power to
defend her hard-won prosperity must of
necessity increase a great deal.
Further complicating Sino-Japanese
relations is this fact: The Chinese real–
ize that their efforts to gain control of
Taiwan, to encourage Korean unifica–
tion under Communist domination, and
in general to establish a dominant
position in Asia come in conflict with
present Japanese foreigo policy.
These are very trying times for
China's leadership today.
No Real Peace With U. S.
Feeling "encircled" by great powers,
China has therefore decided to reopen
limited cootact with the United States,
the other power maintaining a
formi–
dable military presence in China's Asían
"sphere of infiuence" - Korea and
Indo-China.
This
doe¡ not mean
that a full-blowo
friendship is about to develop between
Peking and Washington -
even
if
dip–
lomatic relatioos should be negotiated.
Regardless of immediate U. S.–
Chinese developments, "China will
... maintain her unceasing struggle
against capitalism and the United
States. She will encourage the develop–
ment of what she regards as genuine
Marxist-Leninist-Maoist parties and
[ revolutionary] movements everywhere"
(
Orbis,
Fall, 1970, p. 609.)
The
PLAIN TRUTH
July 1971
Fronk Fishboclc-
lile mog.
(el
Time
lnc.
" PING-PONG" DIPLOMACY
-
Main table-tennis contest in the Peking
sports stodium between American ond Chinese ployers. The 18,000 specta–
tors enthusiastically applouded each time a member of U. S. team scored
a point.
Yet, despite the política! polemic, the
biggest single barrier to improve Sino–
America re]ations is the Taiwan issue.
To the Chinese, the "unfortunate"
United States position in Taiwan only
carne about in 1950 - after the onset
of the Korean war, which
Rt1ssia,
1101
China,
started. There is therefore room
for accommodation with the U. S. -
but not with the U.S.S.R.
True to her historical tradition, China
in her own self-interest, is "playing off
one barbarían against another." With
this consideration, wbat does tbe U. S.
stand to gato by expanding political
and economic contacts with Red China?
Fords? . .. or Datsuns?
After the visit of the American table
tennis players, highly optimistic reports
filled American newspapers, predicting
booming trade relations between the
U. S. and the "vast China market."
The glowing hopes were nurtured by
o.9icial White House announcements
stating that ex-port of certain "non–
strategic" items would be allowed.
But which nation stands to gain the
most from China's new "Slightly Open
Door Policy?"
To answer this, all one has to do is
examine China's present foreign trade
picture.
Japan's trade with mainland China
presently totals approximately $825,-
000,000 annually. This represents one–
fifth of Peking's foreign trade. Hong
Kong is China's second largest trade
partner - approximately $400,000,000
- mostly purchases from China. West
Germany ranks third with $256,000,000
in total trade.
United States' trade with China for
1970 amounted to $3,500,000. It would
probably not exceed $300,000,000 be–
fore a decade, since sorne U. S. export
items would still be restricted as "strate–
gic items."
As one international financia! expert
admits, with a note of wry sarcasrn:
"Guatemala
is
now a far more enticing
sales territory than Red China can possi–
bly be for almost any American com–
pany in quite a few years."
After all, would the Chinese purchase
Fords or Chevrolets over Datsuns or
Toyotas?
Taiwan ... and Reality
Japan's recognition of the Nationalist
Chinese govemment on Taiwan, pres–
sured by the United States in 1952, is
still an obstacle to greater Sino-Japanese
trade, along with Tokyo's support of
the Republic of Korea.
Communist China refuses to trade
with Japanese firms that trade with or
invest in Formosa and South Korea. But
"dummy" firms and mythical trading
companies largely circumvent this
proscription.
Many Japanese still hold a genuine
respect for the elderly Cbiang Kai-shek.
Chiang graciously refused to exact war