Basic HTML Version
8
American preseoce from the area and
what
the withdrawal of American
Armed Forces will do to Vietnam and
the Southeast .Asían area.
Vietnam - Unequalled in
Annals of W arfare
.Ambassador Bunker explained that
the Vietnam war was a completely dif–
ferent war from any other war expe–
rienced by the U. S. .Armed Forces and
the .American people. He stated that it
was a war of aggression, a war of sub–
version and infiltration, a psychological
war, a political war, a social war, and
the first war ever fought nightly on TV.
He also stated that it was a war
fought with such self-imposed inhibi–
tions and restraints that when the his–
tory of the era is finally written it will
be unequalled and unparalleled in the
annals of warfare. It was a war with
unfixed battle lines and a war where the
eoemy could retreat to sanctuaries with
impunity and supply their forces in the
field from the same sanctuaries.
The .Ambassador admitted that many
mistakes were made by the .American
Command because the war is unique in
modern history. Sorne of the mis–
takes were oot rectified as late as Janu–
ary 1968. For example, there were
mistakes in training aod equipping
the South Vietoamese Regular .Army
(.ARVN). The M-16 rifle was not fur–
nished to the .ARVN until after 1968,
and the training of the .ARVN was not
really stepped up and designed to pro–
duce independent and effective fighting
forces until the arrival of General .Abra–
hams, after the January 1968 Tet
offensive.
Ambassador Bunker explained that
the U. S. .Armed Forces became involved
in the area in order to fulfill out
commitments to our .Allies and to
impress upon Russia and Red China our
willingness to fulfill such obligations,
and, in effect, to make our commitments
credible. In a broader sense, honoring
of our commitments manifested our fur–
ther willingness to accept the
respomi–
bililies
of power.
Vietnamization
The .Ambassador then reviewed the
status of the Vietnamization of the war.
Vietnamization has two main com–
ponents. The first is the strengthening
The
PLAIN TRUTH
of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces,
the second is the extension and coosoli–
dation of the pacification program.
Ambassador Bunker assured us that the
Vietnam forces were now stronger and
more effective. He explained that there
were no longer any large-scale enemy
actions and that the enemy was reduced
to small-unit operations.
He described the growth of the
.ARVN forces (the regular armed
forces), which now exceed 600,000 meo.
To that, one must add the regional
and territorial forces as well as the
people's self-defense forces, the latter
being unpaid and volunteer units. The
total number of these various forces is
in excess of
1
million men.
The .Ambassador reminded us that
after the Tet offensive, over 600 villages
in South Vietnam remained in control
of or were being terrorized by Viet–
Cong. Today that nwnber is approxi–
mately 40. Naturally, the degree of
security from village to village varies,
but essentially, although the guerrilla
terrorist action of the enemy is designed
to disrupt and, if possible, destroy
entirely the pacification program, there
has been a steady improvement. Security
in the villages has improved, aod there
is increased Vietnamese support to the
government.
The .Ambassador then turned to the
question of President Nixon's plan to
remove the American forces, except for
perhaps sorne 50,000 volunteer forces,
by June 1972. He reminded us that the
President tied the withdrawal to three
points:
1.
Progress of the peace talks in
París
2.
The leve! of fighting in the area
and the progress of the pacification
program
3. The Vietnamization of the war
itself
The .Ambassador admitted that little
progress was being made in Paris but,
as he had just explained, pacification
was working. Not only was the ARVN
better equipped, better trained and more
confident than ever before, but the
.ARVN was carrying the major brunt of
the entire war effort at this time. .Ameri–
can casualties had fallen to very low
levels, when:as ARVN casualties had
risen to record levels.
May 1971
The .Ambassador also commented
that very heavy casualties were being
suffered by the North Vietnamese and
the Viet Cong. He wanted us to be sute
to understand that any casualty figures
suffercd by the U. S. had to be coro–
pared in terms of the differences in pop–
ulation between our country as a whole
and that of South Vietnam. In other
words, the Ambassador explained, if
South Vietnamese suffered 30 casualties
that is the same as our forces suffering
300 casualties.
Stabilizing Viecnamese Economy
The Ambassador commented on the
new land reform law that had recently
been implemented, and the visible signs
of the strong economy now and for the
future.
He stated that inflation has been
under control since January 1970 and
that there has, in fact, been no increase
in the cost of living since that time
despite the wartime economy. He men–
tioned the record rice crop, the growth
of small industries, the rehabilitation of
the rubber industry and the many plans
of foreign investors for automobile
assembly plants, fertilizer plants, etc.
He commented on the very prosperous
farmers, and told us that he had sug–
gested jokingly to the former Japanese
Ambassador that Saigon should be
renamed as Hondaville.
The Ambassador caBed our attention
to this present year, the year of elec–
tions. The lower house of legislature
will be elected in .August, and in Octo–
ber the President and Vice Presidents
will be elected. He stated that we have
attempted to engraft democratic institu–
tions on a foreign society as we have
done so often in the past with different
degrees of success.
The years ahead will test the nation's
constitutional machinery and political
maturity. Obviously, democratic institu–
tions are a bit strange to a country that
is basically family and ancestor-oriented
and authoritarian in outlook.
.After the major redeployment of our
forces has taken place io June 1972, the
Ambassador was confident that the
South Vietnamese government will con–
tinue to develop and to perfect its own
social revolution, and that the ARVN
(
Conthmed
011
imide back cover)