Basic HTML Version
Marcb 1971
wanted out - and they finally suc–
ceeded in getting out. But they left
behind a part of America's manhood.
Most Americans would never under–
stand painful, prolonged stmggle over
worthless real estate for limited, politi–
cal objectives. They could understand
fighting for home, and for country.
They could understand fighting against
the forces of evil, and to make the
world safe for Democracy. But they
would never nnderstand fighting for
limited goals, to "demonstrate" to an
enemy, or to "inspire" others.
It
should have been historically
edncational to American leadership that
Americans changed governments in the
midst of the Korean War. It should
have been even more cleady instructive
that, following a landslide víctory based
upon promises of new, guick solutions
to protracted struggle, the Republican
Administration of the mid 50's found
itsel f inevitabJy forced into accepting
practically every policy of the preceding
Democratic Administration, including
"containment" of Communism, and
painful, pragmatic maneuverings and
peace parlays instead of guick, decisive
victory.
Just as the conduct of the Korean W ar
was one of the major campaign issues
that swept Dwight Eisenhower and his
vice-president, Richard Nixon, into the
White House in 1952, so the conduct of
the Vietnam war was one of the major
campaign issues that again caused the
American public to shift from a Demo–
cratic to a Republican administration in
the midst of a futile land war in Asia,
and sweep Mr. Richard Nixon into the
Presidency in 1968.
Ironically, those who hoped for
quick, easy solutions to the war in Viet–
nam were once again to be bitterly dis–
appointed by the march of history. Mr.
Nixon, resolving not to repeat the mis–
takes that brought disaster to the Joho–
son administration, hoped for an
"honorable" solution in Vietnam -
oc
at least a partial "face-saving." How–
ever, like the Republican Adrninis–
tration of 1952, he found, before his
term was more than a few months old,
that he was forced to wle out a "mil i–
tary solution" to Vietnam, and that only
compromise with the enemy in Vietnam,
The
PLAIN TRUTH
and gradual defusing of tensions in
the world, could keep the spcctre of
Armageddon from becom_ing abhorrent,
unirnaginable reality.
At least, barring inter ference from a
Divine Being, so it seemed.
Suddenly, it was "Nixoo's war," a
rather unfair label hung guickly by
those whose overview of history is con–
spicuously absent.
Again, Americans didn't understand.
And once again, a little more of our
manhood was being slowly eroded -
gradually drained away.
Parallels With Korea
The
parallels between the Korean
debacle and the war
10
Vietnam are
inescapable.
First, it was a land war 1n Asia.
Next, it was fought, from the begin–
ning, with an enemy granted safe sanc–
tuaries for his war material, and for
regrouping and recuperating areas. It
was fought in a narrow country, run–
ning North and South, genera ll y, and
divided by a purely fictitious "parallel,"
which is on ly an imaginary line drawn
on a map. That "dernili tarized zone" (a
sickly humorous term) in Vietnam
remains just what the 38th parallel was
in Korea - a line that ignores impor–
tant topographical features, strategic
hills, railways, road junctions, cities
oc
towns, and is, therefore, indefensible
frorn a practica! military standpoint.
As in Korea, the U. S. maintained
complete air superiority - but pilots
were restricted in their targets, and
enemy bases were gencraiJy safely
tucked away beh ind a politically un–
touchable border.
Pilots sett led clown to thc grim,
bloody business of a war of attrition in
the air - attempted interdiction, not
preparation for invasion, or destruc–
tion of the encmy capacity for waging
war.
As m Korea, the
U.
S. maintained
complete naval superiority - but the
sea lanes were egually opeo to vessels of
friend ly countrics, mcmbers of the
Uni.ted Nations, who trafficked then, as
now, with the enemy.
As in Korea, Russian submarines or
ai rcraft could free!y shadow
(oc,
in
some cases, even
joiu
temporarily)
43
movements of the U. S. 7th fleet (the
same one.)
As in Korea, Americans fougbt
shoulder-to-shoulder with Oriental peo–
ples who in turn fought against their
own race. And, as in Korea, Arnericans
spawned a vicious amount of anti–
American hatred from their general
demeanor among their Oriental allies.
The parallels are endless - from the
overall policy of American leadership to
the tiresome, unacceptable, but inevi–
table outcome.
And in all this is some of the
destruction of the American spirit.
In Korea, once the peace talks began,
battle.field commandcrs were forced to
notice subtle changes among their
troops .
Everyone knew the war could be over
at any moment. No one wanted to take
unnecessary risks. The Yalu was no
longer a desired stopping place - vic–
tory was no longer contemplated.
Now, they wanted out.
But the poi icy of "leaning on" a
toug h enemy to force him to talk
demanded men conduct themselves like
fierce legionnaires. Leaning on a crude,
peasant host of illiterate Chinese
is
not
quite so easy as Jeaning on young Arner–
icans, given a taste of the affluent life of
post World War
JT
opportunities.
Leaning on an enemy costs lives.
But nobody wanted to die. Especially
when they knew the very moment they
charged yet another of those endless,
bleak, frozen bilis, the word conld come
flashing back along the line that truce
had been declared.
Commanders were trying to win the
battles, but not get anyone killed.
Troops becamc reludant to seek out and
find the enemy.
The Commmlist Chioese and North
Korean People's Anny had dernon–
strated it was quite wi!Jing to expend
its peasant boys, endlessly. While the
U.N. troops killed rhe enerny in Korea
at a ratio of nearly
9
to
1,
it was small
comfort to Westerners, who thought of
home. They lost interest, during the
peace talks and the resultant stalemate
along the lines, in expending further
energies in trying to kili the enerny.
Jllustrative of this, and reminiscent of
the lines in France during the first