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fields were no longer separate from
civilian política! offices. General
Douglas MacArthur, relieved of his
duties as supreme all ied commander in
Tokyo, was brought home as a direct
result of his insistence upon using
America's nuclear arms or whatever
arms necessary to achieve a complete
victory, and doing so by attacking Com–
munist bases in Manchuria. The United
States Government was forced to seek
sorne acceptable substitute for Mac–
Arthur's proposed victory - and this
resulted in a gradual build-up of armed
strength at huge econornic cost, and the
forcing of millions of young Americans
into long, hard and painful service
which they despised.
Reservists Sent to Fight
Sometimes, up to two thirds the com–
plements of the ships of the Seventh
Fleet were made up of reservists. Large
contingents of reservists - men who
felt they had already "done their bit"
during World War 11 and were long
since settled clown in civilian jobs,
made up major segments of U. S. land
forces, and flew many of the aircraft in
the air war over North Korea and along
Mig Alley.
The armed forces of every coun–
try have experienced their traditional
amount of griping and fretting over the
life of the "Gl." But in the early 1950's
the rumblings heard from the canks
took on a far different note.
It was as a result of the war in Korea
that Americans first learned their own
young roen could defect to the enemy
- even choosing to live in his own
country, and become a propaganda and
political tool in bis hands - all in
exchange for their lives and whatever
minor and temporary physical comforts.
The American public Jearned with
shock that Americans would, and did,
betray one another by giviog informa–
tion to the enemy.
The Gary Powers "superspy" incident
- the failure of a highly-trained,
extremely capable and presumably dedi–
Clted "spy pilot" to follow through on
his grisly task of taking his own life–
and the shocking aftermath of the
admission by the American President of
having stated a repeated untruth - aH
this, too, wore on the American spirit
The
PLAIN TRUTH
and the American pride in her power.
StiU, the American public was Jeft
with no deeply ingrained impression of
either unwillingness or inabiljty on the
part of America's fighting sons, fathers
and husbands in the Korean War. It
was quite patently the anguish of the
U. S. Government, finding itself politi–
cally unable or unwilling to win, strate–
gically unable to withdraw or disen–
gage, which led to deeper anguish
and frustration in the general public.
AND Then V ietnam
Wheo viewing the Korean War with
all its futility, in retrospect - it makes
the current situation in Vietnam, and
the protracted struggle of nearly a dec–
ade all the more incomprehensible.
The American Goverrunent clearly
failed to understand that Communists
negotiate fairly only when it is in
their
interest to do so, oc when unbearable
pressure is placed upon them. America
not only failed to win a decisive victory
in Kocea, but she failed to achieve a
decisive peace.
Within months after the final cessa–
tion of the "peace talks," and the sign–
íng of the truce documents, practically
every specific point so painstakingly
hammered out during the months of
insults, long staring silences and sudden
adjournments had been broken.
As is even now the case in Vietnam,
one of the major political footballs of
the 1950's was the question of POWs.
The United States Government was
deeply split over the Korean War, just
as it became deeply split over the Viet–
namese War. During the 1950's there
were those in American leadership who
wanted peace at any price. There were
also those who wanted victory at any
price.
Search your history books, and you
will find a dramatic shift in American
leadership right in the midst of the
Korean War, just as you have seen a
dramatic shift in American leadership
during the Victnamese War. A Republi–
can attack based upon past mistakes of
the existing administration successfully
brought Dwight Eisenhower to the
presidency in 1952. During that early
administration, such solutions as
"massive retaliation," and "more bang
February 1971
for a buck," were proposed. However,
painfully, that same administration
eventually adopted the policy of
con–
tainmenl
-
and somehow convinced
the American middle-classes that Com–
munism must be lived with, even if it is
opposed. After only ayear or two, then,
the new Republican administration
found itself forced into adopting vir–
tually every foreign policy of the pre–
vious Trumao administration.
No Lasting Peace
From that time to this, each new
American leader has discovered that
despite the call for new looks, new pro–
grams, new solutions, the same tired old
stony face of Communism always loomed
on the horizon, and new solutions, how–
ever appealing, remained to be viewed
only in the light of the continuously
awesome spectre of Soviet nuclear
power. America found itself, from that
time to this, simply because of its con–
tinued fear over Soviet reaction to the
most seemingly insignificant innovation
in American foreign policy, virtually
"asking the Conununists for permis–
sion" in adopting whatever ploy for
time, stop-gap, or intervention in what–
ever part of the world.
A new feeling of futility gradually
crept into the American mind as a result
of the terrible stalemate of Korea. This
was the beginning of the breaking of the
pride of our power.
lt
was that momeot
in history when we floundered, indeci–
sive, lacking clear-cut purpose, and
proved our will could be tested by tiny,
fourth-rate powers, with vastly inferior
equipment in the hands of ignorant
peasant boys who were largely illiterate.
Whíle nothing can be said which in
any way could take away from the fight–
ing spirit, in general, of the American
men in Korea, nor no serious criticism
offered of the job most of those men
performed in tl1at war, that subtle
weakening of the American will was
nevertheless a real product of our lack
of victory in Korea.
Living Wi th War
It is not sufficient, at this time, to
blame one political party or the other
- or to label one leader or the other.
The point is that, in Korea, just as in