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THE BERLIN WALL:
both a symbol and
a real·life reminder of the division of
Germany and al/ Europe.
entered the public consciousness."
The Guadeloupe summi t followed
closely two other events displaying
West Germany's growing power and
infiuence. First, Chancellor Schmidt
was the center-stage personality
when he hosted a seven-nation eco–
nomic summit in Bonn in July 1978.
Second, the West Germans in gener–
a l and Scbrnidt in particular a re the
leading forces behind tbe proposed
European Monetary System (EMS)
which should be launched sometime
later this year .
Summing up Bonn's emerging
leadership role, one European am–
bassador stationed in Bonn says that
dur ing the past year "the Germans
have had greatness thrust upon
them."
lsland of Stablllty
The first few weeks of 1979 wit–
nessed a wild fiurry of international
crises and upheavals. Througbout a ll
this turmoil, one cou ntry in the
Western world- West Germany–
ma intained a steady calm, though it
was deeply concerned over events in
lran and the future availability of a
good portion of its oil supply. The
Federal Republ ic could almost be
classed as an island of stability in an
ocean of chaos.
With her politicians clusJered
closely a round the moderate center,
with once troublesome left-wing ter–
rorism basically under control, and
with her people enjoying the benefits
of perhaps the world's most solid cur–
·rency, Bonn is the envy of her neigh–
bors and allies.
West Germa ns have, in effect,
submerged their own nationalistic
urges within that of Europeanism.
And, as the recent showing through–
out Germany of the U.S.-made tele–
vision production
Holocaust
re–
vealed, Germans a re not afraid to
take a hard, though difficult, look at
the recent past of Nazi bruta lity.
World's Leadlng Exporter
Success seems to breed success for
the West Germa n economy. The
steady, almost embarrassing rise in
The
PLAIN TRUTH April 1979
the value of the
deutsche mark
has in
no way put a dent in Bonn's hefty
trade surplus.
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n fact, the 1978 sur–
plus totaled an unexpectedly high
40.7 billion
deursche marks- the
second highest in its history. Even
more significantly, the surplus, when
calculated in U.S. dolla rs, amounted
to $20.3 billion, the largest on rec–
ord- "an embarrassing swelling ...
to ... unforese.en magnitude when
measured in current prices," said the
Journal of Commerce
in New
York.
A modest gain in exports, coupled
with appreciation of the mark, was
enough to propel West Germany past
the United States in 1978 to the rank
of the world's number-one exporting
nation.
One of the most interesting com–
ponents of West Germany's foreign
trade picture is the role that Cornmu–
nist China is playing. Bonn's exports
to most Communist countries in 1978
advanced at a steady rate, whereas
sales to the People's Republic leaped
a spectacular 72 percent.
"German experts," reported an–
other
Journal of Commerce
fi nding,
"feel tbat China wi ll soon becorne the
second-biggest buyer of German
goods in the East Bloc." Should this
occur, it will not make the Soviet
Union, Bonn's biggest Communist
customer, happy, to be sure.
East Germany Slipping Badly
The apparently unstoppable success
of West Germany is not occurring
withóut drawbacks, however. The en–
tire ideological and economic balance
between capitalist West and Com–
munist East Europe is threatening to
be thrown out of kilter. Tbis is espe–
cially true with the impact the soar–
ing West German economy is having
upon the neighboring German Dem–
ocratic Republic or East Germany,
where the economy is heading in the
opposite direction.
The economic outlook in East Ger–
many today is grim, with little hope
of improvement. Yet it was not al–
ways that way for the country's
Communist bosses and centra lized
economic planners.
East Germany, in fact, rnade rapid
economic advancement during the
1960s. Moscow hoped that " its Ger-
many" could be developed as a show–
case Communis t society, thereby
serving as an inspiration to the other
captive nations of her East Bloc cm–
pire.
lt
was felt that if anyone could
make Marxist- Leninism a success,
the determined Teutons could.
For a while the experiment seemed
to work. The East Gerrnan living
standard rose year after year. The
small but hardworking state emerged
from nowhere to become the world's
ninth largest industrial power. The
populace even began to develop a gen–
uine pride in its country's accom–
plishment. A common saying was:
" Look where we are now- and we
didn't have the Marsha ll Plan to put
us on our feet like the West Germans
did."
Bu t then the reality of being
locked into COMECON, the Rus–
sian-dictated Eastern economic web,
hi t hard with the eruption of the
worldwide oi l crisis of 1973-74. Up
zoomed the prices of Soviet raw ma–
terials, including oil (though not a
member of OPEC, Moscow in–
creased its oil prices almost in step) .
At the same time there were few
compensating price advantages for
the manufactured items the East
Germans sold to the Soviets and thei r
COMECON partners.
Almost overnight the East Ger–
man "miracle" fizzled.
Bonn's Helping Hand
l f it weren' t for direct and indirect
aid from her wealthy West German
uncle, the GDR would be in far
worse shape tha n it is today.
The East Germa n economy is sub–
sidized by the Bonn government to
the tune of a lmost $300 million a
year-road transi t fees, $220 million;
visa cha rges, $14 million; and ran–
som payrnents for "buying free" po–
lítica! prisoners, $55 million . On this
latter ítem, Bonn, since 1950, has
quietly paid over $500 million to East
Germany to buy the freedom of polít–
ica! captives.
East Germany also permits indi–
viduals over the age of 65 to emi–
grate to the West to rejoin family
members. This relieves the Eastern
regime of havi ng to pay further
pensions and social security bene–
fi ts, placing the burden for doing so
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