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U.S. PRESIDENTJIMMY CARTER
reviews West German NATO troops during official visit in July 1978. Wi/1American weak–
ness
force Germany to abandon the Atlantic Alliance and seek a deal with Moscow in return for German reunification?
dications of protectionism against
their goods in the United States and
Western Europe.
The weekly
Economist
of Britain.
in its August 19, 1978, issue, noted
the importance of the new partner–
ship:
"It
is not unreasonable for the
non-Chinesc three-quartcrs of the
world to wonder what thc Chinese
quarter. thus modernised, would
mean for it. As the great new Sino–
Soviet game of Encircling the Encir–
cler continues- the thought of a
China at even Britain's current leve!
of economic development, but 25
times as big. raises all the predict–
able eyebrows.
"Might a marriage of Chinese
diligence and Japanese technology
produce a new version of the 'co–
prosperity sphere' that really would,
this time, domínate the world? Or
would Russia march in to stop the
nonsense before it happened?"
How Russla Lost Out
In this developing new order in
Asia, which ultimately might
tn-
The
PLAIN TRUTH Oecember 1978
elude India and other smaller na–
tions. the "odd man out" will
definitely be the Soviet Union.
The Russians have only them–
selves to blame for their plight.
With only a little foresight and will–
ingness to compromise on its part,
the U.S.S.R. could now be Japan 's
economic partner instead of China.
For the last two and a half years
the Soviets proposed a similar peace
and friendship treaty to the Japa–
nese. The core of the pact involved
Japan's assistance in developing the
hidden riches of Siberia. The Japa–
nese asked only one favor of
Moscow: that the Russians return
four essentially valueless islands off
Hokkaido (Japan's northernmost
main island). which they seized at
the end ofWorld War 11.
The R ussians refused - and
thereby lost the deal of the century!
Joseph
C.
Harsch, top foreign af–
fairs commentator of the
Christian
Science
Monitor,
analyzed this re–
markable turn of events this way:
" Moscow could have won the com-
petition with China easily. had the
men of Moscow had the wit and
imagination and the political flexi–
bility. Nothing more graphically al–
tests to the clumsiness and slowness
of the Russian bear than its failure
to see the advantages to ítself of
having done the deal with Japan,
when it had the first chance; and
also its failure to see the danger to
its own interests of having China
obtain Japanese help....
"The United States in 1968 gave
back to Japan the Ryukyu Islands,
including Okinawa. In 1976 the So–
viet Union refused to give back the
southern Kurils. Thus, for the sake
of a few square miles of volcanic
forest swept by fog and bone-chill–
ing winds. whose economic value is
solely in fishing (mostly for crabs).
Moscow missed the chance to enlist
Japan as its panner in Asia."
Kremlln Overtures to Bonn
China's sudden aggressiveness is
having a predictable reaction in
Moscow. And this reaction is the
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