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port only respect strength. Member
of Parliament Stephen Hastings, in
the March 20, 1978
Daily Telegraph,
called current U.S. and British pol–
icy in Africa a "crazy combination
of illusion and weakness." Hastings
added: "The only ... identifi able
objective [of Washington's African
policy] seems to be a wish to avoid
conflict with the Russians at almost
any cost. Dress this policy how you
like, it still amounts to running
away, and if we run and abandon
the African continent to the men of
the Kremlin we shall have suffered
· a catastrophe from which the free
world may no longer have the re–
sources or the wiiJ to recover....
"The Zambezi is probably the
most effective anti-tank ditch in Af–
rica, the Rhodesian army is a match
for any number of Cubans and if
the integrity of the new Zimbabwe
is supported by the West- there is
still hope. Hope for the people of
Rhodesia; hope for Africa; hope
that the present disastrous Ameri–
can mood of dissimulation and eva–
sion can be changed in time; hope
that the British, whose responsibility
is undeniable, will overcome their
sleepy and selfish preoccupations.
Hope finally that good men will
awake before the forces of darkness
and evil overwhelm us all."
Why This Tragic Situation?
How did the United States, Britain
and the West in general get into this
no-win situation with the Russians?
Much of the answer has to do
with America's shattering defeat in
Indochina. Since Vietnam, the
United States has been fearful of
getting involved overseas. Every–
thing is seen in the context of Viet–
nam, whether it remotely resembles
the bitter conflict there or not.
As a result, the United States has
lost the will to aggressively resist So–
viet inroads in Africa and elsewhere.
This fact, opines the liberal
Sunday
Times
of Johannesburg, is the "bru–
tal reality of the matter." The edito–
rial went on to say: "No more
humbug about 'majority rule,' no
more sanctimonious posturing
about racism, no more pretense of
moral superiority. Just a failure of
wi ll. The sad truth of the matter is
tha t when the United States lifted
its ambassador from the roof of his
42
From
Afri~a,
Russia
" intends to move the
earth
in
the communist
direction. If she succeeds,
it will not be because of
her own strength,
but because
of the West's naivete."
To The Point
magazine
embattled embassy in Saigon it
abandoned not only its allies in
South Vietnam, Laos and Cam–
bodia, but it abandoned a cause.
Angola bore this out; so does the
Pavlovian anxiety of the United
States on the Horn of Africa; and so
[does U.S. policy) on Rhodesia."
But there is another reason, too. It
has to do with the very nature of
American policy toward Africa in
general in recent years.
A new book has j ust been re–
leased called
The Cloud of Danger,
Current Realities of American For–
eign Policy.
In it, author George F.
Kennan, one of America's foremost
scholars in international affairs, fur–
ther amplifies the reasons behind the
misdirected U.S. policy in Africa: "lt
was my impression, when traveling in
Africa a few years ago, that in its
approach to these black African
states, most of them new ones on the
political topography of the world,
official Washington had been acting
under the inftuence of sorne sort of
massive guilt complex, or feeling of
moral inferiority- a state of mind
which led many people to feel that it
was we, in the first instance, who had
to prove our benevolence towards the
peoples in question, we who had to
win their favor, rather than the other
way around. It was as though it were
.we who were the only losers if rela-
tions did not work out to everyone's
satisfa<;tion."
As a result, the United States,
says Kennan, persistently overdid
maoy things in an attempt to treat
small nations as equals: magnified
.the size of its aid programs, the size
and activity of its diplomatic staffs,
the number and scope of high-rank-
ing delegations. Amer ica fe lt
obliged to
~uggest
aid programs
where none was seriously requested
or valued. In case after case Wash–
ington sent an ambassador when
none was justified, or when perhaps
a chargé d'affaires would have been
more appropriate.
America pretended to ignore dis–
plays of offensive behavior. This is,
Kennan observes, "a practice that
befits a great power, to be sure, up
to a certain point, but becomes un–
desirable when carried too far, if
only because it encourages assump–
tions and states of mind on the other
side which are in the long run not
tolerable. We allowed to come into
existence, in other words, an atmo–
sphere of the relationship that
placed us in the position of the anx–
ious suitor, always prepared to ac–
cept today's rebuff in the hope of
tomorrow's favor."
This "curious state of mind," ac–
cording to Kennan, has pervaded
America's approach to the Third
World generally, not just Africa. Its
causes are obviously many, "but
beyond them there seems to be
something deeper and more difficult
of definition: sorne inner insecurity
that affects Americans when they
come into contact wi th smaller and
less developed societ ies-something
that causes them to confuse respect
with popularity, and to feel that
if popularity is not forthcoming, it
is they who are somehow at fault.
"However that may be, it is a ten–
dency that has often had unfortunate
results. Not only has
it
often misled
others as to the real elements of our
position, but
it
has laid us open to a
wide variety of forros of blackmail,
sorne delicate, sorne not so delicate,
sorne minor, others serious both in
scale and in offensiveness. Worst of
all, it defeats itself, for it encourages
others to take our benevolence for
granted and to assume that they need
make no reciproca! concessions to
retain it. The first requirement for
getting on with most foreign peoples
is to demonstrate that you are quite
capable of getting on without them.
An overeagerness to please suggests
the opposite."
Frlends . . . or Lovers?
ln this era of independence and self–
determination, many tiny countries,
The
PLAIN TRUTH June/ July 1978