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stant battle readiness. Egypt
desperately needs peace to rebuild
its war-shattered economy; the al–
ternative is total economic collapse.
Sadat was convinced that another
Mideast war-with Egypt as usual
bearing the brunt of the fighting–
was inevitable unless sorne sort of
dramatic breakthrough in the Mid–
east stalemate was quickly forth–
coming. Moreover, Egyptian
military intelligence indicated that
Israeli forces would likely win a
swift and decisive victory in any
new round of fighting, and probably
march straight into Cairo. With the
United States faltering in its efforts
to provide movement toward peace
in the area, Sadat felt compelled to
seize the initiative and act person–
ally to avert an otherwise inevitable
conflict.
Egyptians, for the most part, were
ready to go along with Sadat's
gamble, seeing it as the only alter–
native to the foreboding prospect of
total economic disaster.
The
PLAIN TRUTH March 1978
Though widely applauded
in
capi–
tals throughout the world, Sadat's
peace initiative found little support
in the most crucial area- the Middle
East itself.
Arab Reactlon
Arab reaction to Sadat's Israel
visit carne swiftly. Within hours of
the announcement of Sadat's in–
tention to go to J erusalem, denun–
ciations issued forth from Arab
capitals throughout the Middle
East, plunging the already divided
Arab world into even greater dis–
array and creating its most serious
política! split in many years. What
emerged was essentially a three-way
schism:
Only four nations- the Sudan,
Morocco, Oman, and Somalia-fully
endorsed the Sadat initiative.
Another faction- a loase alliance
of Algeria, Iraq. Libya. Syria, South
Yemen, and lhe Palestinian Libera–
lían Organization (PLO)-con–
demned lhe Sadat visit as
"treasonous," "a betrayal of the
Arab cause," and "a gamble wilh
Arab destiny." This group convened
an anti-Egyptian sumrnit in Trípoli,
Libya, which formally condemned
lhe Sadat move. In response, Sadal
broke off diplomatic relalions wilh
all five counlries.
Yel a third faclion-including
Saudi Arabia. lhe majorily of lhe
Persian Gulf oil states. and Jordan–
cautiously avoided direct in–
volvemenl in the inler-Arab quarrel.
What Syria and lhe other hard–
line Arab states fear is that Sadat
might abandon lhem and make
sorne sort of separale peace wilh
Israel. Syria's President Hafez Assad
declared that Sadat's single-handed
actions had "created a new obstacle
lo peace," and would only prolong
lhe Mideast conflicl. "There can
never be a separale peace. an
lsraeli-Egyplian peace. an Israeli–
Syrian peace, an Israeli-Jordanian
peace," Assad declared. "There
must be either an Israeli-Arab
peace, or no peace."
Most observers agree that any sel–
tlement which left out Syria and
Jordan would be no settlemenl at
all. And both Israel and Egypt have
repeatedly stated that a com-
prehensive settlement is indeed
their ultimate goal. Sadat says he is
seeking peace as the representative
not only of Egypt but of the entire
Arab world. But nol all Arabs are
convinced he will maintain lhat
stance should the negotiations for
an overall settlement become hope–
lessly deadlocked.
If such a separate agreement be–
tween Egypt and Israel were to
come about, the ability of Syria to
bargain for lhe return of the Israeli–
occupied Golan Heights would be
seriously undercut. Moreover, with–
out Egypt-the Arab world's major
military power- Syria and the other
"confrontation states" would be iso–
lated militarily. They could never
hope to face the vastly superior mili–
tary power of Israel in a new war.
Despite the current infighting, Sa–
dat does not see the inter-Arab split
as permanent. He hopes he can
negotiate an acceptable overall set–
tlement with Israel on behalf of the
other Arab states, and then sell it to
them ata later time.
Even Syria's Assad, it is believed,
might eventually come around. Un–
like the leaders of the other hard–
line Arab states, Assad is not op–
posed in principie to the idea of ne–
gotiations with Israel. Syria was the
only participan! in the Trípoli "anli–
Sadat" summit that accepts the prin–
cipie of peace talks under United
Nations Resolution 242, which gives
Israel the right to exist within secure
borders. Assad has shown more cau–
tion than the other Arabs in keeping
the door open lo an eventual nego–
tiated settlement. But because of
Syria's historie rivalrywith Egypt and
fearsofa possible Egyptiansellout, he
has not been able to endorse Sadat's
initiative.
In the context of this Arab frag–
mentation, the role of Saudi
Arabia-the financier of the Arab
cause-is viewed as critica!. The
Saudis were incensed that, despite
the heavy financia! underwriting of
the Egyptian government which
they provide, Sadat neglected to
consult with them beforehand about
his intended trip to Israel. They
were further shocked by his decision
to visit the Old City of Jerusalem
(Continued on page 39)
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