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bile industry was almost completely
engulfed by planned-obsolescence
dogmas: "I can recall the best hand–
ling, most economical car I ever
bought.
It
was a Studebaker Cham–
pion of pre-World War
11
vintage
and my wife and
1
drove it home
from the factory in Gary [Indiana)
to California. We averaged about 26
miles to the gallon through the life
of this little sweetheart, and we
never had a mechanical pet since
that has given us such satisfaction.
Studebaker and its Champion were
driven from the scene by the big
Impalas and all the other expensive
and rough and roaring fauna that
made their yearly debuts on the
highway circus scene" (p. 217).
Wrecking an Urban Rail System
Not satisfied with emasculating the
automobile industry, General Mo–
tors also took corporate aim at what
previously had been a highly suc–
cessful mass transit system. By the
time they (along with Standard Oil
of California and Firestone) were
through, many of the nation's tran–
sit networks were in shambles.
For example, Los Angeles in the
1940s had one of the most effective
mass transit systems in the country.
Raillines radiated outward as far as
75 miles from the center of the city.
Three thousand electric-powered
streetcars crisscrossed the Los Ange–
les Basin and provided hundreds of
thousands of commuters with timely
and reliable service. But this was of
small consolation to General Motors
and her two corporate partners, who
wanted to create a massive market for
diese! buses, automobiles, gasoline,
and rubber tires. Their first move was
to buy up the ioterurban system of
Los Angeles. Once in control they
systematically went about the busi–
ness of ripping out raíl and transmis–
sion lines. The city was then left
dependent on the automobile and the
bus as primary means of trans–
portation. The die was cast for many
of the nation's future energy and
environmental woes.
The same scenario was repeated
in 45 cities as the big three corpo–
rate monoliths succeeded in blotting
out more than one hundred electric
rai 1 systems. In 1949 all three were
found guilty of criminal conspiracy
to replace electric trolleys with gaso-
The
PLAIN TRUTH February 1978
15
AGrowing U.S.
Oil Deficit
,..
..
...
!
.
TOTAL SUPPLY
1
10
D oOMESTIC
suPPLY ONLY
CD
o
..
§
~
5
line- or diesel-powered buses. Gen–
eral Motors was slapped on the
wrist with a $5000 fine, but the dam–
age had been done. Throughout the
late '40s and early '50s the number
of people using mass transit facili–
ties dropped over 50 percent. Al the
same time, the number of automo–
biles doubled.
As Barry Commoner so aptly put
it: "The trolley car did not dis–
appear because of sorne
inherenl
fault ....
lt
was deliberately de-
Ironically, OPEC took
its cues on limiting the
flow of oil from the
practices of its
predecessors in the oil
business, the
major oil companies.
stroyed by the transportation indus–
try- for profit. T rolley cars did not
sicken and die; they were killed–
sacrificed on the altar of profit"
(The
Pover1y ofPower,
p.
233).
Postwar Motor Mania
Raíl transportation had other obsta–
eles to contend with during this
pivota! period. Railroad companies
tended to concentrate their capital
on the more profitable aspect of
their operations- hauling freight.
Passenger service became an un–
wanted stepchild. With General
Motors able to monopolize manu–
facture of diese! locomotives, the
use of highly efficient electric trains
also declined. The automobile in–
dustry also received a whopping
government subsidy in the form of
the multibillion-dollar federal high–
way program. By comparison tbe
railroads received little or nothing.
Most passenger raíl systems, no–
tably Penn Central 's, soon stagnated
and descended into a neglected state
of disrepair. The number of passen–
ger trains in operation fell accord–
ingly-from 20,000 in 1926 to less
than 240 in 1972. In 1939 trains ac–
counted for two-thirds of al! passen–
ger miles traveled. By 1974 their
share was less than six percent. As
America began to travel more on
rubber and less on rails, per capita
fue! consumption rose accordingly.
The nation's energy budget dur–
ing this period was also inflated as
manufacturers opted for a more
profitable no-deposit, no-return phi–
losophy. Synthetics that used non–
renewable petroleum resources were
substituted for naturally grown fi–
bers such as wood, wool and cotton.
On the farro, manual labor and nat–
ural compost gave way to the inter–
na 1 com bustion engi ne a nd
petroleum-based fertilize rs.
lnternational Oil Cartel
But oil production, as well as oil
consumption, was also radically in–
fluenced by the pursuit of profits
and growing industrialization.
During the 1920s there was a con–
tinua! battle by independent oil pro-
17