Page 3844 - 1970S

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they have demanded a new international economic or-
:
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der tbrough the massive redistribotion of wealth and
~
technology from rich nations to poor. In etfect, the South :;
wants the North to take a cut in its standard of living if
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necessary so that the South may raise its own.
c:i
For many years the North refused to take the South's
inte¡pretation of history or concept of just compensation
seriously. The demands were ignored and scotfed at as
absurd and unrealistic. Then carne OPEC's (the Qrgani–
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) fourfold in–
crease in the price of oil in late 1973 and the oil
embargo. The price increase hurt developed and devel–
oping nations alike, but the developing nations sutfered
the most since they could least atford the new price. But,
as
lvor
Richards. United Kingdom Ambassador to the
United Nations, pointed out last October at the Alterna–
tives to Growth Conference in Houston, Texas: "Para–
doxically, hurt as many of them wer:e by the action of
the oil producers, there has not been condemnation, but
admiration. on the part of the developing nations for the
very oil producers who have made their lives so miser–
able. They have been perceived as a group of developing
nations- a group like their own-who have a raw mate–
rial essential to the West, and who stood up to the West
and won."
lt quickly became apparent to the developing nations
that they could use their own resources as leverage for
similar econornic and política! gains. They renewed their
dernands and found an inftuential advocate in the OPEC
countries, who syrnpathized with their economic plight
(though not enough to commit ll}.Ore than a token
amount of their vast new accumulation of petrodollars
to provide relief).
Meanwhile. the developed nations sought to counter
OPEC's power.ln February 1974, 13 major oil importers
met in Washington to plan a cornmon strategy. They
agreed to set up the lnternational Energy Agency to
draw úp an oil-sharing plan in case of a new oil em–
bargo. France, however, boycotted the l EA on the
grounds that it wanted to talk to, not confront, the oil
producers.
The Dialogue Starts
rance's alternative, also espoused by Saudi
Arabia, was a worldwide dialogue on oil and
international economic matters. The United
States was lukewarrn at first. fearing that noth–
g would come out of such a large. unwieldy
forum except provocative rhetoric. This view softened
when it was decided to limit the conference to 27 mem–
bers, including the nine European Community nations
as a single rnernber. Altogether eight members from
developed nations, seven from oil-producing nations,
and 12 from non-oil-producing developing nations were
chosen. In December 1975, the North-South dialogue
was inaugurated with a ministers' meeting. It became
formally known as the Confetence on lnternational Eco–
nomic Cooperation.
The worst fears of the United States were partially
realized. The representatives of the developing nations
filled the a ir with demands of massive transfers ofwealth
from North to South and relief from the staggering
The
PLAIN TRUTH February 1978
"lt
isn't good enough for developed
nations to tell undeveloping nations no
to follow our pa ttern of economic
growth, because eventually they will
face the same problems we face now
[pollution, depleted resources, etc. ].
Frankly, they would rather have our
problems than theirs ."
lvor Richards, United Kingdom
Ambassador to the United Nations
burden of nearly $150 billion in debts owed to industrial
nations, and called for an indexing of oíl and commodity
prices.
The developed nations countered that higher com–
modity prices and debt relief would strain their econo–
mies and add to inftation. The demánd for more
transfers of technology and greater access to developed
nations' markets would only add to unemployment in
developed countries by increasing competition.
The openíng session did not augur well. Yet, despite
the wide divergencies of opiníon, sorne progress was
made. In January 1976, finance ministers approved sorne
monetary reforms to benefit developing nations. And in
May the United Nations Conference on T rade and De–
velopment in Kenya set up a schedule for negotiating
one of the developing world's most cherished objectives:
a $3 bill ion "common fund" to prop up commodities
prices.
But the developing nations were not mollified. They
interpreted the concessions as more symbolic than sub–
stantive. In their view, the North was still not taking
their demands seriously, and had hardly budged on its
original position.
i.e..•
a status quo free-market system
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