Page 3746 - 1970S

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in compensatory military aid (as–
suming the aid plan isn't scuuled
altogether by the essentially unre–
lated question of Korean lobbying
in Washington).
From all indications the U.S.
wi thdrawal has been justified on the
estimation that South Korea will be
able to successfully confront North
Korea on its own in the event of
another Korean war, and that its
own formidable forces could hence–
forth act as enough of a deterren
t.
The big fear in South Korea,
however. is that the Nonh's allies–
Communist China and the Sovie t
Union- would be forced to inter–
vene on Kim's behalf in th e event of
another war. Thus the Korean equa–
tion is not really "one on one" but
actua lly "three versus two." And if
the American deterrent vanishes it
would be " three agaínst one."
It is known that both Peking a nd
Moscow have strongly counseled
Kim to avoid mílitary adventures on
the península. But the North Ko–
rean dícta tor knows he has a free
hand. He is confident of the support
of his two allies, however reluctant
they may be to give ít. As rivals for
influence throughout the Commu–
nist world, Communist China and
the Soviet Union would be forced to
competitively
help Kim in a war
against the South, Jest one of them
be accused of refusing to aid a Com–
munist brotber
in
a "war of libera–
tion." Mo reover, the Korean
península is strategically importan!
to both of the major Communist
powers, and neíther could atford to
allow the o ther to gain the upper
hand there.
Thus, by playing one ally against
the o ther, Kim would be able to
en list massive support whenever he
chooses to launch his drive south .
How Trustworthy ls America?
Pentagon and Defense Depa rtment
officials- and Presiden! Carter him–
self- have repeatedly assured South
Korea tha t despite the troop with–
drawal th e U .S. will respond
promptly to aggression against the
South. A letter from Presiden! Car–
ter to South Korean President Pa rk
Chung-hee assured Park that the
1954 U.S.-Korean mutual defense
trea ty will remain " firm and un–
diminished."
The
PLAIN TRUTH December 1977
DOUGLAS MacARTHUR STATUE
(right) and brass relief sculpture
(above) at lnchon commemorate U.N.
troop /anding there during Korean War.
But South Koreans remaín un–
convinced. The 1954 mutual defense
treaty gives the U.S. a loophole by
stat ing that each side "would act to
meet the common danger
in accor–
dance wizh its constitutional pro–
cesses."
In other words, action by
the U.S. Congress. The NATO char–
ter, on the other hand, provides for
unconditional intervention.
The
South Koreans would a t least like a
similar íronclad assurance of imme–
diate and automatic assis tance from
the U.S. in case of war, wi thout pro–
Jonged congressiona l haggling over
whether or not to send the troops
back.
Yet, in case of war. even if the
U.S. ground troops set out for Ko–
rea immediately from other bases in
Asía, the North Koreans, only 30
miles from Seoul, would very likely
overrun the South Korean capital
long before the Americans arr ived.
Mílitary a nalysts estímate that a
massed armor a ttack launched at
night would have a good chance of
reaching Seoul by dawn, even
against American a ir force opposi–
tion.
This is why one officia l after an–
o ther with whom we talked
in
South
Korea urged the United States to
keep its small but stra tegically pin–
pointed ground forces right where
they are so that
there wi/1 simply be
no aggression to have ro respond ro!
Moreover, the American troops
now stationed at the border- the
very cream of the U.S. military–
ha ve shown the utmost restraint and
caution in the face of frequent prov–
ocations from the North. Would re–
placement South Korean soldiers
be able to exercise as much control
a nd avoid emotional react ions
which could quickly plunge both
sides into another war?
Overall, the gains of withdrawal
are nonexi s tent , but the risks
enormous.
U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus
Vanee has said : "The United States
is and will remain an Asían and
Pacific power." But South Korean
officials, in etfect, say : "Prove it."
They counter that U.S.
actions–
more tell ing of its true íntentions
than mere words-i ndícate it is
steadily retreating from the Pacific!
Tn the event war breaks out after
the U.S. troops are withdrawn,
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