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most undebatably immoral act a
human being can commit. Every
sane human being agrees that mur–
der is wrong. This is because
some–
one e/se
is hurt , and
will
never have
a chance to live again in this pres–
ent world. Murder is the permanent
wrong, the one immoral act for
which there can be no restora tion.
Therefore, unless we can
conclu–
sively
know that the fetus isn't a sep–
arate human being, abortion must
be avoided.
lt
could be murder.
Kevin Axe, writing in
U.S. Catho–
lic,
has phrased the issue with un–
usual clarity: "The most logical–
and moral-'- response to this uncer–
tainty about when life begins is not
to take chances. Since full human
life
might
be present from the mo–
ment of conception, a person who
aborts might be killing a human
being."
Before abortion can be viewed as
morally pe rmissible, we mu s t
know-using the same standard of
certainty that we do in murder
cases-beyond al/ reasonab/e doubt
that tbe fetus is
not
another human
being.
When we look a t the "data," how–
ever, we discover that not only is it
impossible to conclusively prove
that the fetus isn't aoother human
being, but also there is evidence,
both medica! and bibl ical, that the
fetus indeed is another person.
Where Do You Draw the Llne?
Abortions are currently being per–
formed on fetuses up to 24 weeks
old; tbe irony is that doctors are also
having success in keeping alive 24- '
week-old babies after premature
bi rth. Most pro-abortionists try to
draw the line at viability or self–
sufficiency ; the idea is the abortion
is wrong only after the child can
survive apart from its mother. By
these standards, the abortion of a
23- or 24-week-old fetus is nothing
less than infanticide. However, "via–
bility"
is
a deceptive criterion; its
essence is the fetus'
dependence
on
the mother's womb for "life sup–
port." Yet adults are sometimes de–
penden! o n the " l ife-support
system" of an iron lung, but we do
not sanction killing them. Just be–
cause someone is dependent on
someone else to live, does not ex–
elude him from the human race.
The
PLAIN TRUTH August.September 1977
If not at self-sufficiency, then,
where does another life, separate
from the mother's, begin? A few
medica! facts stand out:
The fetus has a detectable heart–
beat, separate from the mother's, as
early as the eighteenth day after
conception.
Brain waves, evidence of which is
the current legal criterion for life,
are in evidence at seven weeks.
The "unviable" fetus responds to
pain, makes respiratory efforts, and
moves spontaneously, which are
other legal criteria for liJe. The fetus
displays personality in that it can
learn, acqui.re likes and dislikes, be–
come bored or excited.
Most important ly, from the mo–
ment of conception the fetus is
genetically a separate organism
from the mother, having its own in–
dividual chromosomal structure.
The upshot is that the line can' t
really be drawn anywhere but con–
ception, wbere living tissue becomes
distinctly identifiable from either its
mother or father.
Inevitably, the pro-abortionists
argue that
at conception
the fcrti–
lized egg is
self-evidently
no t a
human being. It is, it is contended, a
mere "glob of tissue." And yet we
cannot categoricaUy state tha t such
a "glob of tissue" is not accounted
by God as a human being. The
former head of one abortion clinic,
Dr. Bemard Nathanson, feeling per–
sonally chastened after realizing
that he had presided over 60,000
killings, notes that "our capacity to
measure signs of life is becoming
more sophisticated every day, and
as time goes by we will undoubtedly
be able to isolate these signs (heart–
beats, brain waves) a t earlier and
earlier states in fetal development."
Certainly a being who is a sepa–
rate genetic organism from its
mother and which exhibits its own
heartbeat and brain waves cannot
be absolutely defined as "not a sep–
ara te human being." And yet these
are the characteristics of the fetus,
measured with our current tech–
nology, a t seven to eight weeks.
The simple fact is that we
do not
know
how early signs ofseparate life
such as brain waves really do occur,
because knowledge of such signs
may be limited by technology. Be–
cause of the inherent physical limi-
tations of our equipment, we cannot
definitively state tha t vital life signs
aren't there before seven weeks–
on ly that we haven' t detected them
yet. There is no
proof
that they
aren't there.
A Blbllcal Look
T he b íblica) criterion for "m·ean–
ingfullife" (a phrase so dear to pro–
abortionists) is the possession of
the
spirit in man
(1
Cor. 2: 11). By this
theological criterion, a "blob of
ce lls," even if it doesn't
seem
human, is human if it has the spi rit
in man. The next question is, natu–
rally, when does the spirit in man
enter into a human being?
We cannot say for sure.-There are
two admittedly vague biblical in–
dications: the various references to
the "breath of life" (e.g., Gen. 2:7)
and the reference to the "life being
in the blood" (e.g. , Lev. 17: 11). The
former strengthens, though does not
prove, the pro-abortion argument,
while the latter, if applicable to the
fetu s, would positively disprove it.
However, one can counter on both
sides that such phrases onJy serve
literary or poetic purposes, and are
not philosophical statements which
could apply one way or the other.
So we must look elsewhere.
It is undeniable that
metaphori–
cally
Bible writers speak of fetuses
as individual persons. Psalms 139 is
perhaps the most striking: "For
thou hast possessed my reíos: thou
hast covered me in my mother's
womb. 1 will praise thee; for 1 am
fearfu lly and wonderfuUy made:
marvellous are thy works; and that
my soul knoweth right well. My
substance was not hid from thee,
when l was made in secret, and curi–
ously wrought in the lowest parts of
the earth. Thine eyes did see my
substance, yet being unperfect ; and
in thy book all my members were
written, which in continuance were
fashioned, when as yet there was
none ofthem" (verses 13-16).
The phrase " the lowest parts of
the earth" is recognized by many
commentators as a biblical meta–
phor for the womb. This passage is
poetic, but there is no denying that
in the course of this poetry the
psalmist imputes, by the use of the
pronoun "me," individual person–
ality to himself whi le yet unbom.
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