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As history has so often shown,
revolutions are often notorious for
being the harbingers of worse tyran–
nies than the ones they usually
claim to replace. The Ethiopian ex–
periment is in no way ditferent from
tha t witnessed elsewhere in this re–
gard.
0 : What went wrong with the revolu–
tlon?
A:
To back up a bit, one must recall
th e devastating drought and famine
that ravished parts of Ethiopia in
the early I970s. These led to student
riots and general civil disturbances
that marked the end of the regime
of the la te Emperor Hai le Selassie in
1974, and the military, the most
well-organized force' in the nation,
took over the administration of
Ethiopia. The military officers j usti–
fied their actions as a reluctantly
shouldered patriotic duty to enforce
law and order and ensure stability
throughout the country.
The takeover ca rne relatively
peacefully. The new regime's initial
moves were in the right direction. Its
motto, "Ethiopia Tikdem"- which
means putting the country's interest
before anything else- had a simple
patriotic appea l that elicited an en–
thusiastic response from the people.
There was no ideology or doctrine
involved here; no Marxist or Maoist
jargon.
But soon it became quite clear
that these were public-relations
measures undertaken only to get
popular support for the military's
accession to power. It was not long
before the military revealed its true
colors and began to rule the only
way it knew how- namely, through
ruthless repression, indiscriminate
killing of innocent citizens and the
unrestricted use of terror tactics. So
Ethiopia today is back to square one
in the struggle for human rights.
Q:
Who comprises the "Dergue," the
mllltary counci l whlch is running
Ethlopla today? Do they have any
real qualiflcations for rulershlp?
A:
The word "Dergue" means "com–
mittee" in the Amharic language,
which is the official language of
Ethiopia. This body was formed at the
height ofthe political disturbances in
the country in 1974. Originally the
total membership of the Dergue was
120. But a fierce struggle for power
among Dergue members has since
The
PLAIN TRUTH August-September 1977
taken a heavy toll, and today not
more than 40or 50 remain alive out of
the original 120. The strange thing
about it is that the majority of those
wielding great inftuence in the Der–
gue are noncommissioned officers,
that is, the sergeants and corporals.
There are also many privates among
them. So it is these lowest-ranking
soldiers with hardly any forma l edu–
cation and with very scanty knowl–
edge of the world around them that
constitute the real power base of dic–
tator Mengistu Haile Mariam in the
Dergue. Since Mengistu himself is a
dropout from the sixth grade, and
very much like them in every respect ,
this comes as no surprise at all.
This also, by the way, explains the
fantastically anti-eli tist, anti-in–
telligentsia and, of course, anti–
Western stance of this uncouth and
bloodthirsty band of soldiers. At the
moment, the faction which seems to
be on top is the Mengistu faction
which has adopted Marxism as its
official program.
Q:
What are the reasons for the
Dergue's abandonment of Ethlopla's
long-standing relatlonshlp with the
Unlted States and lts about-face
toward the Soviet Union?
A:
In order to prove their st rong ad–
herence to Ma rxism and their
sincerity for the Communist ideol–
ogy to their newfound friends and
allies in Russia and Cuba, the mili–
tary rulers have ordered the whole–
sale expulsion of Americans and
sorne Western European citizens.
They have at the same time ordered
the closure of Western consulates
and five U.S. agencies which oper–
ated for many years in various parts
of the country. All this, coupled with
Mengistu's recent visit to the Soviet
Union, is a clear indication asto the
direction in which the Dergue is
moving, and one doesn't need to be
an expert in global strategy to see
the long-term harmful effects of this
move on the interests of the West.
Q:
What about Ethlopia's relation–
shlps to her nelghbors in the vital
"Horn of Africa" reglon?
A:
In foreign atfairs, Ethiopia's tra–
ditional foreign-policy cornerstones
have been thrown to the winds:
nonalignment, active participation
in African atfairs in order to en–
bance Ethiopian prestige and, above
all, peaceful a nd friendly reta-
tions with neighboring countries.
In addition to all this, war or civi l
war are distinct possibi lities. A sepa–
ratist movement in Eritrea on the
Red Sea threatens to tear the coun–
try apart. And war with the Sudan
or Somalia líes on the horizon. Con–
ftict with Somalia may arise over
access to the port city of Djibouti,
Ethiopia's major ou tlet to the sea,
which gained its independence only
in June of 1977. In short, the dicta–
torship has managed to destroy
within such a short period what took
centuries of painstaking effort and
dedication to build: a unified and
strong Ethiopian nation.
Q:
How do you account for the de–
mise of Emperor Halle Selassie after
his nearly
60
years of more or leas
popular one-man rule? What mls–
takes did he make that led to Ethlo–
pla's subsequent convulsiona?
A:
The very complex Ethiopian phe–
nomenon does not lend itself to any
easy or simple formula in the search
for an explanation. But
l
think it is
quite safe to say that most of the
seeds of the present-day troubles
were sown during the long rule of
the late emperor.
Perhaps no other monarch in the
long history of Ethiopia wielded so
much power and intluence over the
life and times of his people as Em–
peror Haile Selassie. One cannot
help speculating how much better
things would have been for Ethiopia
had the late emperor carried to his
old age the fame and reputation
that he enjoyed as a forward-look–
ing, progressive young man who a l–
ways worked tirelessly for t he
progress of his people.
Particularly for the last ten Lo fif–
teen years, the emperor singularly
fai led to heed a ll the warnings of the
times and to read the writing on the
wall. As he was gradually losing his
grip, largely on account of the effects
of old age, all the nation's known
problems were becoming even more
acute and pressing. They needed
more than anything else a more imag–
inative and responsive leadership
which he was not capable of provid–
ing at that time; and yet he was sti ll
unwilling to transfer the reins ofgov–
ernment to younger, more capable
hands. And at last when he was liter–
ally forced to do so by events, it was
already too late.
o
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