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Given Panama's current sad state
of affairs- an economy on the verge
of bankruptcy, unemployment at 15
percent, and recent riots against in–
creased food prices which nearly
toppled Torrijos-the temptation
will be great for her politicians to
milk the users of the waterway in
order to pay for misdirected policies
in other spheres of Panama's econ–
omy.
Up until now, tbe global utility
whicb is th e Canal has been
shielded from economic and politi–
cal turmoil in Panama itself. This
comfort will cease when U.S. control
ceases-and what a política! football
the Canal could become!
U.S. lgnoring Geopolltlcal Realltles
Critics of a new treaty express grave
doubts that Panama would faith–
fully operate the Canal under rea–
sonable rates and fair and equal
terms for all as the United States
has under what Theodore Roosevelt
called "a mandate of civilization."
But this is only halfthe story. The
biggest fear that opponents of a new
treaty have is this: What happens to
the Canal- what happens to Pan•
ama itself- after U.S. authority in
the Zone ceases following the three–
year period? For while Panama has
proveo itself to
be
a David in rela–
tion to the American Goliath, in
reality it is a small, weak, unstable
nation, vulnerable to imperialist
predators. In possession of the Ca–
nal it would be a ripe plum indeed.
A survey of the history of Pan–
amanian politics is enough to con–
firm these fears. In its 74 years as an
independent state, Panama has writ–
ten a remarkable record of political
instability. In fact, the present nine–
year-old military government of
General Torrijos is uncharacteristi–
cally long-lasting.
Uncertainty over Panama's in–
tentions and future política! direc–
tion is .compounded by the growing
worldwide posture of the Soviet
Union. The opportunistic Soviets
would undoubtedly be eager to
move into a dominant role in
Panamanian affairs if the U.S.
relinquished its authority in the
Zone.
Jncreasingly over the last decade
the Soviets have made huge strate–
gic gains at the expense ofthe West.
The
PLAIN TRUTH July 1977
Negotiations wlth Panama
over the futuré of the
Canal have been carrled
on in the spirit of
wishful thlnklng and
without due regard to the
realltles of
lnternatlonal politlcs.
Wrestlng the control of
the world's strateglc
waterways, lncluding
the Panama Canal,
has long been a major
Soviet objective.
When Britain abandoned her
"east-of-Suez" policy, the Kremlin
moved quickly to fill the vacuum. In
domino fashion, the U.S.S.R. has
acquired a string of bases and port–
and-supply facilities along the entire
circumference of postcolonial Af–
rica- from Algeria in the north to
Guinea, Cape Verde, Nigeria and
Angola in the west, to Mozambique,
Madagascar and Somalia in the
east.
Reds in power at Africa's south–
ern tip, a key Soviet objective,
would mean a Communist stran–
glehold on one of the free world's
mos t vital sea-lanes- the Cape
Route- the critical water avenue
over wbicb sail over 24,000 ships a
year, mostly tankers, transporting
virtually all of Western Europe's
(and much of America's) oil.
Thus it should come as no sur–
prise that the prospects of Kremlin
meddling on the Isthmus are loom–
ing greater. And with the United
States effectively removed from the
scene, it should be obvious that
there is relatively little an unstable
and vulnerable Panama, " pro–
tected" by its 10,000-strong Na–
tional Guard, could do to thwart
any overt or covert Soviet move.
As eminent Panama Canal au–
thority Dr. Donald M. Dozer states:
"With the removal of the United
States' authority, Panama will again
become a focus of intemational riv–
alry." Professor Dozer fu r ther
stresses that wresting the control of
the world's strategic waterways, "in–
cluding the United States' Isthmian
Canal," has long been a major So–
viet objective.
"The current negotiations," con–
tinues this expert, "have been car–
ried on in tbe spirit of wishful
thinking and without due regard to
the realities of intemational politics.
The critica! situation of the United
States in the Canal Zone, produced
largely by Washington policy–
makers, is nota mere local question
between the United States and Pan–
ama. lt is part of a global power
struggle directly related to the secu–
rity of the United States and the
entire Western Hemisphere.
"Upon the defense of the Canal
Zone by the United States depends
the fa te of the Canal. Upon the fa te
of the Canal depend the safety of
world sea-lanes and the fate of the
entire Caribbean-Gulf area. Upon
these factors depend the survival of
the United States as a free and inde–
pendent nation and tbe safety and
welfare of the American conti–
nents."
Wlthout the Zone,
No
Securtty
A key question America's negotia–
tors should be asking is: What if
Panama, under Communist pres–
sure or not, should renege on the
terms of a new treaty and threaten
to expel the U.S. from further part–
nership in the Canal operation?
What if, furthermore, revolutionary
disorders erupt in Panama and
threaten tbe Canal itself? Despite an
"ironclad" defense treaty, Washing–
ton might be accused of inter–
national aggression against Panama
if it intervened militarily- since the
troops would be fighting Pan–
amanians on Panamanian soil , the
Canal and the area around it no
longer being U.S. property.
That is why the " protective
framework" of the Zone is as impor–
tant as the Canal itself. Without the
Canal Zone the U.S. has no future
guaranteed access to the Canal, save
Panama's good faith! The Canal
would become just like any other
commercial enterprise beld hostage
by a dictator's whim to tbe threat of
total nationalization. Tbere is sim–
ply no way a new treaty can possi–
bly provide the protection afforded
by the 1903 accord!
There are those who claim that
the Canal is "indefensible" and tbat
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