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merce and industry, while Canal
revenues, direct and indirect, have
enabled the tiny Republic of Pan–
ama to achieve one of the highest
standards of living in aU of Latín
America.
But, it must be admitted, it is the
reality of the American presence on
a smaUstrip of U.S.-owned territory
operat ing under American laws
which has rankled certain elements
in Panama almost from the begin–
ning of what, but for human nature,
could have been a beautiful rela–
tionship.
As one of the foremost authorities
on the history of the Panama Canal,
Dr. Donald M. Dozer, puts it so
eloquently: "The very success of the
United States in building and oper–
ating the Canal and in developing
the Canal Zone, when contrasted
with th e cond iti o ns of under–
development in the Republic of
Panama, has fi lled Pa namanian
demagogues with envy which has
driven them to covet their neighbor's
canal and Canal Zone. There would
be no Canal problem today if these
politicians would follow the com–
mandment: 'Thou shalt not covet thy
neighbor's Canal Zone, bis canal, or
anything that is thy neighbor's.'"
Baslc Terms
The broad outlines of a new treaty
were established in an agreement
reached three years ago by former
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
and Juan Antonio Tack, who was
then Panama's foreign minister.
Their talks resulted in a jointly is–
sued "statement of principies" to be
incorporated in a .new treaty.*The
essential points called for an early
•Under the terms of the original 1903 Hay–
Bunau-Varilla treaty, still in force, Panama
granted to the United States "in perpetuity" a
strip of territory crossing the Isthmus in
wbich the United States could exercise "all
the rights, power and authority ... which it
would possess and exercise if it were the sov–
ereign of the territory ... to the entire ex–
clusion of the exercise by the Republic of
Panama of any such sovereign rigbts, power
or authority." For this grant of sovcreignty
"in perpetuity," the United States paid Pan–
ama the full purchase price of $10,000,000
and later indemnified the owners of tbe land
by purchasing it from them, tbus acquiring
complete ownership of all the land in the
Canal Zone. The phrase "in perpetuity" is
found a total of seven times in the cession
treaty.
8
lf the Canal becomes
Panama's, the temptatlon
will
be
great for her
politicians to milk the
waterway and its major
users in order to
pay for misdirected
policies in other spheres
·
of Panama's economy.
Many nations will suffer,
not just the
Unlted States.
transfer of the Canal Zone to Pan–
ama and the setting of a date when
Panama would assume "total re–
sponsibility" for running the Canal.
On the first issue-sovereignty
over the Zone- it is believed the ne–
gotiators have agreed that the Canal
Zone itself would pass out of U.S.
hands no later than three years after
the treaty
is
ratified. From the end
of the three-year period unti l the
end of the new treaty, possibly the
year 2000, Panama would also in–
crease its operating responsibilit ies
of the Canal itself "in partnership"
with the United States.
Other big issues yet unresolved
are the number and size of military
bases required by the U.S. for de–
fense of the Canal during the new
treaty's period, as well as the legal
status of the severa! thousand "Zo–
nians"-American cit izens living in
tbe Zone who, up until now, have
been subject only to U.S. laws and
regulations.
Quite understanda bly, morale
among the American workers and
their families in the Zone has sunk
very low lately as the negotiations
have dragged on and as the end to
effective U.S. control looms. Most
see no future for tbemselves or their
families. Key personnel needed to
keep the operation going- pilots,
dredge and tugboat operators, engi–
neers and machinists-are quitting
at double the normal rate. Finding
replacements is proving to be al–
most impossible.
Who will safely and efficiently op–
erate the Canal if most of the
trained Americans leave? Though
Panamanians now outnumber
Americans in Canal Company jobs
(about 11 ,000 to 4,000), it is doubt–
ful whether Panama's tiny popu–
lation can supply enough
skilled
manpower to fiU the gap.
After2000?
Another serious question at the mo–
ment revolves around what rights
the United States will be able to
exercise beyond the
n~w
treaty
period to ensure adequate American
access to and defense of the Canal.
Washington's negotiators have
pressed for continued U.S. defense
rights- perhaps in a separate status–
of-forces treaty- well into the next
century.
Panama insists, however, that the
end of the treaty must write the fin–
ish to American responsibility of
any kind. For Washington's in–
ftuence to linger on afterwards, her
officials say, would be a blow to
Panama's
pride- dignidad.
General Torrijos has proposed
that in the posttreaty period, guar–
antees of access to the Canal and its
continued neutrality (faithfully en–
sured to all nations by the U.S. for
the past 63 years) could be invested
in the United Nations instead!
But with the way the U.N. has been
acting lately, such a proposal is tan–
tamount, say sorne, to vi rtual assur–
ance that "imperialist" America
would someday be denied the use of
the very waterway it built and paid
for!
Four years ago, in a special ses–
sion of the U.N. Security Council
held in Panama City, Panama com–
pletely won over the U.N. to its side
in the Canal dispute. Panamanian
officials, in a successful attempt to
garner Third World support, argued
that the Canal was their country's
"greatest natural resource."
Of course, the Canal
is
nota "nat–
ural resource" in the same sense as,
say, petroleum or iron ore. It is a
man-made project, constructed· and
paid for totally by the taxpayers of
the United States.
With regard to the "greatest re–
source" ploy, Panama's politicians
have repeatedly made ominous
statements to the effect that they
want to see Canal tolls raised
sharply and that they are not going
to continue to "subsidize" the
American shipping industry.
The
PLAIN TRUTH July 1977