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for any sign of weakness- although
most Americans seem oblivious to
this ideological fact of life- dec"ided
to test America's will as it pertained
especiaJiy to southern Africa. It rea–
soned that because of the lingering
gbost of Vietnam, the Watergate di–
saster and the maelstrom swirling
around CIA activities, it could suc–
cessfully intervene in an important
side-theater area of the world with–
out engendering U.S. opposition.
Test Case: Angola
The test case was the former Portu–
guese colony of Angola which lay in
shambles as rival nationalist forces
battled in a civil war. The true story
of the Angolan war has only re–
cently been revealed, largely via a
sensational series of articles au–
thored by Robert Moss early tbis
year in London's
Sunday Telegraph.
Briefty stated, the Soviets had
been backing one of the factions for
years before the Portuguese sud–
denly gave up and made a hasty exit
in 1975, largely as a result of a near
Communist takeover in Portugal it–
self.
According to an agreement made
in January 1975, the Soviet-backed
MPLA group was supposed to enter
into a new coalition govemm.ent
witb two rival anti-Russian nation–
alist movements, the National Front
for the Liberation of Ango la
(FNLA) and UNITA (the National
Union for the Total Independence
of Angola). The MPLA, however,
had no intention of sharing power
with the other two groups. Since its
ethnic power base in Angola was
smaller than UNITA's, a general
election which was scheduled to be
held sometime after the coalition
went into effect would have buried
theMPLA.
It decided instead to try for all–
out military victory.
MPLA's leader Agostinbo Neto
(now Angola's president) appealed
to the Soviet Union for more arms.
Weapons deliveries were siepped
up. But ski lled personnel were
needed to operate them and to train
the MPLA forces in their use. Ap–
peals for direct Soviet manpower
were rejected in Moscow, appar–
ent ly out of fear of American
counterin tervention.
Moscow suggested its Cuban al-
6
lies take up the slack. Fidel Castro
was also said to be timid at first,
fearing American retaliation possi–
bly in the form of a naval blockade
around Cuba. He soon leamed he
had nothing to fear.
During the autumn of 1975, ship–
loads and planeloads of Cuban sol–
diers and their equipment were
ferried from Cuba to Angola. Dur–
ing the height of the airlift , as many
as lO to 15 planes a week refueled at
the Caribbean island nation of Bar–
bados before American pressure cut
off the connection- too late to do
much good.
The joint Russian/Cuban " inter–
vention" was a naked territorial
grab. As author Moss put it: "The
Communist invasion of Angola
posed a challenge to the Wes t.
Would anyone take it up? Or would
Cuban troops and Soviet guns en–
able a Marxist movement with only
minority backing in the northern
part of the country to set up a dicta–
torship?"
Lost Victory
Belatedly and halfheartedly the
challenge was met. A phalanx of
Western nations- most notably the
United States, Britain, France, West
Germany, ltaly-all agreed to one
degree or another to suppoii the
FNLA and UNITA forces. But
more than money and weapons was
needed. By October 1975, the West–
ern powers needed to find sorne
"Cubans" of their own to directly
assist the pro-Western nationalists
who were in danger of being over–
whelmed by the Cubans and their
big Russian guns.
The call went out to South Africa,
which was also very concerned with
the worsening situation in Angola.
When the South Africans agreed
to enter the fray with instructors,
advisors, and finally a Iightning-fast
armored coturno code-named "Zulu,"
they did so
with the blessing of both
the Western and severa! black Afri–
can governments,
plus the urgent
pleas of the aoti-Soviet Angolan na–
tionalists. U.S. Secretary of State
Kissinger encouraged Pretoria's di–
rect involvement; za·ire's President
Mobutu likewise urged the offen–
sive. Other black African presidents
also pressed for the campaign, pre–
ferring a moderate pro-West gov-
ernment to a Marxist government
that could eventually provide a base
for subverting other African states.
Outnumbered ten to one, tbe
South Africans at no time had more
than 2,000 of their own men in the
field. Nevertheless they totally neu–
tralized the Cubans and their
MPLA adversaries in the southern
and central-coast regions ofAngola.
At one time the "Zulu" column
advanced 85 kilometers a day under
tire- more than three times speedier
than the fastest advance Hitler's
panzer troops made in World War
11. (Significantly, the South African
commander was nicknamed "Rom–
me!.")
In
many instances MPLA
forces and their Cuban helpers fted
their positions rather than engage
Zulu Group, leaving behind large
quantities of supplies, including Cu–
ban secret documents. (While Ha–
vana has pictured its soldiers as
courageous liberators, South Afri–
can reports on the Angolan cam–
paign have described instances of
"Cuban cowardice.")
Within a hairbreadth of victory–
only 30 kHometers from the capital
of Luanda - the attack stalled.
UNITA's leader Jonas Savimbi
could not be convinced to pursue
the total victory that was within bis
grasp. He only wanted to consoli–
date and hold areas traditionally be–
longing to UNIT
A.
Then everything fell apart. To the
north of Luanda, FNLA troops en–
gaged Cuban and MPLA forces in
an ill-advised battle. They were
beaten badly. Much of the blame
for the decisive defeat has been
placed on red tape in Washington
that prevented supplies from reach–
ing FNLA forces in time and in
quantities needed. The heavy weap–
ons the U. S. had promised simply
were not arriving as scheduled.
Then, on December 9 , sorne
South African soldiers were cap–
tured and displayed to the world's
news media. Thus the cover of the
largely secret joint Western offen–
sive in Angola was blown.
Vletnam's Legacy
In Washington, Congress went into
action to "prevent another Viet–
nam." All aid to the FNLA and
UNITA ceased, forcing the adminis-
(Continued on page 42)
The
PLAIN TRUTH M
ay
1977