Basic HTML Version
CHINA
AND
RUSSIA
WAR
OR
RECONCILIATION?
by
Kei th W. Stump
Hls health falllng rap/dly, Chair–
man Mao may not /ast through
the year. W/11 the post-Mao era
brlng war or peace between the
Chlnese dragon and the Russian
bear?
1
n Febru ary 1950, in the midst of a
freeLing Russ ia n winter. Mao
Tse- tu ng stood bcami ng in a
Mo cow railway station a t the con–
clusion of a two-mon th stay in the
Soviet Union.
Bundled in a heav) fur coa t and
wearing a woolen cap. the Chair–
man paused briefiy befare boarding
his train to peak to the onlooking
crowd. Havingjust concluded a mu–
tua l defen e treaty wi th the Kremlin
and having received his new na–
tion 's
fir~t
foreign loan for $300 mil–
lion. he confidently declared that
Ch inese-Sovic t friendsh ip would be
6
"everlasti ng, indest ructible. and in–
alienable."
His pred iction turned out to be
one of his tory's wor!.t.
By 1963. thc "cverl asting' ' friend–
ship !ay in rui ns. wrecked by bitter
id eologica l riva lry. Since then. Sino–
Soviet relat ions havc been on ice.
An d a long as Mao rules Ch ina.
observe rs see littl e chance that the
th irtee n -yea r-o ld sp lit will be
healed.
After Mao- Then What?
' 'China-wa tchers" in Hong Kong.
howevcr. are bccoming increasingly
convinccd tha t Mao's long rule is
nearing its end . The health of the
82-yea r-old Cha irman is deteriorat–
ing rapidly. possibly due to a series
of debilitat ing strokes.
Pa rt icularly n:vca ling in this re–
gard was a photograph published in
m id-May by
Jenmin Jih Pao
(P eople's Daily),
the official daily
newspape r. The photo. taken in
Mao's study du ring the
~ tate
visit of
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of
Singapore, showcd the frail Chair–
man sitti ng slumpcd down with bis
head lyi ng weakly on the top of hi s
pla id-covered chair.
Analysts bclieve the selection of
th e frank photo was not accidental.
but designed to subt ly convey an
unmis takable message to the Chi–
nese people: The Chairman is not
long for the world. Similar photos of
subseq uent meetings with other for–
eign d ignitaries leave little doub t as
to hi growing en feeblement.
There have also been rumors that
Chinese labor un ions are already
preparing memorial posters in an–
ticipa tion of his dea th .
Once Mao has fina lly departed
the sccne, a fic rce power struggle is
wide ly expec ted.
G rowing conten t ion be tween
riva l ' 'mode rate ' ' and ··rad ical"
faction of thc Chinese Commun ist
Pa rty is already in e:v idence as each
group maneuvers for position in the
post-Mao era. Once the Chairman's
modera ting influence is gone, the
ri valry may escalatc into a full-scale
poli tica l upheaval. lts eventual out–
come is anyone's guess at th is mo–
ment.
The cent ral
i
sue in the minds of
polít ica! analysts. however. is clear:
How will the post-Mao leadership
treat the Soviet Union? More pecif–
ically, once Mao is no longer on the
cene. what i the likelihood of a
reconciliation
between the two Com–
munist giants?
This que tion is receiving the ut–
mosl attention in Washington and
Wcst European capitals. for the
Sino-Soviet
~ plit i~
viewed as the
cri tica! variable in Asia today. I f the
ri ft wcre cventually healed, not only
would the As ían picturc be dramat i–
cally altered, but thc ent ire global
ba lance or power would be rad ically
transformed.
"Russophobic" Propaganda
But how like ly is reconcilia t ion?
And
~\· hat
are the prospects for the
oppo!)ite a lterna tive -
war?
The Chinese suffer from acute
Russophobia, as any visitar to the
People's Republic quickly senses.
Bi tter rhetoric about the " impe ria l–
istic designs" and ··evil intents" of
the Soviet "renegade clique" is com–
mon fare. l nvoking images of cen–
tu ries past. Peking propagandists
graphically picture thc Soviets as
restless barbarians brooding outside
the G reat Wall ofChina.
Local pa rty officials encourage
the Chinese cit izenry to ''dig tunnels
deep, s tore grain everywhere. and
prepare for war." In regions nea r
the Sino-Soviet border. radio com–
men tators unceas in gly prod the
people to ''firmly guard the West
Gate of the mothe rland."
War. however. wou ld not appear
to be as imminent as these slogans
suggest. The constant high pitch of
Peking's anti-Soviet propaganda is
probab ly an attempt by China's
present leadcrshi p to freeze China's
foreign policy for years to come.
tha t is. to render fut ure rcconcilia–
tion impossible for the fresh lead–
ership which wi ll eventua lly assume
the helm. Other interna! consid–
erations may also play a part.
Soviet anti-Chinese propaganda
is equally in tensive. The average So–
viet cit izen has an ingrained fear of
th e vast "ycllow bordes" to the
south. (China ha a populat ion over
three times that of t)1e Soviet
Union.)
Border Dispute
Sino-Soviet tensions are part ially an
ou tgrowth of the long-standing Chi-
The
PLAIN TRUTH September 1976