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WOBLDWA!CB
An Overview of Major News Events and Trends
SOVIETS
SEEKING
WAR-WINNING
CAPABILITY?
American have been led to believe
th a t an a ll-ou t nuclea r war would be
mu tua lly suicida!
that no one
co uld ··win" a nuclear war and thal
il is lh crefore ··unthinkablc."
13tH
such a lin e of rcasoning may
not hold true insidc the powerful
military establishment of lhe Soviet
Union. Leading Unitcd Slatcs de–
fense ex pcrts are deeply concerned
th at Soviet strategic milit ary poli cy
is ai mcd no longe r at achicving nu–
clear parity with the U.S.. but a t
securing a potential
war-11·inning
ca–
pabi lity.
ln their view. th e Soviets are in–
ten t on breaking ou t of th e present
nucl ea r standoff, with the aim of
achicving such superiori ty so as to
be able
LO
trike ñrst a nd absorban
expcctcd counterblow, all the while
having enough in reserve to deliver
a nuclea r coup de grace - a wi nning
L\\'O-fo r-one exchange.
In line with thi s philo ophy is the
increased cvidence that the Soviets
are engaged in an intensivc civil de–
fense program dcsigncd to enable
Russ ia to absorb - a t limited cost –
any rctaliatory strike thc U.S. could
throw at her.
A~
O.
C.
Boileau. president of
Bocing Aerospace Company. re–
vea led in a speech in March. ' 'An
official Soviet estíma te declares that,
evcn if United States mi siles s trike
th eir cities. they can hold thcir cas–
uallies lo from ñvc to eight percent
of their urban population. For So–
viet demography. this works out to
about ten million potential fa tal i–
lie ."
A Soviet a u ack on American
The
PLAIN TRUTH August 1976
ci tic!> . on th c other hand. could lakc
an cstimated 96 million
li vc~ .
Thc So, ·ie t bu ildup has rcachcd
thc point whcrc it th reatcns stra tcgic
slability. according to Paul
J
l.
Nitzc,
a fo rmc r secret a ry of th c Navy
( 1963-67). deputy secreta ry of de–
fcnsc ( 1967-69). and a member of
thc U.S. delega tion to the Strategic
Arm:. Limita tion Ta lks (SA LT)
from 1969 to 1974.
In a mujor a rt iclc in the January
1976 issuc of the prestigious joumal.
Foreign AJ!airs.
Nitze asscrts that if
th e United States docs not act now
to rcdrc:.s the nuclear imbalance
and maintain high-quali ty deter–
renco.: . America could Ílnd herself in
a ve ry dangcrous pos it ion.
it l.C rcmains skepti ca l. as lO
whethcr a-SALT II agrccmc11t cou ld
evcr result in trategic stability be–
twcen U.S. a11d Soviet forces.
"On thc contra ry. th cre
i~
every
prospect." he asserts. '·tha t under
th e tcrms of the SALT agrecmcnts
th e Soviet Union will conti11u e to
pursuc a nuclea r superiority that is
not me rcly quanlitativc, but de–
signed to produce a theoreti cal war–
winning capability."
Seven Years of SALT
Talks on limiting strategic arms be–
gan in ovember 1969. in Hclsi nki.
Finland. Two and o11c ha lf years
later - in May 1972 - the ñrst
SALT lreaty was signed in Moscow.
bccoming effective 011
October
3.
1972.
SALT
l.
a~
the trca t) i:, called.
limited the U.S. and Soviet Unio 11 to
two defensive antiballi tic missile
(ABM) si tes each. with 100 missiles
a t each sit e. [n addition to th e ABM
accord. a n accompa ny ing 5-yea r
i11te rim agrcement et ceilings for
each side on the numbcr of lal1d–
based and submarine-based
offen–
sil•e
mi iles. Force were essen tia lly
frozen a t May 1972 leve! .
The United States cei ling wa. set
at 1.700
1.054
land-ba~ed
ICBMs
a nd 656 ubmarine-launchcd ba ll is–
ti c missilcs (S LBMs) . The Sovie t
limit was about 2.400 - ovcr 1.600
ICBMs a nd some 740 SL BMs.
The resulting 3
LO
2 missilc ratio
in fa,·or or the Soviets was to be
offset by thc fact that thc U.S. had
over twicc as many deliverable nu–
clear warhcads (about 6.000 to the
Soviets' 2.400). Th is was duc to
MlRVing. or putt ing more than o11e
nucl ea r warhcad on the !>ame mis–
sile a capabi lily which the Soviets.
at that time. did not have.
Coming - SALT 11
Th c SALT
r
treaty. hOWC\ cr. did not
cove r
quolilative
im provemcn t of
missile!> . Cont rols 011 quality and so–
phistica t ion of weapons werc lef't lO
thc SALT
li
negotiatio11s. Such con–
trols a re much trickier to agree upon
tha11 controls on
111.1111bers
of ' 'cap–
ons.
In NO\'Cmber 1974. a prcliminary
SALT
11
agrccmen t was
t1
nally
reachcd by President Ford a11d So–
vie t Pa rty Chie í Brezhncv in Vladi–
vostok. The tcchnical details are . till
being ñllcd in.
Their executive ··u11derstanding··
pro\'idcs for
a
ceiling of2.400 strate–
gic missilcs for each side. 1.320 or
wh ich may be equippcd with mul–
tiple warheads, or MIRYs. Long–
range bombers would also cou11t in
th c to tal.
Th is agreement. if con el uded.
would mean the Soviet ' 'ou ld have
to
pha~e
out some of their .more ob–
~olete
missile launchers. while the
U.S would be free to incrca:.e to the
numericallimit.
On th e ot her hand, howe\'er, the
Soviets - who a re íar bchind the
U.S. in MIRV technoiogy
would
be allowed to
carch up
to the U.S. in
M1RV trength. F unhermorc. H!>
Soviet
missil~
are larger and more
powerful than America's. the Krem–
lin will be abie to pack more MIRYs
5