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mercially and militarily. Two thirds
of a l! shi ps transiting the ca nal -
over 13,000 a year - sa il to or from
America n ports.
On the milita ry aspect. London's
Economist
be lieves that the U.S. ca n
afford
to surrender th e cana l be–
cause it now has a two-ocea n navy.
Th e problem is. th e size of the
America n navy is shrink ing. Th e
U.S. ft ee t has been a lmos t ha lved in
less than eight yea rs - from 900
shi p in 1968 to around 450 today.
The Sovie t navy. on the othe r hand.
has grown rapidly to between 1.000
and 2,000 ships, depending on how
one coun ts cert ain kind of vesse ls.
The great di pa rity be tween the
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in tota l ships
makes it evc n more important that
the U.S. navy be able to shift wha t
re la tive ly few shi ps it does have
to
wherever they a re needed, making
the ca na l comparatively
more
va lu–
able mil ita rily than in reccnt years.
At prcscnt . th ere a re more than
enough vo tes in the U.S. Senate to
block the ra ti fication of any new
t rea ty wit h Panama. Yet the bulk of
those votes usua lly side wi th the
Ford administ ra tion on other mat–
tc rs. and th ercfore may be subject to
admi nistrat ion prcssure. Fun he r–
more. it is rumored that only 20 of
th e 38 senators who a re on record as
opposing the new trca ty are really
"ha rd corc."
lt is vc ry possible that wha t has
been ca ll ed " the most ambit ious en–
gineering unde rtaking in the history
of ma nkind .' ' built and mainta ined
aL a cost of $7 billion in U.S. tax
money. onc of the greatcst symbols
o f Amer ican tcchn ical and eco–
nornic powc r, wi ll soon come under
the jurisdiction of General Omar
Torrijos Herrera and his l if2 miIlion
citizens.
o
AMERICA'S NEW
AFRICAN POLICY
In an cleventh-hour attempt to re–
vive the crumbl ing American irnage
in Africa. U.S. Secretary of State
Henry Kiss inger embarked on a
sudden late-Apri l tour of a ha lr
dozen black Afri can na tion .
A major objective was to put on
record the st rongest American poi-
8
icy statement ever issued in support
of black African demand for ma–
j o rit y ru le in whit e minority
controll ed areas of the southern part
of the contin ent.
In a Lusaka. Zambia. speech tha t
amounted to a U.S. decla ra tion of
psychologica l. economi c, and diplo–
ma tic warfare aga inst Rhodesia.
Ki ssinger declared: "The Salisb ury
regime must understa nd tha t it can–
no t expect Uni ted States support ei–
th er in diplomacy or in ma teria l
he lp a t any stage in its conftict with
African states or African liberation
movemcnts.'' He emphasized fur–
th er, "On the contra ry. it [Rhodesia]
wi ll face our unrelenting opposi tion
until a fin a l se ttl ement is achi eved."
Kissinge r th rea tened Rh odes ia
with congress iona l repea l of the so–
ca lled By rd amendmen t whi ch
a llowed thc U.S. to impon Rhode–
sia n chrome in viola tion of United
Nations sa ncti ons. He also said tha t
U.S. c iti zens would be wa rn ed
aga inst trave ling to Rhodesia or en–
couraged to !cave if resid ing th ere
now.
In addit ion to his wa rn ings
to
Rhode ia, Kiss inger wa rned the
government of' South Afri ca that it
had less time than it thought to pu t
an end to apart heid. its policy of
sepa ra re racia l development. He
urged thc South African govern–
mcnt to announce a long-avoided
ti me tab lc ro r se lf- <.leterm inat ion in
So uth West Africa .
Fear of the Soviets
Behin d th e sudden strong U.S. sup–
po rt for black maj o rit y rul e in
sout hern Africa lies the remarkably
swift victory of Soviet-backe<.l forces
in Angola in mid-February.
To Wash ington's way of thinking,
it is necessary to get on the black
libera tion "bandwagon" bcfore it's
too la te - before more of Africa
fa lls into Marxist hands, and bil–
lions of dolla rs or U.S. investments
are los t and American access to the
co ntin ent's in va luable strategic raw
ma terials is cut off.
It is for this reason that. shortly
aft er his st rong stand on Rhodes ia,
Kissi nge r s topped in Za'ire, th e
fo rmer Belgian Congo. za·ire is an
immense mineral storehouse whose
full po te nti a l has ba re ly bee n
ta pped .
lt
is obvious tha t Kissinger
is pressing Za'ire to link up in a
' 'specia l rela tionship" with the U.S.
simi la r to the new ties which Kiss–
inge r forged with Brazil, another
mineral-rich power. on h is recent
swing through Latin America.
What Happens to "Majority Rule"?
Un fortuna tely, Kissinger's new Afri–
ca n
realpolitik
is a big gamble from
two perspectives. No one can pre–
dict wha t will happen to America n
commercial assets in sub-Sa haran
Africa, especia lly the Republic of
South Africa. which at over
$ I V2
bil–
lion represents the single mos t im–
po rtant investment in any country
on the conti nent.
Secondly. support for majo rity
ru le in no way precludes a bloody
future for both blacks a nd whites in
o uthern Africa . The new policy
po rtends ne ither more freedom. de–
mocracy, nor civi l rights for nations
co nsidered by blacks as ye t "unlibe–
ra ted" from their colonia l pas t.
The truth is, of the 49 coun tries in
Africa. most of whom received inde–
pendence after World War
Il ,
15 are
und er direct mili ta ry rule, and 29
have one- pa rt y c ivilia n gove rn–
ments. On ly 5 nations - two of
them being Rhodesia and South Af–
ri ca - have mu lt ipa rry politi cal ys–
tems. Three out of fo ur Africans live
un der a uthoritarian regimes.
In other words, in mos t black Af–
rican nations, the highly espoused
ideal of one-man-one-vote black
majority rule through the electoral
process quickly breaks down to a
com piete farce of th e democra ti c
process. l t becomes, as economist–
co lumnist Milton Fri edman puts it,
·'minority rule by a black eli te that
controls thc onc pa rty permitted
to
ex ist. "
Nevertheless, in the rush to sa l–
vagc wha t's lcft of a U.S. role in
Africa. to block further Soviet ad–
va nces, and to guaran tee conti nued
access to raw ma terials vita l to
America n ind ustry. th ese facts, it
would seem, must be se t tota lly
a ide for the sake of poli tica l and
economic expedience.
Undoubt ed ly this is the reason
why Secretary Kissinger chosc not
to spea k ou t cqu a lly as strong
agains t thc onc- pa rty black minority
rcgimes in some of the count rics he
vi ited.
O
The PLAIN TRUTH June 1976