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sumers would then pay for their food
twice, once at the supermarket and once
again through higher taxes.
In addítion to hígher food prices,
America
's
large balance of . trade earn–
ings from agricuhural exports would be
lost, makíng it difficult íf not irnpossible
to buy íntemational necessities such as
oil.
Finally there is the moral and ·geopo–
litical implícatíon of seemg the world's
wealthiest natíon slamming its granaríes
shut in tbe faces nfthe world's less fortu–
nate peoples.
Fallacy #S: Grain Reserves Are·the
Answer
Fact: Reserves cannot be rebuilt wíthout
closíng the door on expons (wíth all the
attendant p,roblcms lísted under the cat–
egory above).
Blessed sha/1 be thy basket anci
thy store ... and thou shal t
lend unto many nations, and
tholl shatt not borrow.
- Oeut
28:; 12
Fallacy #9: American Food ls
H igh-priced
Fact : Americans spend less of their dis–
posable income
( 17.4%)
on f(!9<! than
any other natíon. The British spend
25
percent; the Japanese
27
percent; Euro·
pean natíons spend
30
percent and
more; in Asía and Africa, it's well over
50
percent. Food is stiU cbeap in the U.S.
We could try to malee it cheaper by clos·
ing export doors and _isolating our
surplus. Or we could recogniz.e that to–
day's food crisis demands intemational
leadership.
Fallacy
#JO:
Amerita Can (and Should)
"Go
1t
Alone"
Fact: American food policy will increas–
ingly become
world
food policy, for the
simple reason that the United States has
a virtual comer oo the market (see box) .
Supply and demand yet live, and de–
mand for food has never beco higher.
There is economic demand in-the form
of marks, pounds, francs, yen, pesos,
and rubles, and there is moral demand
in the specter of gaunt, bungry faces.
As
a
nation we may ask
if
reserves are
Whether supply rises towar<l world
needed 'lo protect ourselves against pri- demand is a choice for America. lf she
vation dueto abad crop year (the like of cbooses to "go it alone," sbe will indeed
which we have not bad in receill bis- be alone. She would be a nation wilhout
tory). but that's a totally different ques- a friend, a nation without a éonscience.
tion. But if you thínk reserves will keep and a nation without
a
future -
aJI
be-
food prices low - forget it. Tbe supply cause she would be
a
nation without the
and demand equation must now include
facts,
a pcople clinging to fallacies abQut
the demand of
th~
whole hungry world, . the "food crisis."
O
not just
U.S.
demand.
Fallacy
#6:
Govemmeot Subsidies
Sbould
Eod
Fact: Govemment subsidies to the oon–
producing farmer actually ended reoently.
The govemment is now only committed
to support commodíty "target prices,"
which costs little.
Actually, two thirds of the Depart–
ment of Agricuhure budget goes to
an·
other
kind of welfare project - food
stamps.
Fallacy
#7:
Higher Gra in P rices Cause
lnOation
Fact: The value of wheat in a loaf of
bread has gone up
one cent
in the last
three years. although the loaf of bread
has escalated eleven cents in price. The
price of the loaf is leavened at every
truck stop along the way - cornmodity
brokers, prooessors, truckers, and retiil–
ers.
Fallacy
#8:
The
US.
Can Have
Dirt-cheap Food Again
Fact: Not so. Americans must now com–
pete on the world market for the Ameri–
can farmer's food. Two recen t dollar
devaluatíons, plus the rís_íng affiuence of
the rest of the world, bave combíned to
make U.S. food seem auractively priced
on the world market.
The
nou~aux
ríehes
of lile world want
to
ea1
more protein. and lhey are buying
it, mainly through buying feed gcains
and soybeans.
Tbe Japanese; for example, have dou–
bled their consumption of red meat
since the late
1960s.
Th~
trend should
contínue for dccades to come,
since
the
average Japanese still eats less than one
tlflb
a~
much red meat as does the aver·
age American.
WEEK ENDINO OECEMBER 6. 1975
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by
Stanley R. Rader
A HollowVictory for Dr. Kissinger
In January
1973
the lsraeli and Egyptían forces sígned what was referred to
as the
101
Disengagement Pact. The actual sígning took place in the Sinai and
was executed by the respective field commanders of the opposing forces. lmmedí–
ately thereafler, to lend a líttle pomp and
círCUill;Sia~ce
to the mílítary
for~al
ities, Henry Kissinger Oew to Aswan in upper Egypt to "celebrate" the occas•on
wíth Presiden! Sadat. Mr. P.u.btrt Armstrong and l were already in Aswan,
having arrived an hour earlier than Dr. Kíssinger wi.th members of a Japanese
delegatiOn. The foUowing day, afler conferríng wíth Deputy Prime Mínister Dr.
Abdel Hatero, we flew to lsrael for
a
meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Yígael
Allon (who is now Israel's foreígn miníster as weU).
1
was very much interested
ín
knowing just whAt Dr. Kíssínger's role had
been in bringing about the so-called disengagement pact, and l askcd Mr. Allon
dírectly for
his
assessment. With a very wry smile .Mr. AUoo saíd that
Dr. Kissínger's prime contribution was to get Arab leaders in Syria and Egypt to
agree on one thing: that there was somethíng undesirable about Israelí arms
beíng witlün sorne fifiy miles of Damascus and Cairo.
Although 1 bad oot been present and cannot vouch for the veracity of the
story,
1
have been told that when Dr. Kissínger first arrived in Peking on the
secret mission for President Nixon, his ploy to thaw the very cold relationshíp (in
fact unrelationship) between the Uníted States and the People's Republíc of
China was to point to a map showing clearly the frontier between China and
Russia, upon whícb map he bastíly drew sorne undistinguishable niarks and said,
"Gentlemen,'those are Soviet troops. thut is the Síno-Russían border, and that ís
your enemy." Apparently, íf.the story
ís
true, the Chinese also agreed that the re
was something undesirable about havíng countless Russiao divisions, as well
as
Soviet nrtssiles and other-military hardware, pois<;d on their borders.
lf it were true, bowever, one can easíly see wby Dr. Kissínger's recent trip to
China could weU be described as "chilly," and one can easily see why tbe Chínese
are not looking forward (nor is President Ford) to Mr. Ford's forthcomíng visit to
Pelcing. Ifthe Chinese were cool to Dr. Kíssínger several weeks ago, it ís very easy
to predíct how vsry cool they wíll be now that Secretary of Defense James
Schlesingei has been removed from office - because
it
is very weU known that
the most effectíve and persuasive critíc of détente in the U.S. govemment was
Mr. Schlesinger, who not only was persuasíve but was also weiJ...informed and
intellectually astute. In addition, he was Dr. Kíssinger's most severe critíc, not in
the sense of· crítícízíng.' Dr. Kissinger in a personal and dírect manner, but by
contesting bis ideas about détente and the Russians in Congress, in the Cabinet,
in the
Whít~
House, and in public.
-
In an earlier column,
1
expressed concem that détente meant one thíng
10
the Russians and apparently another thíng to us. Tbis very concern has recently
been stated agaín and again in European joumals, where the informed and
enlíghtened are very conéemed that the Kissinger policy in arms limítatíon talks
wíth tbe Soviets will play dírectly ínto Moscow's bands and willlead toa Europe
that gradually but steadily becomes defenseless. Yesterday,
li.S
a
~esult
of Mr.
Schlesínger's disrnissal, West Germany's Defense Minister Georg Leber was
descríbed by an aide as "quite stríclcen." Mr. Leber has been a learung European
exponent of Mr. Schlesinger's views about the importance of maintaíníng
a
high
leve! of defense spending and of not .sacrificing preparedness for the salce of
détente. A few months ago
1
also criticízed Mr. Ford and Dr. Kissinger for faíling
10
meet with famed Soviet Nobel Prize winning author Sol.zheoitsyn because o(
admitted White House fears ofdisturbing the Russians and détente.
lt
seems a pity that the Ford govemment does not have room for both a Mr.
Schlcsínger and a Dr. Kíssinger. lf Dr. Kissínger. ever needed a man of in–
tellectual abíHty, proveo cxperieoce, and great intégrity to make his ideas and
policies stand the test of competition in the market place (the President's mínd),
it is now.
1t
is1a píty that Dr. Kissinger was able to convíncé the Presiden! that
Mr. Schlesin§er sbould go. l t
is.o~
píty that the Secretary of Defense wiJJ now be
Donald Rwlísfeld - "one of my guys" (as Mr. Ford referred
10
hirn) - a very
níce man, without question, and a man wíth a bright "political" future and a man
described as able
10
keep his footing on this fast moving Washington treadmíll.
But ís Mr. Rumsfeld aman big enough to fill the s)loes of Mr. Schlesinger?
1t
is a pity that, in tbis day and age when a country needs its best roen in the
key positions, Mr. Schlesinger's dismissal should be_referred toas a "victory" .ror
Dr. Kissínger. A few months ago the renowncd aulhor, Jobo Hersey, afier bavmg
been given the opportunity to spend considerable ,lime watchihg the Presiden\
and the White House in action, ro:ported how frightening
it
was that the only
person advising Mr. Ford on foreígn policy was Dr. Kíssínger.
lt is
much more
fríghtening now that Dr. Kissínger's prímary critic in foreign polícy matters has
been so neatly eliJ:'linated.
7