Basic HTML Version
--~~~--------=-------==---~-----=------===------Pkün~
THE HIGH PRICE
OFPEACE
by
Robert
Glnslcey
" Lastlilg peace, whlle not
theor~tically
lmposslble, ls probably
unatta/nab/e; even
lf
lt could be achieved, lt would a/most certalnly
not be In the best lnterests of a stab/e soclety to ach/eve
/t."
- Report from /ron Mounteln
'
t
e most everytbiog clse io our-mod–
em world, tbe cost of peace has
beell
rapidly
soaring.
There was a
time wbeo oatiooal peace aod security
(Le, superior
anns)
oould be purcbased
for comparatively paltry sums, but
today tbe .aonual cost of peace has
reached ioto the multiple biUions.
Back
in
1951,
for example, the nations
of the world spent
a
.mere
$300
million
on. foreign purchases of conventional
weapons.
In
fiscal
1974,
they laid out
sorne
$18
billioo - a stagsenng
6,()()()%
inttease. Yet these figures represen! only
iotematiooal arms purchases. Addiog
domestic "peace costs," we tind the oa–
tions of the world are now spendiog
$240
billioo
a
year on "defeose" aod
"world peace...,
The . U.S. alone
ha&
spent over
S
I.S
trillion on defcnse aince lbe end of
World War
11.
lo
1974,
tbe U.S. led i11
sales ofintemational arms with sorne
S8
biUion in wea¡ions sold, foUowed by the
Soviet Union
($5.5
billion), tbeo Fraoce
and Britain. Since
1950,
tbc U.S. has
sold or giveo away over
$86
billion in
arms
to various nations, presumably
10
_insurc world peace.
·
Tbe
Price
ofMiddle
East
Peaee
The new lsraeli-Egyptian peace settle–
ment in tbe Middle East will also cost
Americans dearly. The U.S. assi.stance 'to
Israel io
1975
wiU be close to
$3.25
bil–
lioo - whicb may not be too surprisiog
in view of tbc lsraeli military ooo-
oessions
lO
EgypL
.
In fact, tbe Uoited States has
shipped so much weaponry
10
Israel that
thc
U.S.
National Guard and ResCNes
are still short of tanks, even though thc
Chrysler asscmbly line is now tuming
out
ti
ve tru¡k.s daily compared to ooe 'per
day beforc tbe Yom Kippur War of
1973.
Yet. interestingly cnougb, U.S. eco–
oomie assistaoce aod arrns sales to Arab
oountries for
1975
wiiJ
be equally im–
pressive - sorne
$2.2
billioo
10
Arab
oatioos,
including SI billioo for military
items
10
Saudi Arabia aJone.
Peace,
it seems, can most effectively
be achieved by expensive and extensivo
arrnaments. Thirty years ago, only
5
na–
tions were in the position ·of providing
significan! arms for world peace. Now,
over 30
oatio~
are involved in a big,
highly competitivo way, and
50
oations
se
U
arms
to sorne dcgrce.
Tbe push is toward "ultimate" weap–
ons- tbe most'bang for the least bucks.
One military tec:bnolo&ical rcvolution
follows anotbc·r witb such bewildering
rapidity tbat one is hard put to keep
abreast ofdcvclopmeots.
Thc development of
preci~ioo-
WEI!K ENDING OCTOBER 18, 1975
guidcd muoitions was ooe breaktbrough
tbat is baving
a
profound dfect oo tbe
peace-keeping abilities of the world.
Stimulated by the effective
use
made
of
laser·guided bombs in VietolUJI, thcre '
now cxists a whole class of prccision–
guided munitioos. Tbey include all
those bombs, missiles, and otber projec–
tiles that can score direct bits on their
targets at fuU raoge. with
a
high proba·
bility onen approaching peñectJon -
ooe sbot, one hit. Acoording to tbe de·
sigo of these missiles. tbe targct may be
a
tank, sbip,
aircran.
bridge, radar in–
stallatioo. a concentratioo of
armor,
or
troops.
rl.e
Costs of Peace
Wbat is tbe pñce for sucb pcace-keep–
ing weaponry7 The cost of precision–
guided roissiles varies from about
$3,000
for ao anti-tank missile to about
$500,000
for an anti-sllip missi.le. Even
the expensive ones, however, are bun–
dreds of times cheaper Iban somo poten–
tia! targets - a modero tighter
can
oost
about
$20
million, a cruiser over
$100
millioo, and a
tank
between
$500,000
and
$900,000.
Billions of doUars are also bcing
poured into electronic equipment-jam–
ming devices, decoys, sophisticated ra–
dar traccrs, and intelligence sensors.
Tbese electronic devices are used vir–
tually everywhere - on grouod vebiciC$,
sbips, aod aircra.lt; or they may be
strewo about the battletield by rockets,
mortars, aod artillery sbells.
So subtle and rapid are tbe tbrusts
and parries betweeo radar systerns aod
jamming systems that oomputcrs have
takcn over tbe job of orcj!cstrating de–
fenses - "watc!ting" for probos by
enemy radars, instantaneously deciding
wbat counte'rmcasures to use, and de–
ploying invisible forces
10
jam radars
and tum aside onooming missiles.
Radar-decoying chal!', mi.sleading
heat sources, aod even repeating false
radar ec:hoes are amoog the oew cleo–
trooic oouotermeasures.
Radars
musl
shln up aod dowo tbe spectrum, chaog–
ing probmg methods
like
a runoing back
oo a footbaD team to penetrate defenses.
Eveo sateUite-jammiog by sateUite
has been used. Tbere i.s evideoce that
tbc
Sovie~
Uoion has directed electronic
couotermeasures against U.S. satcllites.
The result
is
that incrcdible changes
in the oature and cost of wañarc are
ooeurring as clcctrooie sopbi.sticatioo in–
creases.
~ow
eveo
a
"welkquipped"
army
may be virtuaUy wipcd out in a few
minutes. Sopbisticated ühlding" is
be–
ooming more imponaot than fightingl
The ramilications are far reacbiog. Por
example,
if
both sides use
a
full panoply
of automatic weapoos, how
will
victory
be dctermined7 Will the victor be the
ooe with the bigsest arsenal at tbe be·
ginoiog of war?
lf
so. we are moving
ioto an
era
in
whicb
nations
wiiJ
spend
eveo more oo
weapons
thao
they
do
oow.
Y
es.
the prioe of "peace" is indeed
escalating. But what about
true
peace -
not ao insano arms race tbat goes by the
name of ..defense,"' ...security."
64
balance
of power," or "world
peace'' -
but real,
genuino peacc? Wbat about a
peace
tbat
is oot just the absencc of war, but ao
abseoce of even tbe preparatioo for war?
Surely it would be absurd
10
talk
about
such a peacc as being too oostly.
Or
would it?
Cu
Mu
All'orcl
PHec!
lo the middle
1960s,
a secret think
taok was commissioned to objectively
aoalyu the possibility and '-desirability
of peace. The primary purpose of tbe
analysis was ro scc just bow feasible aod
desirable total worl4 peaoe would ac–
tuilly be. Of course, in makiog such a
study, it was
aJso
oecessary to consider
the beoefits
war
provides tbe oatioos
wbo choose itas a way oflife.
The result of over 2
~
years of re–
searcb was
a
rather unsettliog aod
dis–
turbing tepc?rt that was anything but
hopeful about mao's cbanoes for achiev–
iog
a
lasting peace.
Tbe so-<:alled " l ron Mountain Re–
port".(in refereocc
10
the secret nuclear
sbeltcr whicb servcd
as
the locatioo of
sorne of thc mcetinp) pointed out thal
tbe usual explanation for war is that it is
caused by internatiooal
ooo!licts.
War
is
geoerally
seen as
ao extension of oa–
tiooal policy designed to extend aod de–
fend the self-interests of a oation.
As
such, it
secms
logical tbat man could,
if
he wou)d only be less beUigerent, elimi–
nate war and achicve lasting peace.
But, the report cootinued, a system
based on war also has many noomilitary
fuoctions that make it vcry attractive -
so attrattive that.
paradoxically, "peace"
may
lw
simply
t~M
costly to consider!
The report listed tbe fuoctioos
of
war
(other
than
tbe
obvious
military ooes of
oatiooal agsrandizemcnt. expaosioo, or
defense) as foUows:
•
Economic.
War, emph8$ized the re–
port. aUows a oouotry to dispose of ex–
cess productioo and surpluses. War has
a voracious and uolimited appetite that
soalcs up aoy exeess inventories. The
economic advantages of
war
are unsur–
passed; war can and does stimulate the
ecooomy, reducin& uoemploymeoL
In
fac:t. there are ao estimated
91,000
jobs
tteated in tbe U.S. for every billion dol–
lars in aonual anos sales. Other coun–
tries bave similar economic incentives to
maiotaio a war mentaüty.
•
PoliticaL
The permaoent possibility of
wár,
said the report,
is
oneo tbe fouoda–
tioo for a stable 11ovemment. War, oran
arins race, suppbes the basis for general
accept'ance of poütical authority. HisiOr–
icaUy, cooeluded the report. it is ex–
tremely
difficult
to stay
10
r.wer
if
no
credible "externa!" threat o war exists;
in fac:t. tbe whole ooncept of a oatioo–
natc
drovGli moob of iu ftlftX rrom
tbe
reatity (or illusion) of confticts witb
other national entities. The report stated
tbat politicál leadcrs onen
nud
war lo
survive.
•
Soclo/oglcal.
War, maintained tbe
r~
port. aUows a country
10
control maoy
-.lcmcnts of youth, social di.ssideo'ce, aod
destructivc antisocial teodeocics by
chaoneliog them iniO the war machioe.
War
also
creates a stroog social oohe–
sion. based oo a murual enemy in a üfe–
and-deatb aisis. War, said tbe report.
gives overriding
oogeocy
to national
programs such as 'fo'&ge and priee con·
trols, physical 1\tness, or "patrioti.srn."
•
Ecologlcal.
War, the report points out,
of\eo serves to reduce tbe population in
a way tbat man seeoís uoable or unwill–
ing to achieve by "peaceful" means.
War is thus
a
mecbabism for periodic
population control.
•
Cultural
Art.
music, and creativity,
claims the report. are oftcn inextricably
involved WJth the
drama,
excitcmenl,
and glory of war. Take away war (and
tbe meotality tbat acoompaoies it) and
ma.ny people believe tbat tbe
arts
would
largely dry up and become sterile, pur-
poseless.
.,
•
Science and
Teclrnology.
lnventions
and scientitic di.sooveries ar-e extremely
depeodent on the stimulus of war. From
the · first smelting techniques for brass
and iroo to tbe practical appücations of
atomic eoergy to the latest break–
_throughs in laser optics and miczo.mio–
iaturiution, war (and the prt:paratioo
for war) has provided an
overw~helming
ímpetus for tecbnological dcvelopment.
•
Social
Release.
War, acoording to the
report, oneo serves tbe same functiorras
bolidays. celebrations, aod orgies -
a
release from tensions andao adjustment
of tbe standards of
social
bebavior, i.e.
the "moral climate."
Also,
and vcry im–
portaotly,
war
provides a way to dis–
sipate the
g~neral
boredom, of\eo
a
most persisteot social problem.
•
ldeologlcal Clarijicarion.
FinaUy, tbe
report, emphasized tbat a war mentality
helps men to make deci.sioos - to choose
one side or tbe otber, to bccomc com–
mitted to
a
cause. 'T)e simple decisions
ofwañare are oneo appealiog to
a
large
numbcr of people who would otbcrwise
bccome frustrated and ooofused witb
vague aod ill-detioed moral questions.
As
panial substirutes for tbe nonmili–
tllry functioos of
war,
the report sug–
gcsted a massive space program
(perh.apa in response to real or imagined
'space invaders), a gigaotic public wel–
fare program,
o¡
eveo ao elaborate and
sophi.sticated system of slavery and re–
pression. Yet such üsolutions" would
hardly be expectcd to eogender long–
term public support.
In
sbort, tbc lroo Mouotain Report
ooocluded tbat lastin.g peace, wbile not
theoretically impossible, is probably
unanainable; and eveo if it oould be
achieved, it would almost cenaioly not
be in the best ioterests of a stable society
to achieve it.
'
Tbe paradox is that
in
spite of man's
earnest• desire for peace, tbe price may
simply be too high.
Only
a
total reorientation of the fun–
damental values
aod
instituuons of
man's'
civilizatioo would seem to be ade–
quate for makiog peace
a
viable tltema–
úve
10
war.
Bul
until sucb a ume -
given man's present
sociaL
economic,
and politieal lOStitutions - tbe incred–
ible cost of war may actuaUy be ex–
ceeded by the high price of peace. O