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EUROPE' S FUTUR.E
PEACE OR WAR?
3
An on-the-spot report on the pros and
cons of the recent European Security
Conference in Helsinki.
THE INCREDIBLE HUMAN
6
POTENTIAL .....:. PART VI
The editor:in-chief's new book now ex–
plains how God planned to carry
ou~
the
awesome feat of reproduéin!¡J himself.
IN BRIEF
7
Stanley R. Rader's column
portant developments in
Helsinki.
covers im–
lsrael and
THE NEXT 25 YEARS
-
CRISIS OR OPPORTUNITY?
. 8
Our reporters cover the Second General
Assembly of the World Future Sodety,
held last June in Washington, D.C.
TWO V IEWS
OF THE FUTURE
9
At the fÚturist conference, the prophe–
cies polarizad between "good news" and
"bad news,:· displayed here in chart form.
THE MISSING DIMENSION
IN SEX - PART.VI
10·
Sex and family relationships are God–
plane relationships, not available on the
animal or angel plane.
12
ORCHIDS AND ONIONS
Response to the sex series is overwhelm–
ing - both pro and
c~n;
b.oth serious
and humorous.
14
WHO WON AT HELSINKI?
"Garner Ted Armstrong Speaks Out' '
on Moscow's possible side
benefi~
from
Helsinki - a rift in the Atlantic alliance.
2
THilONG11010
lO
HllSINKI
The East-West charter signed ear–
l ier this month at the 35-nation
European Security Conference in
Helsinki represents the achievement
of a long-sought goal of Soviet di–
plomacy.
In 1952, Soviet Premier Josef
Stalin proposed to h is Kremlin
assocíates that an aii-European con–
ference be convened for the an–
nounced purpose of peacefully
settlíng ·East-West differences. Hís
principal motive, however.. was to
ratífy SovieÍ control of the Eastern
European states, acquired duríng
and alter World War
JI,
and to effect
a wíthdrawal of American troops
from European soil. Stalin had con–
ceived of the conference as a sub–
stituta for a German peace treaty
which had been made impossible qy
the d ivisíon Óf Germany inio tl!ll-o
separate státes.
Stalin's idea was floated in early
1954 by Soviet Foreígn Minister V .
M . Molotov at a
in Hu,ngary in 1956 and Czech–
oslovakia in 1968 - the Soviet
proposal was pul in cold storage,
but soon afterward revived. Some of
the Warsaw Pact nations - Poland
in particular '- began to get into the
a·ct by lobbying in Western Europe
for acceptance of the idea. But
NATO·s response to the feelers re–
maíned cool. The íssue of Berlín
needed
10
be settled first, NATO in–
sisted, and talks on mutuál force
reductions in Europe had to be ini–
Íiated - if not
prior
to a.European
security conference, at least
para/le/
withit.
Following the ratificatíon of the
Four-Power Berlín Agreement in
1972 and Soviet acceptance of the
idea of parallel talks on mutual force
reductíoris, the way
.)N
S
fínafly
cleared for a security conference.
On November 22, 1972, prepara–
tory díscussíons began in Helsinki.
. The confe-rence began at the foreign
minister level in
Ber.lin fore ign
ministers· confer-'
ence. Molotov
proposed a 50-
year collective
security treaty
along with a neu–
t ralizad and per–
manently divided
csce
the same cíty on
July 3, 1973.
Actual negotia–
tions , however,
did not get under
way until Sep–
tember .of 197.3
Conference .on Security
and Cooperation in Europe
Helsinki·1975
Germany. ·The Kreml in's immediate
aim at that time was to head off the
alarming prÓspect of West German
rearmament and Bonn's entrance
into NATO. The bitter experience
with Nazism, in fact, was,
an~
still
ís, at the very heart of the Soviet
dríve for securíty along her western
flank.
Molotov went so far as to seri–
ously suggesi that the Soviet Union
might even consider joiníng NATO!
The Western representativas to the
conterence burst ínto audible laugh–
ter, and immediately rejected the
idea.
A year later -
in 1955 -
Moscow formed the Warsaw Pact
alliance as its counterpart to NAT0.
Soon thereafter, the Kremlin pro–
pose.d that NATO
qnd
the Warsaw
Pact be simultaneously dissolved in
e mutual security arrangement.
NATO again rejected the proposal
out of hand.
• More than a decade passed wíth
Moscow pressing on and off for a
securíty conference. but wíth little
result. Each time a crisis arase - as
in Geneva.
· Duríng the 22
months of negotiations leading up to
the final Helsinki extravaganza,
about $50 miliion was spent on con–
ference activities.
1
n some 2,400
negotiating sessions, the 37 5 repre–
sentativas tu rned out some 4,600
do'cuments tot¡'lling over 9 million
pages. The end result was a 100-
page, 30.000-word " Final Act,"
outlining promises to respect na–
tional borders, to expand trade and
cultural exchanges. and to ease the'
flow ot people and ideas across the
; lron Curta in.·
Presiden! Ford minced no words
when he told hís fellow heads of state
what the U .S. expected from the lofty
principies signed at Helsinki: "Our
peoples will bewatching and measur–
ing our progress. They will ask how
these noble sentiments are being
translated into actions .. .. History
will judge this conference notbywhat
we say today. but what we do tomor–
row- not by the promises we make
but by the promises we keep...
An on-the-spot report begins on
page three in this issue of
Plain
Truth.
O
WEEK ENDING AUGUST 23, 1975
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