Basic HTML Version
--~--------------------------------------·~~
symptom that the whole
h~
may be
about
10
bum down. The Uniud Sta1es
simply bas over-estimatcd its wcalth and
uied
10
do
too
mucb: aillltarily defeod
tbe non-Communist world, educate
every child
10
graduate rdlool, malee
war on poverty, and compel
~usiness
10
solve deep-rooted sociological problems.
American ambitiooa have exccedcd
American poiency. To accomplish its
lofty social visiooa, the country
has
bor–
rowed heavily against the furure. The
intercst on the national debt alone now
exceeds
S30
billioo.
Tbe
Pracripdoll
The
Wa/1 Strut Journa/
points out
that you
can•t
light
rec~ioo
and in–
ftation at tbe same time using the stan–
dard economicmcdicine which has
beeñ
in vogue since tbe
Depression.
Tbese
tbeories may bave workcd in tbe thirties
wben the economy exhibitcd
al!
tbe
teo–
sile st.rength of a l.inlp balloon, but tbey
do not "take"
toda
y.
The standard medicine consists
of
printing more money
to
'stimulate tbe
1
demand side of the equatio.n. B'!t to
light bolh unemployment and inflation
you must concentrate on supply. Pro–
ducing extra
goods
will put more of tbe
joblcss
10
worlc as well as tend to bo1d
pricesdown.
The rub
is
that tbe natiottal supp1y of
góods'-aíiii
-'SérviCcs'
c:lll"r~Winaelúed
-
wilhout the
U.S.
tpcmment
CXlllSCiously
witbdrawing from
some
of what it is
óoío,g.
L:ike
·a
fam.í!y whose purchases
overextend its income, something must
go - tbe expensivc military machinery,
the large standing army,
lb
e com–
mitment
10
lift
the elderly and poor out
of poverty, the cducational system, or ,
the myriad ofspecial causes tbe govem–
ment serves (grants to the
aTts
and
sciences,
disease_.n:searcb,
space
explora–
tion,
etc.).
They sim.ply cannot
al/
be
alforded.
The poütical apparatus. bowever,
is
-unable
10
make a clear-cut list of prior–
ities. Politicians in a democracy are nor–
mally beret\ of the willpower to make
h.ard decisions - particularly any deci–
sion which may deprive any segment of
tbe electorate ofmoney tlowing from tbe
federal l:itry. The inevitable result
is
walll.ing and oompromise in which
no
real cutbaclcs
are
ever made.
Human govemments are wonl
10
in–
crease their spending. Opening up sorne
new porkbarrel is a oonvenient way to
look generous. Too rnany poUticians li.l:e
10
po$ture as "bc!nefacton," as tbey con–
spicuously
tire
up the ¡overnrnent en–
gines lo salve wbatever real or imagined
crisis
is
fashionable at the time.
lf
intlalion and recession are
10
be
exorcisect out of tbe eoonomy, tbe
"pub–
líe sector"
wil1
bavc to make deftni1e,
onnscious contractions.
Since the eoonontie solution depeods
on the resttaint of tbe poUticiall$ aod the
public, logic demaods tb.e gloomiest pos·
síbl~
onoclusion: tbe economy woo't be
eured. o
WEEK ENDINO
JUNE
7, 1!175
ltt-
s,.iil
by
Stanley R. Rader
LONDON,
May
ll:
Two qucstíons
are
posed
by
Euro–
peaos in tbe wake of tbe U. S.
witbdrawal
from
Indocbina. Wbat
wil1
the Unitcd States do in tbe furure vis-i–
vis its <:Ommitments
10
its alües in Eu–
rope, and
wil1
Mr.
K.issingtr remain in
oflice througllout the balance of Presi–
den! Ford's term?
ll is
ironica1
how sttong tbe European
reaction has
been
10
the events of tbc
past several
weeks
in Cambodia and
Vietnam - ironical
because
during the
long
U.S. involvemenl in that
arca
tberc
bad
001
only been a singular lack of
material and moral support from its Eu·
ropean alües but
repeat~y
tbere bad.
a1so
beco
sharp
aiticism and rebulce of
the U.S. effort. Now tbat the Unitcd
States has, in fact, done what was for
so
'tong advocated, however, these same
European allies are ditectly and in–
directly stating tbat the United States
bas abandoncd Soutb VietnAm or at
lwt bu failcd 10 supporfin'ally and it
bas shirlccd its
moral
rcsponsibilitics, not
only lo the governrnent ofSaigon, but
10
!hose
many thousands of Soutb Viet–
namese wbo supported U.S: programs
and policies and wbo were
1101
able to be
evacuated during the dramatic war's·
end rescue operations. The Europeans
now
rea1.ize
once again how very much
lhey mustlook
10
tlie Unitcd Stale$.
Pubtic opinion polls .abroad only two
yean ago showed that
Mr.
K.issinger was
the most popular
Ame~
in tbe eyes
of the European peoples. But bis image
ofCaptain Marvel. one able
10
"single–
baodcdly" resolve some of the most
kootty problems oonfronting manlcind,
bas now
beco
very badly tarnished.
Many of the people with wbom
1
spealc
are oonceroed that, should Kissinger re–
main in oflicc, American diplomacy dur–
ing the Deltl
IWO
yean
wil1
sulfer
because
of
a
lack
of unity and idealism.
1
bave tricd
10
reasrure ¡ny fricnds
tbat Amcrica
wil1
not 1um its baclc
on
the world aod tbat the witbdrawal frorn
Indochina does not suggest that it will.
Presiden! Nixon rnade it plain upon
gai.ning offiee in 1969 that )le. inlénded
fully
10
disengage American forces from
that arca at tbe eailiest possible oppor·
tunity ODftSistent witb an bonorable
peace, including tbe retum of
al!
Ameri–
can prisoners of war.
lt
is plain
Crom
everything that Mr. Kissioger and Mr.
Nixon said during the period 1969· 1973
that both were oonóeroed with tbe credi–
bility of thc United States worldwide as
a result of the ultimate disengagement
that Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger koew
was
unavoidable. Uofortunately, the
U
.S.
elforts
10
st.rengthen tbe South Viet–
oamese
10
stand independently even in
tbe face of
future
aggressíoo rróm the
north were unsuecessful and were
doomed
10
be ;..,uoeessful from -the
start since Presiden! Nixoo was unable
to fulliU bis promises to Presiden! Thieu
aod bis governrnent
10
use
force if neces–
sary to enforce tbe Peace ACICOrds of
January 1973. But at no time bave
Mr.
Kissinger or Mr. Nixon, and now Prcs.i·
dent Ford, failed
10
ratate flrmly and
precisely tbat the Un.ited Stale$ would
honor its oommitment wortdwide.
The United States is making this plain
to its
real
or potential adversaries whe>–
ever tb_éy may be aod wherever tbey
rnay be. The' United States has, in fact,
already ruid its lint
;test
in this regard,
wben it had to, apply force_against tbe
Cambodian governrnent for its seizure
of tbe American merchant ship
May–
aguez.
·
Perbaps this provocative act by-"
tbe Camboilian govel'lllJÍent was one de–
signcd
to
test' tbe mettle o( the Un.itcd–
States at this particularly
d~lieate
time.
Perbaps there will be otber probcs in
. otber places
10
do tbe same.
1
bave
as–
sured my European coUeagues that the
Unitcd States
wil1
react to any provoca•
tive and aggrcssive acts in a decisive,
immediate and eft'ective ma.nner.
Vis-!-vis
Mr.
K.issinger, norwithstand–
ing
bis
receñ.tly avowed intention
10
stay
in oflioe for tbe benefit of the onuntry
and
lb
e world., it is difficult
10
foresee bis
staying on the scene
too
much longer.
AU of
bis
poücies bave u.nfonunately
resultcd in failure or have been very
seriously tarnished and unfortunate1y
seem devoid of the kind of idealism that
is expectcd of the Un.ited States abroad
and by tbe American people.
Mr.
Ki.ss–
inger's poücy is dominatcd by
bis
over–
all view · of tbe world, of the basic
re1ationsh.ip between the United States
and the U.S.S.R., tbe United Stales and
its European allies, and tbe Unitcd
States and Ja.pan. He has from time to
time alienatcd our European allies by
faiüng
1
to oounsel with 1hem or advise
them in advaoce as was the case during
the October 1973 Middle Eastem crisis.
He has
a1so
deeply oft'ended tbe Japa–
nese
on
occa.sioo. Basi<:ally Mr.
K.iss-–
inger beüeves that tbe Russians are
ODftStantly watching the Unitcd States,...
for
signs
of a weakening in the
U.S.
resolve
10
meet its obügations, P.articu–
larly where tbe onmlnitment of
'U.s..
forccs
would be i.nvolvcd. Consequeolly,
Mr.
Kissinger bas found bimsel!
main–
taining the status quo even
if
sucb a
posture would
require
ignoring basic hu-
manitarian va!ueS.
Mr.
K.issinger's rela·
tions witb Congrcss are wonening. and
yet
it
the legislative and executive
braoches of the govemment
are
to
worlc
together in forming eft'eetive national
foreign poücy of
a
consensos
nature,
tbe
Congress
wiU
have to respect tbe Secre–
tarj
of State. Uofortunately Mr. Kiss–
inger has shown
a
certain higb–
handcdness in deaüng with Congrcss as
weU as a markcd preferente for wÓrl:ing
under circumstances
that
are antitbetical
to that wb.icll would be
required
if
Con–
grcss
is
10
maiJ¡ta.in a stroog role in for·
mulatin¡ basi<: U.S. foreign policy.
Just today it
was
reponed, in the
New
York Tlmts,
tbat. Mr. Kissinger may
bave made sorne ill-advised statements
about.Arab, Japanese and Russian lead·
en during
h~
ill-fatcd step by step ap–
proach
10
peaee in the arca. Tbe lsraeü
governrnent is trying
10
suppress tbe
publica!ioo by
an
Israelí joumalisl
which is reponedly replete with refer–
ences
10
staterncnts made by
Mr.
K.iss–
ioger and leake'd by ao Israelí
govemment offic:ial to the author.
lf
tbis
be true, Mr. Ki.ssinger's value in thc
Middlc Bast may be completely
eümi–
natcd.
1
remember only too well beibg ad·
vised in Septem'&r of 1973 by tbe Egyp–
tian
Perrnaoent Reprcsentative
10
tbe
Unitcd Nations in Geneva,
Dr.
El·Erian,
that tbe major role
that
K.issinger bad
played in bringing about the initial dis–
engagernent pact _berweeo tbe Israeü–
Egyptian forces and tbe Israeli-Syrian
forces was that of tbe admircd and re–
spected iotermediary who could be
trusted by all .parties - this being par–
ticularly importan! as both Egypt aod
Syria oould not and would not
talle
10
tbe lsraelis di.rectly. But,
if
as reponed
by the
New York
TI11J!S.
Mr.
Kissinger
has, in fact.. made disparaging
remarts
about Arab leaders during
bis
coofer–
ences witb the Israelis al a time when he
was
tr~ted
with respect, admiration and
trust by tbe leaders of tbe.Arab nations,
it
is
difficult to see how
Mr.
Ki.ssinger
could justity tbat oonduct aod remain of
aoy value in future negotiations along
!he ünes
of
the past.
This
would be par–
ticularly sad since both President Sadat
and Prime Minister Rabin have sug·
gested on severa! oc:caSions since tbe col–
lapso of the last round of talks that tbey
would still welcome oew initiatives by
the United States and Mr. Kissinger.
· In
addiUon
10
tbe foregoing it seems
tbat Mr. Ki.Ssinger, even
if
be sbould
remain in of!ice, is not going to bave tbe
independeot and all-powerful position
in forcígo policy matters tha1 he has bad
for lOme time. Presiden! Ford
wil1
meet
witb Prcsídent Sadat in Salzburg early
oexl montb and
wil1
probably mect
abo
With Prime Minister Rabin.
Mr.
Ki.ss–
inger is mea.nwbile making adclitional
plans witb members of Presiden! Pord's
Wbite House stalf, many of whom feel
he should not be allowcd to dominate
both the National
Security
Council and
tbe State Oepartment. o
11