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1111 TIRRDRISTS
GO IICliAR
by
Robert Ginskey '
'
o The Honorable Msyor of Your
Belfutiful
City:
A redio-control/ed
nuclelfr bomb
has
been
c~trefulfy
conceltled n6/fr the helfft ol
your
me–
tropo/is
11
you distribute
20
mil/ion do/·
Jars in stnlfll bilis to the mlnority
members ol your community within
the
next three days, you wi/1 be not/fied of
the bomb 's location and no harm wi/1
befa// you
or
your people. However; if
you
feil to meet these
dem~tnds,
tha
nuclttlff devica
w111
be
deton4ted. Tens
of thous•nds wi/1 be kiiied. your ciry wi/1
be
dtlstroyed. snd radiolfctive con–
taminlftion wi/1 tender it
uninh~tbitable.
Ene/osad
are
the plans lor the davice.
You bomb' experts wi/1 conllrm that
1
know what Pm ta/king ltbout - 11nd
rm not kidding!
In 1970. a precocious 14-yeer-old Or–
lando. Floridlt
boy
sent local off.cials a
note threatening to 8nnihilate the
city
with an H-bomb if he were not given s 1
million. Ha supplementad his demands
with a convincing set of detailed plans
that had experts more than slightly wor·
riad
The boy was eventually appre–
hended, and his nuclear black-mail
turnad out
to
be a hoax. But the ve,Y
fact that he was able to supply a realis–
tic set of plens for a nuclear bomb sent
ripplas of concern and uneasiness
throughout the nation. Were home·
made nuclear bombs nearer than we
dltrad to admit? W&S the d8y' that terror–
ists
go nuclear frighteningly close at
hand?
Prylng lnslde Pandora'e Box
Severel factors determine just how
difficult (or easy) it is to design and con–
struct e nuclear
bomb
(see the acoom–
panying bolC). Only six nations - the
U.S.. U.S.S.R.. China. Britain. Franca,
and India - have so lar managed to
pry into the explosiva secrats of Pan–
dora's nuclear box. But ono thing is
clear. 11 the essential mataríais are 8vail–
able, it ís very possible to make an
atornic bomb using information that
is
available to
the
pub6c.
•
..Any reasonably intelligent person
can build a nuclear bomb," claims Dr. ·
Theodore
8.
Taylor, who helped design
much of America's nuclear arsenal. Tay–
lor has long argued that whh a do-it–
yourself bomb guide drawn frorn pub–
licly avaílable ·federal documents
or
the
local library. a person could buy -
or
steal - much of the materials for a
nuclear bomb.
8
As if to prove Taylor's point, a recent
TV documentary, "The Plutonium Con–
nection,.. revealed that
1
20-year-otd
M. I.T. college student had designad a
crude but worbble atomic bomb in frve
weeks. The Public Broadcasting Service,
(PBS) challenged the studant to design
the bomb to test the theory that a home·
made nuclear weapon could be fash–
ionad solely through the use of availabfe
published documents.
The student said he reliad solely on
reportS and files available in such plaoes
as his college library and the Atomic
Energy Commission·s. own public read–
ingroom.
..All of these books ere available
through the National Technical lnforrna–
tion Service in Washington. D.C.." the
student observad . "1 went down and
picked them up myself. about five
):!ol–
larsa book..• . lt's really no problem to
go down there and get enough informa–
tion to designa bomb...
Even the
Encyclopedilf Americtma
gives a very informativa (Uscussion of
the principies and techníquea used
io
making nuclear explosivas.
Atomic scientists were shocked 81
what they considerad a " fair chanca"
that the studenrs bomb would go off.
Swedish Defense Ministry scientist Jan
Prawitz llated that the ,device might
have the power of 1DO tons of TNT. 8nd
addad. " In the hands of the terrorist.
from the point of view of authorities
negotiating with the terrorist. the
fact
that the bomb might go off is thrimpor–
tantthing ... •
" Now. what you do, you detonate the
TNT... atates the "studeni" on the PBS
documantary. "That squeezes the
tamper and the plutonium core together
enough that the plutonium becornes su–
per
criti~al.
lt
stays together long
enough that you get a chain reaction
and. boom. you get a bomb .
" lt's thlit simple."
Nuclear Theft
Grentad,
it
is
possible to
de$ign
an A·
bomb, but just how would one acquire
the necessary
fissi~able
material? Un–
doubtadly this is the greatest obstacle
for a would-be nuclear tarrorist. Sophis–
ticated nuclear procassing plants are in–
credibly expansiva. Yet the so4ution m8y
be surprisingly and distressingly simple:
theh.
Militlry supplies
of
nuclear materials
and even complete weapons are
now
widely dispersad 8round the world. The
U.S. keeps 7.000 nuclear wsrheads in
Europa atañe. with 2 / 3 designatad for
use not by the U .S. but by our allíes.
The sacurity surrounding such supply
dumps is often appallingly inadequate.
Retireó Adm. Gene R. LaRocque. a
forrner Navy fleet cornmander and
strategic planner who
now
heads the
Center
lar
Defensa lnforrnation, recendy
admonished a Senata atornic energy
subcommittee that "relatively few
.men" guard U.S. nuclear warheads and
bombs atorad in such countries as
Gnsece. Turkey and South Korea . ..A
wel~planned.
well-executad terrorist
at–
iack
could easily captuns our nuc{ear
weapons. and a
fast
plana
or
helicopter
c:Óuld get them out of tha country justas
easily, " LaRocque wsmad.
The danger of atomic blackmail re–
sulting from stolen military supplies
could
be
minimi!ed by increesing secu–
rity and / or raducing
the
numbers of
such weapons in vulnerable areas. But
unfortunately. another
soun:<~
of illicit
nuclear material is 8fso on the horizon
- the atomic power industry:
--
Nuclear power plants " burn" ura-
nium and plutonium. both elemento
used In making an atomic bomb. While
being usad for power generation. the
uranium end plutonium are relatively
•• sale from theft because they are mixad
with other highly radioactive substances
that make removal of the nuclear fuel
extremely diff.cult and hazardous.
However. the fuel must eventually be
iemoved from 1he plant 8n.d shipped out
toa reprocessing facility. lt is here that
the various isotopes of uranium and plu·
tonium ara saparatad
from
other
radio–
active by-products as p•rt of the
recycling prooess. While transporting
such nuclear material to and from a re·
actor, and especially 81 the reprocessing
plant itself, theh can much more easily
occtJr.
A recent Ford Foundation ttudy. " Nu–
clear Theh: Risks and Sefeguards.' '
as–
serta
that " transportation is the weakest
link" in the nuclear fuel cycle frorn the
-standpoint of vulnerability to theh and
diversion . But thfl report adds that even
WEEK ENDLNO TUNE 7, 1975
· '
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