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piasters at the expense of others.
There was growing antagonism in
the streets against corruption in high
placas . 11 wa's OK to be corrupt
when times were good and everyone
got their fair share, but these were
hard times!
There was open hostility and dis–
gust directed toward the Thieu gov·
ernment. There was more talk about
interna! política! corruption than of
battles to the North. There was. in
fact. a feeling of apathy as far as the
war
was
concemed . The communist
strategists, they said, were con–
centrating on crushing Cambodia.
Saigon expec!!d no mejor spring of–
fensive from-the Nonh - not this
year anyway.
The war was " way off some–
'where." The most pressing concern
was how to get a share of what the
fat cats were skimming off the top.
And if it meant shaking the Thieu
government to the ground for
"eco–
nomic" reasons, so be it. This was
the street talk - at least when it
was safe to voice one's opinion. The
"business of war" was viewed more
and more as an economic enterprise
that made the rich richer and the
poor poorer. Patience of the less for–
tunate
was
wearing thin. They too
WE.I!K ENDlNO MAY
2.4,
1975
had a greedy appetite, but it wasn't
being satisfied.
As much as the South Vietnamase
hated communism ·ánd the pros–
pects of l iving under its rula, they
were obviously wondering il the Sai–
gon government with its "politics of
corruption"
was
wonh
fighting and
dying for. 1cen' t help but think that
this was a mejor reason for the sud–
den collapse of morale, the military
desenions among the officers and
enlisted men, and the panic.
After the U.S. pullout, South Viet–
namwas actually a house of cards, a
hollow shell, a plum ripe for picking.
Had the arms been ·available, of
cours'e, there would still be a deter–
mination to fight the communists -
war, after all, was the accepted way
of life for generetions - but 1don't
think there was much desire to fight
for the preservation of what had be–
come a totally corrupt politice! and
economic regime.
Without a constant supply of U.S.
arrns, the inevitable defeat would -
heve happened sooner or later, but
South Vietnam, even with U.S. aid,
would have eveotually decayed from
within. The entire economic and po–
lítica! system was in the process of
destroying itself. O
THE MANY FACES OFSOUTH VIETNAM
LEFT: Sllígon ís 11 bustlin¡¡, commercially actíve cíty, with rraffic which 1111ries in
the
extmme.
The
few shiny new American or European
e•~
were m•de to look
clumsy
tJmid
the
sw~~m~:s
of :sma/1 motodNke:s which t'Mde driving difficult. if nor
d11n¡¡erous. lt was not unu:sua/to sH tour or five peop/e on one two-wheeledmechine.
TOP RIGHT: Two girl:s dressed in their "eo ·dais" stop to ponder the fine quality
hand-madB shoes, a specialty in Saigon. CENTER: Ths markets werB we/1-:stockBd
with food. which rhe mtJrchants sold wlth patient determlmltlonl BOTTOM: A rBfugee
csmp nesr Da Nang,
be/ore
its
tal/,
symbolizes Vietn11m 's agony over
a
wsr that
exh<Justed three ganer11tíons of
V.etnt~mese.
The anxious expression in tha children 's
e)'lts
•nticipates the culminlltíon of 11vents thet soon took place.
9