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WATERGATE AND THE
VIETNAM
·DEBACLE
by
Stanley R. Rader
Now lhat the
Wa~rg¡ate
atrait
u
bdW>d
us - Prcsident Nixoo hav·
in¡
r«'31'ed.
the major and mioor
dcfeodanll in thc
"11rious Ctials
havi.n& beeo
coovi~
or havio&
S\lbmit~
a plea Of guilty
~
ODC
mi&ht oot itomediatcly collll<Ct
thc
faU of Cambodia, thc coUapse of
So\lth Vietnam, thc failurc of Mr.
Kiuinscr's peaoc m.issioo
in
thc
Middle'
!!as~
thc coocem of our
ames throughout thc world and thc
dismantliog of the Nixoo·Kissinger
and l'ord·Kissingcr forcign polícies
with theevents ofWatergate.
Thc con.nection. bowever,
bc–
twecn these events and Watcrgatc
is
not a.n att.enuated one and, as we
shall scc, but for
Wa~rgate,
much
woukl a.ot have OQC:Urred, or at
lcut lhc ctrcel would havc beco
slwply mitigated. When che Pw
Pcaoc
Ac:oords wcrc finaUy SÍ$Jlcd
la Jaouaty
1973,
it had bccome ap–
~ot
10 aU that
ceruio
promises
wcrc madc
by
Presjdeot Nixoo aod
Mr Kiuinscr
to
Prcsidcot Thicu
and tbe Sout.b Vietnamese
govem~
meoL Thc substao.ce of tbuc
promises
was lhat che Uoitcd States
wouJd.
in
essenü, not onJy oon·
t.inue
to
rupply economic and mili..
c..ry aid in s.dequate amouots
10
lhe
Republic of South Viem.m, but
wt>uld also
be
P"'fHITed ro enfort:<
rht
gulUtln(<<>
ofrlr• Peace AttoNÚ,
if
not
by
ditect
ioterveotion of thc
Uoitcd Statcs military fon:cs again,
at kast
by
thc
rhnar
of sucb force
bein¡ uscd, as it was so dsaJnati·
cally in
thc
closing moo.ths of thc
c:onllict.
8ut la ordcr for such
promisa
10 be ful6lled, it
was
im·
portaot that the
Uní~
Statcs be
led
by
a stroag
presiden.~
ao.cl, in
tbis case. a strong Mr.
Nixon,
::::i~:~~:!!::OWn::,:
sound that botb thc Soviet Union
aod the Pcoplc's RepubUc of China
k.new.
or
h&d
reason
to
believe,
tbat
he.
would
not he.sitate to use lhat
amount or
force nece.ssa.ry to stcrn
::~~w
1
~! ':or:.~=ta~:io:r
North Vietnam o.ot stay al bome as
thcy had promilcd.
Evco before Watergate bccame
the o.ational issuc in thc sprin¡ or·
1973, lhc Congrcss
was
alrcady
do1.11¡ battle wi!h Mr. Nixon over
Vietnam and tbe inc::lusioos or
ARVN ioiO Cambodia. Amcric:ao
&u'
~r
wu a6ordiog thc pro,_
tioD SO Deoessaty
for
wch
a
ven•
turc. ao.d Congrcss
was
at~mptiag
oot ooly lo out oll' fwids for further
military suppon of Soulh Vietnam.
but was
aJso
attct)lptio.g 10 pass lcg·
iJI:tioo· tbat would forbid thc uso
of America's mmtary power
in
lhe
arca wilhout prior congressional
llpproval. Witb lhc Pruidcol's
powcr, prestigc aod aucntion scri·
ously dimioished by che novclatio.o.s
of Watergatc - rcvclations wbicb
iocreased montb
by
moolh -
il
was
obvious that the Prcsidco.t was
in
no position 10 lcad the Coo.grcss in
aoy
dlrcctioo,
ao.d
cenaiuly was la
6
ao
~itioo
to
enter into an un–
popu1ar etron as events in Vietnam
and Cambodia begao. 10 rcvcal that
the Nonh
Vietnamese were not
stayio¡ at bome aod tbat the Soviet
Uoion wu aupentio.g its
tlow
o(
suppUco or the
m0$1
sopbisticated
mihtary hardware.
Ouring much or
1973,
and ccr·
taínly almost all of
1974
uotil Mr.
Nixon's resi¡nation ln August.
United States forcign poUcy was
carrled on by Henry Kissinger, who
bceame Se<:rccary of Statc in lhc
summer
ot
1973.
Sur oven Mr.
Kis.sinaer's power and prestigc
Embroiled in
Watergate, President
Nixon was in no
position to do battle
with Congress
.over Vietnam.
wcrc diminÚ:hed as a result of Mr.
Nixoo's
ltoublcs
with
Watergate -
oot only bccausc Mr. Kissio.gcr
htmsclf bccame cmbroilcd in the
Watcrgatc atratr (although 10 a
lcsser exteot) as a rcsult of lhc
wirc-tap incide:ot involviog mcm–
bcn
of
hu
stall',
but
bccausc
at aU
11m
ea
Mt.
K.issinger
was
acting only
u
Mr. N¡xon's ...
aseut'·
or ..proxy.•
ln othcr words, u Sccretary
o!
St.ltc, be wu able 10 inftuence poi·
icy
10
a
¡rcat extent.,
he was
able
to
initiate policy 10 a grcat cxtcnt, be
wu even ablc to implcmco.t policy
10
some exterll,
but when it ca.me
to
a quesuon of implcmeotio.g policy
by tbe use or American. military
fo~.
once his principal - lhc
President - was sharply
circú.m·
tcribed in tbe use of thc presiden·
tial
powers, thc power of
bis
agcot
or proxy wu dec:reased · much
more. Hcoceforth, Mr. Kissingcr
was uoable
co
deal with bis
eounterparts in Washington or
abroad u thou&h be wcrc speaking
not ooly ror thc Prcsideat but ror
thc Amcncao. peoplc.
Everyon.e
tb.at
we mct dw:in&out
travcls abroad dwiag
lbis
period
W&S LDquitiag
of
US
wbether we
thou¡ht Mr. Nixoo would be no·
sigoiag aod,
if
be did not
res;go..
would he be impeacbed and con–
vietcd. No impona.nt statesman
that wc
met
ín
our
uavels
during
thiacime failed 10
as~
chal qucstioo
dlreetly or indircctly. Con·
scqucntly, onc can scc that people
had 10 look beyond Mr. Kissingcr
to
thc Prcsidcot, aod bad
to
look at
tbe natu
re and
ex.teot
of
bis
po~ers
to cnforce ao agreemenl or
to
honor
a
suara.ntce, and,
o(
cou..rse.
they bad 10 loot beyoad Mr. Nixoo
10 bis poteotial suco=<>< in ollicc.
as wcll as 10 lhe Uoited States Con·
grcss
and
the peoplc of thc Uoited
States in general.
~~
oa
1MMl<ldle
tast
h
1.1
very
dear lO mos:t observen:
tbat ODC Of the moot importan! fac:–
ton m
the fllllure or Mr. Kissingcr
to
mai.nt.atn lhe momcntum for
peace in the Middlc East, by'a scc–
ond Israelí withdrawal ftom occu–
pied
tenitory in thc Sinai, was
lba.t
the Israeli ¡ovemment
wu
very
muen aO'CCied by the cvcncs in
South Vietnam and the Unitcd
States, failure 10 honor
its
c:om~
mjttnent lherc to Pre.s.idcnt
Thieu
and his 1ovcmmetft. The Minisler
of DefcoJe of thc State of Israel,
Mr. Peros. slatcd quite cmpbat–
icaUy lhat tbat
was
thc case, aod
attcmpted 10
JUStity
lsracli ada·
maocy io oot wilhdrawin¡ from
uy more territory without
receiv-
. iog the much hoped ror dcclaratioo
or noobelli&ercocy from che
Egyp–
tiao g>vemmcnt by rcfetring poiot·
edly 10 America's tailurc
10
prcvcnt
lhc coUapse of Soutb Vieto.am aod,
toa lesscr
cxtcn~
Cambodia.
or courte. lt i$ ao
ill
wind chal
blows no good. and cvco from
Watcrgato and •ics cll'cct on Unitcd
St.ltcs forcign policy sorne good
has
beco produccd. N"-.!onger will,
or sbould, Uniccd St.ltes foroign
poUcy be so personal
aod
so glam·
ori.ted. Tberc are,
ia
fac::t, n.o mit·
adc workcn. Mr. Kissjoaer's prior
cll'orts oot withstandio¡. Although
thcrc
CMY
DOl be any sucb lhing as
a truc coa.scasus forctp policy,
aod evco •howd a bipartisao for·
eip policy oot dcvclop, it
wiiJ
be
mao.da10ry for our forcip
all'aits
10
be conductcd tn a more opeo mao·
ner, as it should in
a
&ovemment
wbcre the ¡ovemment is one of lhe
peoplc and !hose who gnvcm gov.
em
wit.b
lbe consent
of the gov·
cmed. Our aUíes a.od fricnds,
as
well as out advcrsa_ries., have now
leamcd a valuable lcsson, and lhcy
will oot in lhe fUturo be so quick 10 ·
rcly upon a fcw tndividuals, place
too much failh on a fcw individ·
uals, and ignore lhe people lhat
thosc-
rew iodivíduals have beco
cbosc.i
10 rcprcscoL
lt
may makc
summh coolereoc:a even more
ir~
rclevao.t thao thcy havo proveo 10
be in thc
post.
and it mi¡bt mal:e
ueaty-makin¡ more time con,.
sumía¡
lbu
ever before. But per·
bapo la tbe fUture ic
wtU
be more
rcprcseotauvc of thc peoplc of che
Uní~
Statea and bopcfully of the
people of the otber signatory to lhe
trcaty or agrecmcot.
lt
will proba·
bly mean lhat thc State Dopan·
mcnt wiU be a more professionaJ
one, or tbe professionals who are
already
in
the St.ltc Depanmcot
wiU
have more power and more
pr«íige ovcr thc machincry lhat iJ
thcre but has so onco beco ignorcd
or bypassed by thooe wowd·be fa<>
IOlUIDS wbo wowd pror...
lO
tnow
aU about alllhings.
or courx. thcrc
is
anolhct itony
lhat
is
clcarly rcvcaled by the col·
lapsc of Vietnam aod ics cll'cct
upon Mr. K.iJsi.ogcr aod hiJ reputa·
llon. Wbeo
Mr.
Nixon wu cam·
paiguiog for the
p~sidcncy
in
1968,
he said that
he
bad
a
plan to
end t.be
war
in
Vietnam.
Aner he
was elected, be oever revcaled tbat
plan., but he ao.d Mr. Kissinger
wcre apparcocly worthlg for somo
time
in
secret negotiations
with
thc
North Victo.amesc rcpresco.tatives
over
a
pcriod of
thrce
ycars.
Mt
Kissinger rcpcatedly insisted that
thc Unite<l,.
Sta~
could
001
diJ.
cngag< from Souch Vietnam 1utder ,
c:ircumstances
tbat would atrect
U
.S.
credibility around che world -
crcdibility viJ.i·vis ics
allí
es· wilh
rcspca
to U.S.
willirt~ess
10 honor
its commjtment
aoa
eredibility
with U.S. adveruri., vis·l·vis its
standing as a world power. Con·
seq\Jently,
il
took almost 6ve years
for Mr. Nixon, witb Mr. KJssiogcr's
a.uistance:.
to
extricatc the United
States from
its
mUitary activities in
Soutb Vietnam. and wbea.
Lhat dis–
cngagcment finally
took
place it
was
c::aUed
a
withdrawal witb
honor. Our prisóoers of war were
rclcascd
ao.d
tbe aovcm.moot of
South Vietnam
was
lclt wilh cvcry
reason
to
bel.ieve
that
it would sur–
vive
even
in
tbc.
tace
or
nuure
·~
grcs.sioo from Norcb Vicla.am
because or tbc
American
etron
tbcre
0Vet
a
_pc:riod
Of
ten
yean
Of
more.
Certainly
everyon.e
in.
the
Nixon adminillratioo
wa.s
COD·
fident that Ibero would be no col·
4apse beforo•Jaouary
20. 19't7.
Mr.
Ki.ssinger
was
evco aworded
a
No–
bol
Peacc
Priz.c: in
1973
for
bis
work
in
effect.ing an
'"agrecmeot
oa. cnd·
ing the wat and restorin¡ peace in
Viitnam."
:rhc itony, of courK. i$ that thc
military collapse of Souch Viec.nam
came under c:ircumsta.nces that sur·
passcd
by rar lhc calculations of
Mr. Nixoo, Mr. Kis.sioaer. the
Uníted StatQ lntcllí&cocc
Scrvtec,
thc
Uoited Statcs miUtary, and
most
of thc supposcdly coli¡btcocd
sources
of
informatioo. Coo–
scqucotly, che
el!'~
upon lhe
ercd·
ibility of thc United Sc..tco
is
cvcn
gruter. Eveo bclorc the cont\ict
was supposedly cndcd in January
1973,
vcry fcw peoplc around the
world would bavc criúcized the
Uoited Statcs for polling out of a
situation
tbat had become
.ro
deY·
astatiog al borne and abroad. No
ooe had qucstiooed tbe ability of·
lhe Uoited Statcs 10 win a mmtary
victory la chat arca, ao.d, in
fKt,
lhe
Uoited States was bein& com·
mended in maoy placa for its sclf·
imposed rcstraiot, albeít it ......
bciog criticiud at
thc
samc time
for the dcvutation
it
bad ca\&Sed io
che
arca.
lf thc U111ted States sovero.mcnt
had simply admitted in early
1969
that thc Uo.ited States bad bccome
iavolved
in
lhc
wroo.¡
wa.r
at thc
wroog time in thc wrons place for
wrong rcasoos aod bad simply ad·
mined a
mistalu,
no one would
have equatcd a mi.stake or an enor
wilh a defeat. Tbc domino cbcory,
whicb had beco fir1t promulgated
by Presidcnt Eiscnhowcr in
1964,
would
0.01
havo becn proved valid
- lhat
is,
lhcrc
u
a
are••
likclihood
that other countnca
in
the area
wowd oot have beco
thrca~ned
by
aggressivc commuoism
bccausc
of
tbe succeso of
che
Nonb Vietnam·
ese wbo bad beco secltins 10 win
lheir independeoce
(or
more than
filly
ycars from Europeao colonial
powcrs, aod had beco thco sccldng
lo uoify lbe country wbcn ic was
divided in thc
19SO'•
after lhe
Frcncb wilhdrawal. Ccrtainly lhc
couotrics of Thailao.d, Malaysla,
Singaporc, thc Pbilippines and lo·
doncsia had already stopped
sup–
portio.g lhc U.S. etrort aod bad
becn clamoring for
IL
U.S. wilh·
drawal
Bu~
havi.ng pcrsistcd uotil
1973
ia
a
wa.r
that
was
u_npopWar at
bomc
ao.d
abroacl,
ao.d
havio& io·
sistcd
tbat thc
Uní~ Sta~' c~i·
blliry
witb ics
aHics
was
the
pnmary
issue.
lhc
Uní~
States
ra~ed
10
prevco.t thc subscqucot coUapse or
Soulh Vietnam.
This
hu done far
more 4amagc :ood bu Utcrally
shaken the world.
O
THilD VVORLD 'NAR
(Conclm.~ed
from
page
2)
lhe Golao Hcigbts." He
was,
of
coune.,
re-ferring
to
tbe outbrcak or
wbat
is
o.ow
caUed the "Holy Day
War" ofOclober,
1973.
Without any equivocation wbat·
socver, Presjdent Thieu
abo
had
sta~
that
bis
peoplc would
COD·
tinue
to
rcsist aggression
suoces.1·
fuUy from North Vietnam and thc
Viot Coog
as
loag
as
economic and
military aid' would be continued
from-the.Uoi~
Stateo¡lbccaUSO>be
wu
ccrtain
tbac the North Vict·
namcsc and the Vict Co,11g would
not abide by lhc Pal'is
Aocord
and
would contio.uc tbcit cll'orts 10
un·
dermine. in1iltra.te and overtbtow
bi.s
JOVetM'ICDl
With
filly·six
tbousaod Ameri·
cao.s
dead in South Victo.am, more
lhan
300,000
wouodccl, witb mil·
tioo.s baviag scrved. aod Wlch Sl70
billioo havi.ng
bcen
spent, cCfUJAiy
Prcsidcot Kco.nedy's dcclaration of
fowteco ycars ag>
has
bccn more
thao satisfied
.dcspi~
tbc prcscot
debacle in South Vietnam. h
is
time 10
~>ADlÍD.c
our foreign
poi·
icy
in light of our prioritics, our
actual power ao.d rcsoui'OC$, and
che
chanscs
tbat havo
occurred
in
the world
s:ince
President Kcn·
nedy's inauguraladdrt:ss.
Furthermorc, wc should also
uk
ourselves, as shouJd
othen
in thc
world,
"Wher~
are
w~
gnlng aod
why are we hcre?" ActuaUy, nono
of lhc evcots of thc past
fo~o
yea.rs
we:rc
wúoreseeable or unpre·
dictable, ancl, in fac:l, wcrc propb·
csied.
As
Mr. Armstroag aod
1
cootio.uc our visits tbrou¡boul the
world with lhe lcadcn
o(
many na.
tioas and their people, we sec bow
lhey are ruuggli.og with thcit prol>–
lcms as peoplc havc struU)ed for
somc
6,000
years.,
a.nd
wc sec
bow
vainly lhcy strivc for pcaoc within
their
owt1
oou.ntries
a.nd
peace in
tbe world. Peacc
l"iU
c»m.e,
bow~
cver, ooly aftcr people everywhcrc
havc chaoged, but already wo ftnd
that the people we meet are more
and more aware of thc need 10 re·
tum to the spiritual valucs which
will
lead
to
the salvation
ot
man·
kind. lt was ouly last mootb in Ja·
pao that Mr. Armstroo¡ was
toasted by Prince Mjkua of Japan
aod lhc ambassador from
Israel
u
thc "spiricual Kissinger." O .
WEEK ENDINO MAY 3, 1975