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Pakistan's Precarious State
PADIA
u•at
(Comlnutd
from
pogt
J)
Tensions are on the rise throug.h·
ou1
the
stratcg.ie Jnd1an
Ocean
ba·
sin. The stimulanc tbiJ time
is
tbe
recent docision by the U.S. StAte
Oepanment
tO
lill
•ts IG-year
em·
bargo
on
arms
sales
to
PakiJtao.
The Uoitc<l States embargoed
trms exports to both India and
Pakistan
in
1965~
when the two na·
1ions were at war.
Pakistan was dealt
a
harder blow
by the embargo than was India.
whicb has
it.s
own homegrown de·
fense industry aod
has
been geuing
a
steady supply of anns from the
Sovi<l Uoion,
Uldud••&
MIG-21
fighters, destroyer esc:orts,
tanks,
and helicoptcrs. India ha.s sbown
rehuively Utlle interest in obtaioin_g
weapons from the Unlled StatO$.
Nurnero-us studies have shown
that lndia far outclasses Pa.kistan io
all forms of weaponry. lndia's.
anny of almost a m1lbon men is
more than double that of Pald–
st.an•s. In addiuon, lndia"s
SUClCC$$–
ful nuclear
test
lasl May has thrust
hC"t
into the now not·SO·exclusive
nuclear club. Though India has re–
peatedly emphasiud her intention
o(
utili:ting nuclear energy for
sólely pe=ful purposes, many ob–
Jervus
privately doubtlhe
sincerity
of
Ibis
sdf-imposcd lunitatioo.
These facooa prompted Pakí–
stan'S Prime Minuter Ali Bbuuo
1.0
state last
Dec:ember
tbat Pakistan
would be foreed lo develop nuclear
capability
if
it oould not obutin
suf–
ficient
arms for a conventional
dca
terrent.
Tbis suggestion
is
believed
lo have inftuenccd lhe U.S. deci–
sion
to
resume arms .sales
to
that
nauon.
Fean
of
a
Breakup
Palcistani oflicials in
Wash1ngton
foresce eventual assis-tanoe in the
rorm orloans from
Arab
nations to
help fioanc:e pur<:hases of Ameri–
can weapons. Arab cOuntries have
already helptd Ptkistan,
aJso
a
Mos.lem. natio.o, with loans
u.
6
4
nanee
oil imporu.
Paldstan's ooo·A!*b but feUow–
Moslem neighbor, lrao,
u
alrudy
stepping up
its
aid prograrns
to
Pakí•tan. The Shnh of lran, Paki–
nan's best fricnd in thc
re~ion,
has
long beeo
an
advocnle of hfüng the
u.s.
arms embarco.
Perbaps the reason for Ibis
oom–
muniry
o(
interat
&S
lhat
lhe Sbah
and
Mr.
Bbuuo are
lcnown
to
share
fears over the terntonal designs of
India, Afghaoistan, and the Soviet
Union a.gainsfPakistan
Paldstan is oomposed of four
provi.nces, two
on each
side
of
tbe
tndu.s
River.
Tbe
two
provinc:es on
lhe eastem side - Sind and Puojab
- are
iu
the
firm
amtrol of
Mr. Bbullo's PakiJtao People's
Party. Pakistan's eapital. Islam•·
bad,
i$
in
Punjab pnovinoe, and the
nation's largest city and pon,
Júra.
ehi,
is in Sind.
The two provinces west of the
lndus - BaluehlsiJin and Nonh–
West Frontier - are in a state.. of
unr<s~
believed
to
be fomented by
Afghanistan witb Soviel and
tndian
eDCOUit&emenL
lo
1
~ftt
devel–
opment.·Pakisw pl-.1 its Nonb–
West Fronlier province
uoder
di·
red Federal rule for three montlls
following lbe bombing d""th ofthe
4
provincial inrerior minister. tn an
obviol.lS reference to Afghanístan, a
Pakistani communiqut
said
a
"nei&hboring foreign powe(' was
actively engaaed
in
disruplin& nor·
mal
~fe
tn the province.
Tho "Poland" ofSoulh
Asia?
8oth the Shah and Mr. Bhullo
believe thc
Soviets are ultimarely
behind an effon
to
carve out an
mdependenl state oompooed of the
Nonb-Wesl Frootier and Baluch,_
tan
provincq.
Rumors
have
¡ur·
fac:ed of
a
Moseow-Kabui-New
Dellu
"pud design" 10 divtde up
Pakistan into two portions - a
pro·
Russian vass.al stat.e made
up of the
..
two westem provinces and an
lna
dia.o·oecupied tcrritory east
or
1.he
lndus. In elfec:1, Palc.i>utn would
be–
eome lhe "Poland" of Soulb
,..;a,
sp~l
among its encmies JUSI u the
Pobsh republic was
io
1939
be·
twcen
Oermany aod the
Sov1e1
Union.
As the Shah sees
í~
India would
talce ndvnntagc of a fuU....,.Ie r<·
beUion in the westem
provinces
as
an
excuse
10 ..
intervene"'
in
suppon
of the establishment ofan indepen–
dcnl SLitC tberc..
This
would rcsult
in
tbe occupation of thc
usteru
areas by !odian forees and the
' complete dissolution of Pak,.lan as
a
nadon.
The Shah has indicatcd that his
armed
forces
wiU
Slep in
nuher
lhan pennit Pakistan lo be further
dismembered as it was in
1971
wbeo Easl Ptkistan splíl away wilb
Jnd.a's suppon 10
bec:ome
_the
inde·
peadenl nation ofBangladesh.
An
10dependent pro-Soviet
ltalt
in the arca
WC$1
O(
the
lndUS WOUJd
extcnd Soviet
influencc soutb to the
Oulf
or
Oman and the major oil
supply línes from lhe Pet$ian Oulf.
lt
is
believed that U.S. determina·
tioo
tO
protect tbese lmes was a
maJOr factor
in
its
decision
to
hn
the arms embargo oo Pakastan. A
1tron1
Pakislan is apparently
viewed
as
in the U
.S.
intercs:t and is
consa.stent with America·s
massive
arms sales to neighboring l ra.n and
eurren1 moves lo bolster thc U.S.
naval presence io the lndian
Otean.
Wbatever the motives and de·
sip.s
or
t.he
various nations
an..
VOlved, 11
Í$
dear
tJ.a¡
tbe Strate¡ic
South Asia region wiU toereui.nsJy
bc:come the foeus of worldw•de at–
tcnlion a.nd concem in
thc
mon~J
ahead. O
perfectly undcatandable wby Pan–
ama
chafes under
tbe continued
American prt.sence in lhe Zone.
Afie1
all.
aftluent
Americ:ans are
not a loved racc around the world..
-rhCÚ
comes
a
ume," analyus
James J. Kllpatnclc, "when greal
powm mus1 behave
as
peat pow·
e~.
Not evcry source
or
conflic.t
ea.n
be
removed. Sonle
oonftic:ts
must
by endured; they must
be
lived
with.
Not every
wounded sen.siciv
4
ity
can
be soothed.
..Whtn
every
rcasona.blc and
prudent
coocesston
to
Panama
hu
been mo.de,
a
lioe
hu
to be drawn:
No more. And
sorry
about that."
Will the U
.S.
Wilt?
Panruna
is <:learly a test ofAmer·
ican rcsolve.
For to
give in
will
asa
suredly
nol
win the
Jove and
respect
ot
the
Panamanians..
nor
even of
the
other Latin American
pooples - cven though tbe olher
hemisphenc states ollieially
en·
dorsc Panama's cla1m
to
sover–
eignty. Say> one cxpen on U.S.·
Latin affairs,
htm~elf
a latin:
..Americans
should
not
aocept
~he
superficial view
about the ultl·
mate reaction
10
Latin America
to
lhe giveaway
o(
lhe eaoal. Tbe Lat·
ins respeel power. What lbey
clis–
trvst and dc:ride is
wea.kness.
appeasernen1
and
surrcnder.
J
can
assun:
you that 1hey will look upon
American
wHhdrawal
from Pan·
ama
with
incredu lity
and con–
tempt.
..Besides,
tbelr own
security
l$
clearly
involvcd.
(t's
a slur on
thc:ir
common sense to u.sume that
Lalln
Ammeans
could reaUy welcome
eontrol of
Ibis
all-imponant com–
mercial and naval passageway be·
twec:n the Atlan1ic
and Pacific
by
a
small, weak and chronically un–
sutble country."
Will lhe Uníted States stand up
to the eho.Uen&e
or
has
il
totally
lost the pride of 1ts powtt (Levi–
tieus 26:
19)?
Wtll it
bow -
at lbe
•sound of a
shaken
lear (v.
36) -
before the oft-n:peated ''threats" of
Pana.ma's
dictator General
Omar
Torrijos:
to
storm the
~nal
with his
6.000· man Panamanian nalional
guard?
Tbe whole world
will
be watch·
ing what lbe United Stales chooses
IOdO.
0
GRIMISRAR
(Conrlnued
from
pog•
J)
tion of a Palestinian
state.
It
is
lhe
attitude of those whh whom Israel
has to deal and 10 whom she feels
shc
can safcly
tum over territory
eaptured
iJl
prev.ous
wa.rs.
The l.uaehs llave judged the
Egyplian
OIUIUde
1$
tmpnoviog and
leaoing
toward
peace. Therefore
they
are
willin&
to
telum the Sinai
to Sadat.
Jordan's
King, Hussein.
bowever, is seen aJ
being too weak
to
be
gjven authorhy again over bis
rormer
area.s
on
the
Wes1
Bank.
The atti<udes of the Syrians and lbe
terro·rist
orpnizations
are viewed
as il'ftCOncilablc:..
lsncli ofticiab
have not yct
•ueed
on what to
do
with
!hose
Palesuoians wbo do
want lo tive peacefuUy with her,
•nd time
i.s
ruonjng
out.
-
Chtis Pstton
llllerlllwalall
by
Gene H Hogberg.
Going...Going...Gone?
1
guess il
tnU$1
be that úrne of year again. Regular
as
clock·
work, oul bf the deptbs of lhe Stale Department catacornbs come
the annual pleas to Congress that the United States must ·relinquish
its control over tbe Canal Zone
10
the Panarnanians.
The argument thu time,
as
elucidated by Assislanl Seaetary
of State
William D.
Rogers. is that failure of lhe United Slates
10
recogniu Panama's fuU
sovereig~~iy
over "all its terriiOif' could
"lead toa confron1auon wtth Panama ... and a real possibility thal
thc canal would be closcd in lhe
process.~
Two points stand oul in this fallacious assenion. First of
aU,
lhe five hundred-square-mile Cana l Zone
is
not, and oever has
been, the propeny of the Republic of Paoama. The Zone belongs
lo lhe govemmenl of lhe United Stales and nonc else. Under the
ternu ofthe
1903
Hay Bunau-Varilla Treaty, regardless ofbow one
W<es
or dislikes tbu
pact.
admiuedly favorable
10
Washington, the
United States was granted perpetua! rights over tbe narrow strip of
land i!' order 10 build, operate, main.tain and defend a ltanSOCCanic
canal.
Subsequentto this gran! by t he lbeo new Repubtic of Panama,
the United S1a1es government procecded to purcbase all private
properry within the new tonal boundaries. To Ibis day, American
as
weU
as
Panamanian resideniS tiving in lhe Zone cannol buy
propeny; tbey can ooly rent their bornes from tbe govemmenL The
Zone is, in effect, sunilar
10
a large cornpany towo.
To assen that the Zone is "Panaman•a.n property"
is
thus
a
gross misstatemcol - and the boys at Foggy Bouom know beuer.
T.he Republic ·of Panama can -only 11SSCrt
11
claim (o•"residOJrl"
ót-'–
"titular" sovereignly - the right
10
owncrship in case the Uni1ed
Stalts should choose 10 leave.
Sorne
consututional lawyers assett
1ha1 Columbia, previous sovereig:n over the Panama islhmus, has
as
much claim to "restdual rigbts"
as
does
Panama.
Secondly, thal the United Slales should be "placee! in con·
frontatJon',
witb
Panama un.less
it
agrces
tO
turn
over
sovereignty
of 1he Zone to the rcvolutionary goverrunent of General Ornar
Torrijos and "share" in the operation and dcfcnse of the canal with
!he Panamanians is unerly ridiculous!
ls lhe United S!alCS, world's premitt mililary power, afratd of
one and a batf mill10n Panamanians -
who
don~
ntn
ha~
an
army,
bul onty a 6,000-man Naúonal Guard? Has the Uruled
States uuly lost the
~pride
of iiS power' '
(Lev.
26: 19) -
when
oonfronted by a
~mouse
that roars"?
Are lhe men from Stale reaUy serious when they propose that
Pnnama - again with its 6,000-man Nalional G uard - should
sbare in the
DEPENSE
of one of tbe world's most st.rategic water–
ways?
The truth
is,
if
the United States wants 10 avoid 1rouble over
the canal and oonlinue
10
cnjoy its bene6ts, 11 had bener hang onto
11. To tbink tbat U.S. autborities can continue 10 operate and sbare
i.o the defense of tbe canal after rclinqwshing 1ts legal, sovereig:n
rights in tbe Zone is playing wi tl¡ the fire of anti-American emo–
tionalism.·The only conceivable outcome is fol Torrijos or sorne ye1
future Panamanian leadcr todo 10 the Panama Canal what Egypt's
Nasser did to Suez in
1956.
Oh, perhaps tbere are enougb Senalors in lhe U.S. Coogress
10
block the giveaway tlus year (ooe tbird negative vote can void tbe
U'atlSI'er). butl fully expect !hecanal to go sooner orlater.
The canal was
a
birthrigbtto the poople ofthe United States –
a
key "seagate" held within the midst of national enemies (Gen.
22: 17).
For sixty yea.rs the waterway has served as a tremendous
benefi1 to our naúonal economy in time of peace and lo our
oational defeose
in
time ofwar. Bul tbe vast majority ofAmericans
simply don't appreciate it any longer, any more lhan they are
110p1izam
ofthcirotber manifold blt:mllP$ from On
Hip,h.
Mart my word: the canal will go - if nol soon, eventually.
And wben tbat bappeos, rare
will
be
the American ftag tba1 fties
arnas1 a sbip sailing througb the Big Ditchl For "the Lord gjveth,
and 1he Lord taketh awuy."
WEEK ENDINO APRIL
S. 19?5