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Y
UGOSLAVIA
is fac ing an
U!1-
certain fu t ure. With his
heal th fa il ing, 82-year-oid
President Josi p Broz Ti to may not
be the master of bis country's des–
tiny much longer.
S ince his break with Stalin in
1948, Tito has success fully stee red
Yugoslavia on a course independent
of Soviet Russia. He has constantly
stressed hi s country's nona lignment
wi th the world 's two power b locs.
ldeo logically, Yugos lavia is
linked to the communist East. Eco–
nomica lly, however, this most lib–
era l of communist countries is tied
considerably more to the Wes t. A
full two thirds of it trade is con–
ducted with the nine-nation Euro–
pean Community, or Common
Market. The million Yugosla v na–
tionals working in Weste rn Europe
- who ea rn for their country about
$500 million ayear - underline Bel–
grade's vi tal economic links with the
We
t.
Militarily. Yugoslav ia follows
a policy of independence from both
East a nd West, with its own armed
fo rces numbering 230,000 men.
President Tito's adamant refusa l
to join the Sov iet-controlled War–
saw Pact alliance has more than
once precipitated rumors of a mili–
tary intervention in this strategic
Balkan state by the Soviet Union
anct its communist allies.
Recent unofficia l reports tell of a
massi ng of Warsaw Pact troops in
areas along Yugoslavia's no rthern
border. T he bui ldup, o tensibly for
" troop ma neuvers," is o f growing
conce rn to the ailing Tito.
Soviet Objectives
For obvious reasons, the Soviet
Union has never been happy with
Yu gos lavia 's independen t stand.
Belgrade's nonalignment policy has
been instrumental in preventing the
establishment of permanent Soviet
naval bases a long the Adriatic
Coas t.
Moscow's foremost long-range
o bjective in the Balkans is to bring
Yugoslavia back into the Soviet
sphere of inftuence. Although d irect
Wa rsaw Pact military intervention
presents difficult ies - and would
PLAIN TRUTH September 1974
YUGOSLAVIA
AFTER TITO
what
will
happen?
by
Gerhard O. Marx
certainly be the last resort - the
Kremlin may eventually decide it
has no other option but to intervene
with force if diplomacy shows no
promjse of s uccess.
Ethnic Dilemma
As long as Tito is in control. this
ultimate course of action remains
highly unlike ly.
Under Tito's shrewd leadership,
Yugoslavia has enjoyed a measure
of interna! stabil ity. Mainta ining a
semblance of na tional unity in an
ethnically divergent na tion histori–
ca lly torn apart by domestic con–
fticts has not been an easy task.
Getting Serbs and Croats - the two
most numerous and influential of
the coun try's 18 ethn ic groups - to
share a common Yugoslav purpose
has required conside rable per–
suasion and savvy.
Tito - who has been ca lled the
"only true Yugoslav" - has worked
feverishly
to
dampen the flames of
secti o nali sm which occas ionally
fiare up. In the a bsence of any ap–
parenl successor, Tito bel ieves the
answer to Yugoslavia's future as a
unified state líes in collective lead–
e rship.
According to this princip ie, mem–
bers of the presidential council (re–
cently reduced from 23 lo 9) will
e lect a chairman fo r one year. The
incumben t wi ll have ümited powe rs
a nd the chairmanship wi ll rotate
among Yugoslavia's six republics
a nnually. This ro ta tion is to preven!
et hn ic j ea lousies from taking root.
The a rmed forces will be run by a
mili ta ry committee. consisting of the
defense minister and two members
of the p residential cou ncil.
Many political observers - in–
cl uding conce rned Yugoslavs - fear
tha t the proposed collective lead–
ersh ip, howeve r cleverly con tri vcd.
will not be strong enough to mai n–
tain national unity once Ti to
is
gone. An inte rnally weakened Yu–
goslav ia woul d be extremely vu lner–
able to a ny Soviet "d ivide and
conquer" policy. Another possibility
is t ha t s hould nationa list ic st rife
e rupt, Soviet troops might be "in–
vited" into t he country - as in
Czechoslovakia in 1968 - to " pre–
serve socialism."
Regardl ess of the route taken,
Russ ian control of Yugoslavia or
strat egic part s of it would be a seri–
ous wound on NATO's Mediterra–
nean fl ank. As one analyst put it: "A
time bomb is ticking in Yugos lavia
and no one ... knows when it wi ll
go off .... Yugoslavs, a lmost with–
out exception, know they a re living
on borrowed time."
o
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