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men of Europe," such policies - a
sign of economic weakness - were
nothing new or unexpected. The
French, on the other hand, have lec–
tured the world ceaselessly, and
fellow Common Market members in
particular, about the importance of
maintaining fixed exchange rates.
The world "ftoatation" was absolute
anathema. In addition, the French
have always been the big force be–
hind the push toward an eventual
European monetary union.
Thus the abrupt French abandon–
ment of what was presumed to be
their fundamental European and
monetary principies served to dem–
onstrate once again that the prin–
cipie of national self-interest is still
of paramount importance and that
every nation must fend for itself
when economic storm clouds begin
to gather on the horizon.
British, Germans Angered
The French actively pursued their
new independent course at the Feb–
ruary conference in Washington of
the world's major oil producing na–
tions. The meeting was highlighted
by a wide-open política! rift be–
tween Paris and her eight Common
Market partners. French Foreign
Minister Michel Jobert alone
refused to accept most of the con–
tents of the conference's joint com–
muniqué.
4
Taken together, the French
moves could have far-reaching im–
plications for the future of the Com–
mon Market.
It
is highly unlikely that France
will be permitted to roll merrily
along while the rest of Europe con–
tinues to buy cheaper French goods
and support indefinitely the Com–
munity's Common Agricultura! Pol–
icy (CAP) - a large farm price
support program, the payments of
which primarily benefit the still sig–
nificant French farming population.
The British - faced with a $5 bil–
lion balance-of-payments deficit in
1973, even before new oil prices and
the toll of her own domestic diffi–
culties is added up, certainly can't
afford to go along without a whim–
per. It is no secret that many Britons
have sour attitudes toward the
Common Market they reluctantly
joined. They embraced Brussels in
the first place because there was
precious little alternative in the
world for a fadiog Britain, bereft of
empire. The Common Market.
moreover, provided a chancy device
to
get
more money (mostly German
marks) for redeveloping economi–
cally depressed British industrial
areas than the British would have
to
give
to keep the French
paysan
behind the plow. But it hasn't
worked out this way yet, as any
British housewife will tell you.
e(
-;
~~~~~~~E:=:::::::lJ ~
Still. it is not the British but the
Germans who hold the trump card
to the Community's future.
More than anyone else, the Ger–
mans have been angered by tbe
Great Franc Float, which they view
as nothing other than a Parisian
gambit to sluff the burden of oil
price increases off onto other Euro–
pean shoulders. The French would
disagree.
Even before the oil situation,
Bonn was becoming infuriated over
being treated as nothing but a "milk
cow" for the agricultura! and re–
gional development funds, all the
while supplying most of the "offset"
money to support U. S. military
forces in Europe. To have to pick up
a large share of the French oil tab
would be unthinkable.
Should Bono decide to follow the
French example by fl.oating its cur–
rency as well and by adopting a
blocking posture in Brussels (which
was the French policy during much
of the De Gaulle era). then the
Common Market would be in dire
straits indeed.
Paris-based Don Cook, writing
for the
Los Angeles Times,
summed
up the Community's present plight
in this way: "Europe, which has
been sadly unable to speak with one
political voice in meeting the situ–
ation, is now facing a deeply unset–
tling period of economic disunity as
PLAIN TRUTH April 1974