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and Israel announced their accep–
tance of the cease-fire resolution.
Heavy fighting,.however, resumed
the next morning-
a
la Vietnam –
with each side accusing the other of
violating the cease-fire.
The Security Council hurriedly
passed a second U.S.-Soviet spon–
sored resolution (Resolution #339),
reconfirming its previous call for a
cease-fire and urging that "all forces
be returned to the positions they oc–
cupied at the moment the cease-fire
became effective." The resolution
fu rther requested that U.N. Secre–
tary General Kurt Waldheim take
measures to immediately dispatch
U.N. observers to supervise the ob–
servance of the cease-fire.
However, still further violations
of tbe truce occurred along the Suez
Canal before the U.N. observers
could place themselves on the cease–
fire lines.
At this point, the Soviet Union
threatened to unilaterally dispatch
troops to the Middle East to end the
fighting. President Nixon responded
in the early morning of October 25
by placing U.S. strategic forces -
including the nuclear strike force -
on precautionary alert throughout
the world. It was the first time such
an alert had been called since the
Cuban missile crisis of
1962.
Tensions were running higb. The
October war had pusbed the two
superpowers toward tbe brink of nu–
clear warfare.
At that moment, the United Na–
tions began to demonstrate its role.
To defuse the Soviet-American con–
frontation, eight non-aligned na–
tions on the U.N. Security Council
introduced still another Middle East
resolution - Resolution #340. Un–
der it, the
Securi~
Council would
demand that " immediate and com–
plete cease-fire be observed" and
would "set up immediately under its
authority a United Nations emer–
gency force" wbicb would not in–
elude troops of either the United
States or the Soviet Union.
The United States accepted tbe
resolution, the Soviet Union fol–
lowed suit, and Peking - in defe-
PLAIN TRUTH February 1974
rence to the majority - wi thheld its
veto.
The crisis began to wind down.
Resolution
#
340 had defused the
U.S.-Soviet confrontation by elimi–
nating its cause - the threat of mili–
tary intervention by a superpower,
namely the Soviet Union. Further, it
resulted in a period of relative calm,
thus giving U.S. Secretary of State
Kissinger "breathing time" in which
to travel to the Middle East to
strengthen the shaky cease-fire and
seek a formula for beginning full–
scale peace negotiations between
the Arabs and Israelis.
The world, in general, has ex–
pressed satisfaction with the United
Nations over its role in the resolu–
tion of the crisis. The much ma–
l igned and n eg lected United
Nations had demonstrated that de-
spite its shortcomings, weaknesses,
and past failures,
it
was still a viable
mechanism which could be used ef–
fectively in time of crisis.
The Road to Permanent
Peace?
There have, however, been nu–
merous Arab-Israeli cease-fires in
the past. None have lasted. After all
the speeches and resolutions were
said and done, the basic problems
still remained.
The first of the three cease-fire
resolutions passed during last Octo–
ber's crisis - Resolution #338 -
called, in its second paragraph, for
the Arabs and Israelis "to start im–
mediately after the cease-fire the
implementation of Security Council
Resolution #242 in all ofits parts."
What was Resolution #242?
Resolution #242 was proposed by
Britain and unanimously passed by
the U.N. Security Council on No–
vember 22, 1967 - five months after
the June Six-Day War ofthat year.
lt
called, in essence, for Israelí with–
drawal from territories occupied
during that war,
in
exchange for Arab
recognition of Israel 's sovereignty,
territorial integrity, and political
independence. Thougb agreed to at
that time by both Israel and Egypt, it
has never been implemented.
The problem lies with its wording.
The official English translation of
Resolution #242 calls for "with–
drawal of Israelí armed forces from
territories occupied in the recent
conflict." The Russian text agrees
with the English, reading "from ter–
ritories." But the French text reads
" from
the
territories," since in the
French language it is impossible to
ornit the definite article. Con–
sequently, the French, like tbe
Arabs, insist that Israel witbdraw
from
al/
territories it acquired dur–
ing the Six-Day War.
Tbe Israelis, on tbe other hand,
contend that Resolution #242 de–
liberately does not state "all" terri–
tories occupied or even "t be"
territories. Israel stresses that in or–
der to live within "secure bound–
aries" (which Resolution #242 also
guarantees her) she cannot possibly
return all occupied territories.
Despite its purposely vague and
ambiguous provisions, Resolution
#242 remains, by broad agreement,
the controversia! foundation upon
which the new peace is supposed to
be built. But if the Arabs cannot be
persuaded to alter their demands
for total Israelí withdrawal from all
occupied Arab territories, or if the
Israelis cannot be convinced that to–
tal withdrawal is compatible with
national security, a renewal of hos–
tilities will be the tragic result. And
if the superpowers should fail to
agree on a course of action in an–
other round, the result would be
much different than that witnessed
last October. The peace and stabil–
ity of the entire world would be
jeopardized.
O
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