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N
OT SINCE
the United States emerged as the
world's premier power from the ashes of World
War II has its global prestige been at such a low
point.
The current crisis between Western Europe and the
United States goes far beyond the Watergate affair and
its damaging impact upon the confidence in U. S. lead–
ership overseas. It can be attributed primarily to Amer–
ica's orientation - or disorientation - in foreign affairs
beginning in the early 1960's.
During the dozen frustrating years of tbe Vietnam
experience, Washington's ties with Europe became
strained, links with Japan rusted and Africa was vir–
tually ignored, while much of Latín America became
openly antagonistic.
In a touch of bitter irony, Washington's relations
warmed up with North Vietnam's two principie sup–
pliers and spiritual advocates, the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic of China. It is now no secret that
"
relations between Washington and Moscow - which
are now to ;nclude annual, w;de-rang;ng summ;t con-
'"
ferences - are in many ways better than those betweeo
Washington and París, Bono, Brussels or Tokyo, for
that matter.
Nowhere has the effect of this "friend-swapping"
been more serious than in the nations of Western Eu-
1N THE
rope. During those same Vietnam years, the U. S. dol-
lar, coveted earlier
~~it~ii~!i~
ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
wanted. Tens of biJ–
lions of surplus American greenbacks, by-products of a
tidal wave of U. S. business investment, now constitute
a major threat to the stability of nearly all tbe European
currencies - and as a result, the entire world monetary
system as it now stands.
Official views on a future national monetary ar–
rangement could hardly be more divergent than be–
tween the French and the Americans. The French favor
a return to fixed exchange rates among the world's
major currencies, along with a key role for gold in any
new system. Most leading American economic policy
framers, on the other hand, prefer to see currencies
"float," as they do today. And they do not hide their
intense distaste for gold.
Not only are American monetary policies highly
suspect in Western Europe, but so are Washington's
views in the critica! area of world trade.
Europeans, for the most part, are highly suspicious
of the repeated calls by American trade experts for a
"fair deaJ" for U. S. exports. They translate "fair deal"
as "special advantage." The Americans, in turn, take
sharp issue with the Common Market's various and
sundry quotas, discriminatory taxes and preferential
trade agreements with other countries.
The "capstone" of the economic dispute is the op-
PLAIN TRUTH October 1973
To
Washington policy-makers,
1973 was to be the "Year
of Europe," a time to
renew and strengthen
trans-Atlantic relations. lnstead,
disputes over trade, monetary
and military maHers
are
threatening to tear apart the
strategic partnership.
by
Gene H. Hogberg
3