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All during the French project,
Americans looked on with a mixture
of suspicion and open hostiüty.
ll
was onJy because the French effort
was privately financed and was not
a government-funded project that
Washington did not impose the
Monroe Doctrine. Besides, Ameri–
can interest in a canal route had
been centered on a route across
Nicaragua, not Panama. Even as the
French blasted and dug across Pan–
ama, an American company was ac–
tively engaged in constructing a
Nicaraguan Canal.
Colombia Balks
After much debate in the V. S.
Congress with the "Nicaraguan fac–
tion," the U. S. Isthmian Canal
Commission, in 1902, recommended
purchase of the rights and property
of the new French Canal Company
for $40,000,000. Negotiations then
began with Colombia, sovereign
over the lsthmus of Panama, for
treaty rights to construct and oper–
ate the canal.
Secretary of State John Hay and
his Colombian counterpart Tomás
Herrán labored long hours over a
new treaty and finally produced one
in early 1903.
According to íts terms, the Vnited
States was to be granted "use and
control" of (not obtain sovereign
rights to, as was later granted by
Panama) a strip of land síx miles
wide (not ten) for a period of 100
years, renewable at V. S. option (not
"in perpetuity"). The treaty specifi–
cally stipulated that sovereignty
over the Zone would remain in Co–
lombia's hands.
Despite objections, especially
over the sovereignty clause, the
U. S. Senate ratified the treaty. The
Colombian senate, however, balked.
The chief obstacle was money. Co–
lombia demanded $25,000,000 cash,
plus $600,000 a year compensation
for revenues to be lost from the rail–
road franchise, customs and taxes.
The United States held out for
$10,000,000 plus $250,000 a year
PLAIN TRUTH Moy
1973
compensation for tbe railroad only.
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Days and months passed with no
action by the Colombian senate.
Prominent residents in Panama
grew exasperated with their govern–
ment in far-off Bogotá. They felt
their hopes and fortunes would soon
be lost. They were well aware that
the 1902 Spooner Act specifically
authorized the V. S. President to
pursue the Nicaraguan route
if
Co–
lombia would not agree to U. S.
terms for Panama.
The Panamanians chose to secede
from Colombia.
Panama Acts on lts Own
The history of this stormy period
of Isthmian affai rs has been the sub–
ject of much debate and contro–
versy. The Panamanian revolution
succeeded
in
no small part - due to
intervention by the United States.
President Theodore Roosevelt, act–
ing in full
leg~ l
accordance with the
Treaty of 1846 to guarantee free–
dom of transit across the Isthmus,
prevented Colombian troops from
trave ling by raíl from Colon to Pan–
ama City to suppress the uprising.
It
is evident, however, that the
U. S. government did not plot or ini–
tially encourage the Panamanian re–
volt - even though knowledge of
the impending overthrow was well
known in higher circles of power in
Washington for some time.
But tbere is no doubt President
Theodore Roosevelt took full and
forceful advantage of a situation
which had been created by others
totally outside bis control. In bis bi–
ography, Roosevelt wrote: "1 did
not lift my fingers to incite the revo–
lutionaries.
1
simply ceased to stamp
out the different revolutionary fuses
that were already burning." On an-
lA
very
important ract is tbat the $250.000 annual
compensauon was la ter ucceptcu by Panama.
lt
was
increased to $430 .000 in 1934 arter the U. S. dcva l·
ued the gold do llar. In
1955.
the Sta te Departmcnt
gratu itously added to thiS a mount the
sum o~ $1.~
mi Ilion out or itS own budgct. ror
~good
relauons
(which never resuhcd ). rnaking
a
tota l annual pay·
ment o r $1.930.000. But ne i the r the orig inal
$250.000 nor thc increased annu ity can be con·
strued
as
"rent" or "lease" since thc
U. S.
govcrn ·
ment owns
a ll
the property within the Zone.
other occasion he asserted: "Be it re–
membered that unless 1 had acted
exactly as
1
did acl there would now
be no Panama Canal." In his view,
the Colombian government was ob–
structing the progress of civilization.
Panama 's revolutionary leader,
Dr. Manuel Amador Guerrero,
cleared the United States of any
complicity. On his first tríp to the
Vnited States after the revolution,
he said:
"Of course, we expected that the
United States would not let the Co–
lombian troops attack us, because of
the effect that war there would have
in tbe way of blocking traffic across
the lsthmus, but we had no under–
standing with the Government here,
nor are the people o.f the United
S tates at al/ responsible .for the revo–
lution. It was our own act."
Man of Destiny
The pivota! figure in the entire
Panamanian episode, however, was
neither a Panamanian nor an Amer–
ican. He
was
a Frenchman, Philippe
Bunau-Varilla, who, as a young
man of 26, was De Lesseps' last
chief engineer. Bunau-Varilla had
"consecrated his life" to the Panama
Canal. He spoke of it with an almost
religious fervor.
Bunau-Varilla's pride suffered a
near fatal blow when the French
project collapsed. He therefore
feverishly set about to vindicate the
" olory of France" and the honor of
the discredited De Lesseps. To his
way of thinking, if the idea of the
Panama Canal was abandoned and
a Nicaraguan route chosen instead,
the world would always believe that
France had been wrong.
Bunau-Varilla failed in his etforts
to inspire the French people to re–
sume the work. He then tried to in–
terest the Russian government.
"He gotas far as the czar's Minis–
ter of Finance, and for a while there
seemed to be a good chance that the
Panama Canal wou ld be Russian,
which might have led to a rather bi-
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