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Relatively minor modifications of
the 1903 treaty were made in sub–
sequen! treaties concluded in 1936
and 1955 within the framework of
"Good Neighbor" relations. Al–
though the basic issue of U. S. sov–
ereignty within the Zone was not
compromised, the United States was
beginning to show signs of losing its
control, piecemeal. In return for
U. S. concessions, Panama solemnly
promised to "strengthen the bonds
of friendsh ip and cooperation" with
the United States.
That professed friendship didn' t
last long. In a bold move called
"Operation Sovereignty," Panama
University students in May 1958 in–
vaded the Zone and planted 72 Pan–
amanian flags
in
various spots. U. S.
authorities ignored the incidents as
"youthful pranks" and made no ar–
rests. Other riots and ftag-waving
demonst rations naturally followed
over the next two years.
The turning point in U. S.-Pan–
amanian relations carne in 1960. By
executive order from Washington,
Panamanian ftags were ordered to
fiy alongside the Stars and Stripes
at designated locations in the Zone.
This was done, it was officially
explained, to demonstrate "visual
evidence" of Panama's " titular sov–
ereignty" in the Canal Zone. But it
was actually done to pacify Pan–
amanian public opinion, which was
becoming increasingly anti-Ameri–
can.
American legal experts explained
that "titular" sovereignty meant " re–
sidual" sovereignty - that the Canal
would rever! to Panama whenever
the U. S. should choose to leave. But
to Panamania n na tiona lis ts, the
term, along with the authorized fly–
ing of their flag, amounted to the
first official admission by the United
States of Panama 's full sovereignty
over the Zone territory.
The offensive had shifted to
Panama.
The " Fiagpole War"
The "two fl ag" issue erupted into
violence on January 9, 1964. Ameri-
PLAIN TRUTH Moy 1973
can students at Balboa High School
in
the Zone, in defiance of a govern–
ment order, flew the American flag
on the lone flagpole outside the
school. The flag had been ea rlier
withdrawn, because the school was
not one of the officially sanctioned
locations in the Zone where both
fiags were required to fty together.
In retaliation, a group of Pan–
amanian students marched into the
Zone from Panama City and tried
instead to raise their flag in front of
the school. In the ensuing scuffie,
tbe Panamanian flag was torn . The
Panamanian students then fled from
the Zone, destroying property on
the way.
Large crowds formed at the bor–
der of the Zone and serious rioting
broke out. Fires erupted in Ameri–
can-owned businesses in Panama
City. Panama's
Guardia Nacional
made no attempt to maintain order.
lnstead , they were ordered conñned
to their barracks.
By the time order was restored on
January 12, four U. S. soldiers and
22 Panamanians had been killed.
During the melee, the U. S. troops
conñned to the Zone were not
allowed to fire until they had sus–
tained several casualties.
Panama charged th e United
States with "aggression" a nd
severed diplomatic relations on Jan–
uary 10. Three months later, how–
ever, the two nations agreed to
restore diplomatic relations and to
"seek elimination of the causes of
conflid."
Secret Treaties Leak Out
What happened over the next
three years has been described by
the more conservative leaders in the
United States as "appeasement"
and a "sellout to mob rule."
From 1964 until 1967, American
and Panamaniao negotiators la–
bored in secrecy over three new
treaties to replace the 1903 Hay–
Bunau-Varilla pact. The silence was
broken briefly when an American
newspaper reporter obtained ad-
vanee texts of the treaties - oo the
streets of Panama City, where they
were being openly peddled! (In
Washington, the texts were still clas–
sified.) Wheo details of the treaties
became known, a major controversy
erupted in Congress, especially in
the House of Representatives.
Briefly stated, these proposed
treaties provided for, first, the ced–
iog to Panama of sovereignty over
the Canal Zone and making that
country a joint partner with the
United Sta!es in Canal manage–
ment; second, sharing the defense of
the Canal with Panama; and third,
authorizing the United States to
conslruct a new sea-leve! Canal in
Panama. Under terms of the
treaties, Panama would ultimately
be given
without cost,
not only the
existing canal, but also any new ca–
nal in Panama that the United
States might construct
to
replace it.
Congressional critics of the new
treaties clairned U. S. negotiators
were committed to a policy of "sur–
render in advance" and that the
treaties would only result, later on,
in "greater extortions and our com–
plete abandonment of the Canal en–
terprise."
Defenders of the new pacts, how–
ever, said the time was long overdue
for the U. S. to "meet certain rea–
sonable Panamanian aspirations,"
with the objective of contributing to
a "more enduring relationship be–
tween Panama and the United
States."
In their arguments , they at–
tempted to prove that American
sovereignty could be compromised
or "sbared" with Panama without
sacrificing the ability of the United
States to operate and defend the
Canal. A State Department view–
point was that "adjustments" were
necessary in order for the United
States to "justify itself in world fo–
rums."
Partly as a result of the aroused
congressional opposition, the new
canal treaties were neither signed
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