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rare of 128 a year. The mosr disrurb–
ing rrend of all, ro American su·ace–
gisrs, was rhe fairly rapid replacemenr
of older Russian missiles wirh rhe
huge SS-9's, wirh rheir walloping 25-
megaron payload capabiliry - far
heavier rhan the U. S. Minureman
ICBM. There have even been reporrs
of newer and bigger missiles of an
awesome 50-megaron capaciry.
Meanwhile, for five years, rhe
Unired Srares had added norhing ro
its land-based offensive missile force,
excepr sorne technological improve–
menrs. Only rhe mobile submarine
cask force, equipped with "Polaris"
missiles, and now che newer " Poseí–
don" missiles, had been steadily im–
proved. This developmenr was
coupled with che beginning of a lim–
i red anriballisric missile (ABM) sys–
rem.
The massive Russian buildup led
U. S. Vice Admira! Hyman Rickover
ro state that " there has not been an
arms race - rhe Soviets have been
running at full speed all by chem–
selves." Ominously, Rickover added
before a New York audience: "The
blunr siruation facing us is rhar So–
viet Russia is doing all rhe rhings a
nation would do if ir wanred ro be
the number one military power with
clear, unequivocal superiority."
Obviously something had ro be
done - but whar ' Mr. Nixon re–
vealed in his speech before rhe com–
bined houses of Congress on June 1,
immediarely afrer his Moscow rrip,
that he had "srudied the srraregic bal–
ance in grear derail" wirh his senior
advisers for "more than rhree years."
The Chief Executive funher added
why geccing the Soviets ro agree ro a
slowdown in the nuclear missile race
was so imporrant:
" From rhe srandpoinr of rhe
Unired Stares, when we consider whar
rhe srraregic balance would have
looked like, larer in rhe 70's if there
had been no arms limirarion, ir is
dear that the agreements foresraU a
major spiraling of rhe arms race -
one which would have worked ro our
disadvanrage."
8
Shocking Panel Report
As eady as 1969, Presidenr Nixon
had appointed a 16-man panel of lead–
ingprivate
cirizens - ro avoid any en–
trenched Penragon influence - ro
assess America's securiry posirion.
Their lengrhy repon, issued March,
1971, warned that " the convergence
of a number of trends indicares sig–
nificanr milirary balance againsr che
Unired Srares and in favor of the So–
viet Union. . . . If rhese observable
rrends conrinue, the U. S. will be–
come a second-rare power incapable
of assuring rhe furure security and
freedom of its people."
Perhaps mosr significant of rhe
commitree's observarions was this:
" Neirher rhe faces concerning rhese
rrends nor rhe ultimare danger is gen–
erally undersrood by rhe public,
which for che most pare remains
uninformed and hence aparheric."
The more rhe President and his
chief foreign affairs adviser, Henry
Kissinger, srudied rhe nacional secur–
ity issue, rhe more rhe only choice
confronring rhem became obvious. Ir
was ro rie clown rhe Soviet govern–
ment co an arms lim irarion agree–
menr, and in addition ro chis primary
poinr, ro arrempt ro bind the Soviets
in so many direcrions ro rhe U. S. -
increased trade, joint space ventures,
combined scienrific, healrh and eco–
logical research, among orhers - rhar
Moscow would find ir exrremely dif–
ficult not ro cooperare wirh rhe
Unired Srares.
Given che birrer Vietnam experi–
ence, che American populace was
clearly in no mood ro accepr a costly,
rapid buildup in srraregic weapons ro
meer the Soviet challenge head-on.
Besides, rhe general public had been
lulled into a false sense of securiry by
the so-called mutual overkill syn–
drome and the belief thar the narion 's
roving missile-eguipped submarines
were all rhar was necessary ro derer a
preemprive arrack.
Mr.
Nixon and bis advisers, how–
ever, knew berree. Through derailed
inrelligence, they realized rhat che po-
renrial enemy was sreadily gearing up
ro rhe posirion where ir could ,
if
it
wanted to
-
assuming the very worsr
in rhe Soviet morivacion - srrike
firsr wirh a massive nuclear blow.
Then ir could prorect irs key posi–
rions from a counrerattack through a
sophisricated antiballisric missile de–
fense nerwork - and srill have
enough firepower left ro administer a
final coup de grace againsr a vircually
defenseless Unired Srares.
At rbe very least, the Sovie ts, were
rhey ro become che predominant mili–
rary power, would be able ro render
the Unired States diploma tically im–
porenr on rhe world scene. The re–
specred Cenrer for Srraregic Srudies in
Washing ron,
D.C
revealed in an in–
tensive scudy chat "achieving U. S.
recognirion of Soviet superioriry
would permir che U.S.S.R. ro pursue
a more aggressive foreign policy, ro
demand concessions from che Unired
Srares on many issues long in conren–
tion, ro inhibir U. S. resisrance ro
communisr inspired or exploited wars
of liberarion, ro fracture Western al–
liances, ro achieve more dominanr
control over the internacional com–
munisc movement and ro arcain
grearer support from the unaligned
third world."
In such a superior posirion, rhe So–
viets could have rheir own selfish way
virruaHy anywhere in rhe world -
wirhout having ro back down before
a superior Unired Stares, as they did
in rhe Cuban missile crisis a decade
ago. (In fact, rhe Havana humiliarion
marked the moment when che Soviets
finally derermined ro catcb up wirh
American military power. Ar rhar
rime, only ren years ago, rhe Un.ited
States enjoyed a rwo ro one missile
superioriry and an overwhelming na–
val ascendency on che high seas.)
Since rhe American public was in
no mood ro buy an alarmist message
in che eady seventies, the Presidenr
rook what he felr was rhe only orher
alrernarive - ro go direcrly ro rhe So–
viet Union and atrempt ro engineer a
hale, or ar leasr a slowdown, in the
runaway Soviet missile buildup. Ir
PLAIN TRUTH August 1972