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44
The chimp is thinking some minutes
into the future.
But how long can an animal think
into the future? Do aoimals think
ahead to their future migrations or
hibernations - or do they only react to
the stimuli at the appointed time?
In either event, animal brain is still
limited -
it
thinks in the sphere
( domain) of time only
i11
relation to
itself.
The uniquely unrestrained human
mind is totally different. lt can envision
the absolute certainty of an
etemity of
time -
both before and after its own
particular existence. This ultimate aware–
ness may express itself in an awareness
of death. But it is not limited to an
involvement of the self. Economists and
sociologists are visualizing the 21st cen–
tury. Astronomers have calculated the
number of billions of years it would
take for the sun to become cold.
As the eminent ethnologist, W. H.
Thorpe, states, "Man has a language
which can denote and specify the past
and the future far beyond bis own life
span." It was Dostoevski who wrote:
"Mao needs the unfathomable and the
infinite just as much as he does the
small planet which he inhabits." And
what animal could ever comprehend
enough about the concept of past and
future epochs of time to wonder what
the 17th-century philosopher, Blaise
Pascal, wondered:
When 1 consider the sbort duration
of my life, swallowed up in the eter–
nity befoce and after, the üttle space
wbicb
I
fill and even can
see,
en–
gulfed in the infinite ímmensity of
spaces of which
1
am ignorant and
whícb know me not,
I
am frigbtened
and
am
astoníshed at being here rather
than there ; for there is no reason
why here rather than tbere, why now
rather than then. Who has put me
bere
?
By whose order and direction
have this place and time been allotted
to me?
Here, then, is the human mind -
racing through the endless corridors of
time before and beyond its own life
span, wondering, speculating, searching.
3. THINKING ANO
COMMUNICATION
Abstract T hinking
Thorpe expressed it well:
What are the featuces in which man
differs from the animals? ... man can
internalize celations pecceived in the
The
PLAIN TRUTH
externa! wodd to a vastly greater
extent than the animals. In other
words, man can manipulate comp1ete1y
abstract
symbols
co an extem fac be–
yond that possible in the animal
world; it's on chis ability matbematics
is based.
I
do not believe that animals
will ever be able
to
do mathema–
tics ....
As far as we know for certain, no
animal language, bowever much in–
fo.rmation is conveyed, involves che
learned realization of completely gen–
eral abstractions.
Connections Between W ords
The great linguist, Eric H. Lenne–
berg, shows that humans not only
understand the symbolic meaning of
sounds - which animals may also do
- but humans also construct and iden–
tify
the relatiomhips betwem
these sym–
bolic sounds. In other words, humans
understand
sentence stmcture
-
syntax
- the
connection
between words.
The acquisition of words by them–
selves does not create the
httman
lan–
guage. A real Janguage must select from
the myriad computations that the
human mind performs when ioteracting
with its surroundings. Lenneberg con–
eludes that "Whether the brain of a
chimpaozee has the same or similar
properties must yet be demonstrated. It
is possible
bttt not
probable." Suzanne
Langer asked:
If
we find no prototype of speech
in the highest animals, and man will
not say even the first word by in–
stinct, then how did all his tribes
acquice their various languages? Wbo
began the art which now we all have
to learn? And why is it not restricced
m
the cultured caces, but possessed
by every primitive family, from dark–
est Africa
to
the loneliness of the
polar ice?
What about the "languages" of ani–
mals? Ernan McMullin, Chairman of
the Department of Philosophy at Notre
Dame, explains why they must be
sharply distinguished from the lan–
guages of human beings:
In recent times, much has been made
of the "languages" of honey-bees, ants,
dolphins and other highly-organized
animals. But severa! features of the
"languages" mark them off sharply
from che Ianguages of man. Fi.rst,
they are spedes-specific, inherited not
Iearnt. Their use is instinctive, not
reflective. Honey-bees of one species
will not be able to "follow" che Ian–
guage of anothec species, nor can they
learn it. Genetic differences can even
arise within species due to geogcaphic
separacion; an Italian honey-bee can–
not follow the cues given by a hive
of German cousins. Once an Italian
honey-bee, always an Italian honey–
bee! The individual can in no way
February
1972
modify or unlearn its "Ianguage" be–
cause of its being
(so
far as we can
tell) entirely genetically determined,
entirely instinctive in origin. Second,
all of tbe signs used are
signals,
strictly speaking, that is, they elicit
immediate action. There is no reason
to attribute to them a propositional
character. They are not being used
to make statements about the sugar–
source, but rather to serve as stimulus
for an instinctive response on che pan
of othec bees chat will send them to
the right place. Third, these Janguages
are entirely limited to a single type
of situation, one that is of biological
significance to tbe species, food
gathering, for example, oc courtsbip.
Animal languages stagnate. Human
languages adapt. McMullin stresses the
difference:
Man does not inherit a language;
he has no endowment of Ianguage–
signs .... Thus, human languages bave
to be learnt .... To the child, they
come extra-ordinarily easily and
quickly; for the adult, it may require a
great effort to acquire
a
new language.
But just because they are not pro–
grammed into the human brain, man's
languages possess a feature that more
than compensares for the effort it takes
to
learn them. Tbey are capable of
being modified at will, to respond to
new kinds of situations. There is
a
creative element here, an implicit de–
mand on human creativity that is sei–
dom cecognized.
Is the spoken human laoguage
unique? Dobzhansky says yes - but
then leaves us hanging as to a
t"eason
¡¡;hy:
The fascinating work of
C.
Hayes,
who attempted to bring up a chim–
panzee child by treating
it
as if it
were a human child, is relevant here.
The ape has learnt all manner of
things which no other ape in che world
ever did, excepting that it was unable
ro lea.rn to speak. And yet its vocal
capacities seemed adequate to produce
all the sounds of which human lan–
guage is composed.
Many social scientists are perplexed
by the singular existence of the human
language. S.
L.
Washburn, for one, can–
not understand why
many
animals
haven't "developed" this capacity.
But aH the animals make sounds
and it would seem to be so advan–
tageous to develop a language, so it
seems to me ve.ry surprising that lan–
guage also has apparendy only de–
veloped once .... What human lan–
guage does in its simplest forro is to
name something in the environment.
This is precisely what monkeys' sounds
and gestures do not do. They mean
wacning of a predawr, but they can't
say "!ion," they can't say "hyena,"
they can't say "Ieopard." This would
seem to be of supreme adaptive value.
Tbis is why l tbink it's so surprising
that chis didn't happen more often
because what the animals, in fact, have