4
scientific and precise manner:
"IJ
the
inp11t, 011tp"t and intervening men–
tal activitiu of the h11man brain q"ali–
fatively dilferent from the inp111. 0111pu1
and inlen,ening mental activilies of an)'
and euery animal brain?"
Howevcr it's phrased, the question is
fundamental. Because
if
the human
mind is
not
qualitatively, uniquely and
even radically superior to the output of
animal brain, then man
1U011/d
be just
another animal - with little hope for
species survival.
Yet this is precisely what the mate–
rialist seems compelled to prove - that
THE HUMAN MIND ZS NO DIF–
PERENT
PROM ANIMAL JN–
STINCT.
Does this claim sound ludicrous and
absurd?
lt is not.
The materialist is pre–
pared. He has done his homework and
has sorne carefully reasoned arguments.
And even though he is motivated by a
pre-packaged ideological bias, we must
ask:
Co11/d he be right?
Many people –
religious people for the most part -
intuitivcly "feel" that roan "must be"
unique and easily distinguishable from
all animals. But that "feel" does
not
prove
the point. In fact, religious
ignor–
ance,
however sincere it might have
been, has been the food by which
materialism has been nourished.
What Materialism Propounds
It is our responsibility to present the
tenets and arguments of materialism as
accurately and as forthrightly as pos–
sible. Thcn, and only then, can we
confidently begin to analyze them and
discern whether or not the obviously un–
restrained human mind
is
utterly
distinct from the seemingly stereotyped
animal brain.
The materialist clings to a fundamen–
tal axiom: He claims that humans think
pretty much the same as animals do -
that the psychological (individual)
and sociological (collective) accom–
plishments of human beings are
not
qualitatively different from those of the
animal kingdom. We present a typical
materialistic argument:
"All the qualities," says the material–
ist, "customarily considered 'uniquely
human' are merely the highest psy–
chological manifestations on the present
physiological continuum - and are in
The
PLAIN TRUTH
Jaouary 1972
The Dogma of Materialism
T
HE DOGMA OF .MATERIALISM
de–
clares that only "the physical"
is real - the possible existence of
non-physical reality is categorically
rejected. Materialism teaches that
"mind" is simply the totality (Ge–
stalt) of physiological brain function.
Consequently, "the mind" would be
just "the brain." And nothing more!
Just the complex output of the most
advanced mammalian brain!
The materialist believes that
all
psychic processes are entirely the
product of multitudinous electro–
chemical changes in the nervous sys–
tem. "Mind" is therefore viewed as
an
epiphenomenon
- a
secondary
phenomenon ("mind") which does
not maintain an independent exis–
tence of itself, but is actually the
shadowy by-product of another,
primary
phenomenon
("brain").
Consequently, the human mind
would be merely an artificial cate–
gorization or an artificial extrap–
olation of the physical human
brain.
As a matter of fact, the mate–
rialist might well condescendingly
remark that the term "mind" itself is
quite confusing and completely
unnecessary -
having been
"in–
vented by primeva! man to super–
stitiously explain what he could not
yet physically comprehend."
One semi-sarcastic but revealiog
analogy used by extreme representa–
tives of materialism is that "human
mental thought is the product of
human brain function in the same
way that human urine is the product
of human kidney function." Many
evolutionary scientists, who by their
own definition concern themselves
reality represeoted in other highly com–
plex animals." (Which is a technical way
of stating the materialistic dogma that
human mental activities are
not
all that
different from animal mental activities.)
The materialist continues by asking,
"Why do these traits
appear
to be
'uniquely human' "? He answers bis
own question: "Simply because they are
enhaoced and exaggerated by the full–
range
meam of expression
available to
roan, but are not developed in lower
animals." In other words, al! human
mental processes differ from their
pre–
cise
counterparts in animals only be-
exclusively with the physical, epito–
mize that attitude.
We are not finished describing
materialism - we still have a prob–
lem. Granted - materialism promul–
gates the idea that only "the
physical" exists.
But -
what is
"the physical"?
That might seem like a ridiculous
question to some. Nonetheless, many
people lose much sleep over it. The
materialist might deline "the physi–
cal" as "everything" - which would
just be circular reasoning. The
non-materialist might define "the
physical" as everything which is
no/
non-physical - a double negative
and another example of circular rea–
soning in the caw.
It is difficult to define "the physi–
cal" to everybody's satisfaction. We
offer the following attempt:
"The phyJical
is anything which
must be defined in terms of mass,
energy, space, time and
¡oc
mathemat–
ical formulations. Included within
this definition - in addition to all
particles, forces, distances between
objects and intervals betweeo events
- are all physical laws such as grav–
ity, inertia, etc., all electromagnetic
phenomena, all applied mathematical
conceptions such as entropy, anti–
matter, tachyons, etc., aod all pure
mathematical abstractions such as
real and imaginary numbers, sets and
matrices, n dimensional geometry,
transfinite mathematics, etc."
Note that our definition makes
"the physical" a "closed system."
But a c!osed system which can affect
another system and which can be
affected by another system,
if
indeed
another such system - a
non-physi–
cal system - should exist.
cause of man's ability to write, speak,
compose and draw - abilities which in
themselves are just
impt·oved
techniques
of expression, and are
not,
if we cace to
admit it, limited to human beings."
Materialists will readily admit that
mankind has a phenomenally large in–
tellectual and technological capability
- as evidenced by the full scope of
20th-century society. They vociferously
maintain, however, that all these im–
pressive accomplishments are actually the
product of many generations of
acctlnut–
/ated knowJedge.
As a result, material-
( C0111imred on page 6)