Basic HTML Version
PAGE 10
PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, MAY 13, 1986
The British did, too. But public-opinion polls revealed that nearly seven
out of 10 Britons felt Prime Minister Thatcher erred in consenting to
letting U.S. bombers take off from British bases.
The so-called "nonaligned" movement, meeting in New Delhi at the time of
the bombing raid, condemned it as a "dastardly, blatant and unprovoked
act of aggression.•
The nonaligned (primarily Third World, some
communist) countries further extended •heartfelt sympathies" to the Libyan
people "for the losses they have suffered." Another impact of the April
14 raid is the scar tissue left on the NATO alliance. Major powers on the
Continent either refused or indicated they should not be asked to grant
permission to allow U.S. bombers based in Britain to overfly their
airspace en route to Libya.
/
-
·
Mien Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger showed on television how the
F-IIIs had to detour around France and the Iberian peninsula, adding 2,400
extra miles of round-trip nighttime flying, the American public was
incensed, particularly at France. Owen Harries, editor of THE NATIONAL
INTEREST, called the circuitous route "the line of shame," a takeoff on
Mu'ammar Qaddafi's mythical "line of death" stretched across the entrance
to the Gulf of Sidra.
"The etching of this line on the mind of the
American people is likely to be the most enduring and important
consequence of the Libyan episode,• said Harries. H. Ross Perot, a Texas
billionaire who once engineered a private escape operation for his
employees from an Iranian prison, also was irate at the French refusal.
"Twice in this century we rescued the French nation,• he said. "As far as
I'm concerned, as long as I'm around, if our country ever considers
spilling one drop of American blood for the French, I'll do everything I
1_;- an to stop it.•
But wait a minute, argued William Safire, the NEW YORK TIMES' token
conservative columnist. The French, Safire maintained, may have refused
to help because they felt the U.S. action would amount to little more than
a •pinprick." He reported in his April 19 column:
/;;;ybe there is more to the French decision than we know. At a
{
p�ivate dinner party in New York•••the French chief delegate to
the United Nations, Claude de Kemoularia•••, speaking among
friends and off the record,•••indicated that the best way to
stop Col. Khadafy was not by bit-by-bit escalation, and that
had the United States decided to hit hard and decisively with
its military might, "you would have found us on your side.••••
President Reagan sent our U.N. delegate, Vernon Walters to see
[Prime Minister Jacques] Chirac Sunday night and President
Mitterrand Monday morning before the raid•••• The French
leaders told our emissary that they did not like our plan: It
was too weak. "Don't do a pinprick," one of them said, or so
it is translated and reported back•••• We did pull our punch.
Our bombs were limited to "terrorist-related" targets, not to
the oil docks that would cripple Khadafy's ability to pay
weapons bills or speed his overthrow. Never in the course of
� ern warfare has !!2 much eower been calibrated so exquisite!�
g inst so few••••