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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, JUNE 21, 1985
PAGE 9
On the other hand, Mr. Luttwak said, "The U.S. record in hijack
ing is really quite pure. The U.S. has not retaliated for any of
these outrages; they have not pursued individuals."
The TWA terrorists weren't dumb. They knew that with the hijacking inci
dent played out every night on American television, with their spokesmen
interviewed by correspondents and "anchor-people," that their cause would
get a hearing before millions.
And, of course, the highly competitive news media wouldn't dare consider a
news blackout on sensitive matters--an act that would deprive the hijackers
of the forum they want so much. Pentagon spokesman Michael Burch, in fact,
has complained that the networks are in a race with each other to report on
any suspected contingency plans to rescue the hostages. ABC News even
chartered a plane to fly over the Sixth Fleet positioned off the Lebanese
coast. "Our plane was not intercepted and we plan to continue aggressive
news coverage," said an ABC director. Mr. Burch added that "there seems to
be more respect for next fall's scripts for 'Dynasty' and 'Dallas' than
there does for U.S. contingency plans."
The United States government continues to fumble around without any clear
policy response to terrorism. It is further hamstrung by inter-depart
mental bickering, hesitancy on the part of the military (burned badly in
the barracks explosion) and an emaciated intelligence operation. This was
explained in the June 20 article "A Clear Plan to Handle Terrorism Still
Eludes Divided Reagan Camp" in THE WALL STREET JOURNAL:
Ronald Reagan, for all his tough talk, has failed to develop a
coherent anti-terrorism policy•••• Administration officials say
they probably lost any chance for a quick rescue mission to free
the Flight 847 hostages after the first 48 hours. Such a move was
discussed but was ruled out because of technical problems. There
is a continuing debate within the administration, however, over
whether the U.S. should apply force if the crisis drags on••••
Administration officials agree that as long as saving hostage
lives is the top priority, the U.S. will have limited options in
handling terrorist incidents. A tougher policy would require the
U.S. to subordinate the welfare of the hostages to broader
national concerns--a painful step for any U.S. president••••
Quarrels within the administration have hindered development of a
coherent anti-terrorism strategy. The reaction to the October
1983 bombing of Marine headquarters in Beirut, for example, was�
case study in bickering and indecision. Shortly after the bomb
ing, U.S. intelligence identified a terrorist target in Lebanon's
Bekaa Valley. There was a top-level debate on Nov. 8, 1983, two
weeks after the bombing, about whether to attack the target. But
President Reagan was leaving that day on a trip to Korea, so
officials decided to postpone a decision until he returned a week
later.
When he got back, disagreements between the State Department and
the Pentagon over the operation continued, and the U.S. at the
last minute backed out of plans for a joint reprisal raid with
France. The French went ahead on their own on Nov. 17. There
never has been any American retaliation for the bomb that killed
241 American Marines•••.