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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORI', JUNE 7, 1985
PAGE 15
The "front line" in Europe is holding steady for the moment, Moscow having
failed last year to forestall the deployment of new NATO weapons. It is in
the area of the "periphery" where the challenge is the most intense--Asia,
Africa and Latin (specifically Central) America. The Soviet s nurture "na
tional liberation" movements in these regions, using Cuban and East Bloc
personnel to do the work for them. Where conditions of unrest are not yet
ripe enough for the "peace forces" to exploit, Soviet agents stir up strife
in order to plant the seeds of revolution, spreading lies through a delib
erate policy of "disinformation." The Soviets do not have to have sizeable
Communist parties in the target countries of the periphery. In fact, large
official Communist parties are often a detriment, drawing too much negative
attention. Much better to work through other forces of the Left, some of
whom are just naive.
Ever flexible, learning lessons from the past, the Soviet s have chosen a
"hard-to-detect, hard-to-criticize" path to power in target countries. In
the May 1985 issue of the British journal ENCOUNT ER, H.S. Ferns writes in
the article "This Spy Business":
The ruthless methods of Stalin in the promotion of Soviet-con
trolled revolution beyond the borders of the U SSR...have been
abandoned. Even strict and detailed control of Communist Parties
outside the reach of Soviet armed forces has been jettisoned, and
for one very.good reason. Such control does not work. China is a
convincing instance, and such a disaster for the Kremlin that
even the most hardened Stalinist cannot argue the utility, from
the Soviet point of view, of orthodox Marxist rigidity in the
promotion of revolution.
Flexibility has become the keyword in Soviet thinking.
The
"United Front" tactics of the 1930s involved clandestine domina
tion of the Left everywhere by Communist Parties loyal to Stalin
ism. Nowadays the slogan "No Enemies on the Left" means an ac
ceptance of, and collaboratfo"n w1th..•democra.t1c socialist s, re
volutionary nationalists, hippy bombsters and even romantic anar
chists.... The Soviet politicians••.take the long view--confi
dent that when circumstances are right they can do away with
their allies as Lenin did with his in 1918-23. Keeping the pot of
revolution boiling is� important than doctrinal orfn<Xioxy.�
Given this approach, it would be stupid to give the KGB the task
of destabilising enemy·regimes. If Mrs. Thatcher could prove in
an open Yorkshire court that [mine workers' union chief] Arthur
Scargill and his mates have links with the KGB, she would be home
and dry. But she cannot. What is important for the Soviet Gov
ernment, however, is to establish agents of influence_ in "bour
geios" governments, in the media, and ineducational1nst1 tu
t1.ons, who can by their advice and counsel keep a blind eye to
what goes on";""seaate and disorientate the patTerit,-and redu�iri="
terference�ith the destabilisation process.
The strategy and tactics employed by Communists more closely parallel the
methods used by Satan than in any other worldly system today. For a paral
lel as to Satan's opportunistic nature, notice I Peter 5:8: "Be sober,
be
vigilant; because your adversary the devil walks about like a roaring lion,
seeking whom he may devour" (RAV).