Basic HTML Version
-6-
Barry Goldwater termed the switch from Taipei to Peking "one of the most
cowardly acts ever performed by a President of the United States." He
vowed to sue Mr. Carter over the abrogation of the defense treaty. Even
some Senate liberals were dismayed that the President took the big leap
while Congress was in recess -- in full realization that earlier in the
year the Senate had passed a 94-0 resolution demanding advanced consulta
tion ·on the Taiwan defense treaty issue.
Reaction around the world, however, was generally positive, from U.S.
allies in Europe, to Japan, Singapore, Thailand, even South Korea. The
shock was not that it happened -- the U.S. had been seeking such a relation
ship ever since President Nixon's ice-breaker trip in 1972 -- but that the
final stage toward recognition moved so swiftly. Only in Israel was the
reaction basically negative, the mood there reflecting the feeling that
if the United States could so easily jettison a loyal ally; and an iron
clad defense treaty with it to boot, then how reliable were U.S. defense
commitments to Israel?
How did the on-again-off-again negotiations between Washington and Peking
come to a head so quickly? According to the December 25 issue of Time
magazine:
"On September 19, Carte.!:_ prodded the Chinese at hi� first formal meeting
with Ambassador Ch'ai /China's envoy in Washington/ at the White House
by again laying out his terms for normalization: -Peking must allow the
U.S. to keep its economic and cultural ties with the Nationalist 'Chinese
and agree, at least tacitly, not to reunite Taiwan with the mainland by
force. The Chinese began dropping strong hints that they were getting
ready to accept the U.S. terms. In late November, for instance, Teng told
� visiting Japanese delegation that diplomatic relations with Tokyo had
been restored 'in one second' and that relations with Washington could be
re3tored in 'two seconds.' In diplomacy, a second can be the equivalent
of a week, and, in fact, the final stage of the bargaining took only two
weeks."
Teng also started saying, apparently for American consumption, that Peking
was willing to be very patient over the Taiwan issue, even if it would
take a generation or two or more to reach an amicable solution. In the
meantime, the Peking leadership, he stressed, was not against Taiwan
retaining its economic and social system. "China has no intention of
bringing down Taiwan's living standards," said Teng on one occasion.
In an attempt to keep face, China refused to place such peaceful inten
tions in writing in the joint communique, lest it appear that a foreign
power (the U.S.) were dictating the terms of what China considers an
"internal dispute." China did not like, but agreed not to contest, either
the one-year retention of the U.S.-Taiwan defense treaty or the U.S. posi
tion that it could continue to sell Taiwan defensive military equipment
even after January 1, 1980.
Washington felt that for the short-term at least, perhaps till the end of
the century, heavily-armed Taiwan faced no immediate threat for three
reasons: 1.) Mainland China lacks the offensive capacity to overrun the
island fortress 120 miles across the Taiwan Straight in what would surely
be a terribly costly assault anyway; 2.) China is tied down facing the
Soviets along their long mutual border, and 3.) With Peking's new break
out to Japan, the U.S. and the rest of the West, and her determination to
modernize swiftly, a bloody showdown with Taiwan, and resulting possible
estrangement from her new allies, was out of the question.